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Supervisor:  Stephen D. Reese 
This dissertation uses a media sociology approach to untangle how multiple 
influences shaped journalistic coverage of two waves of protests in Brazil. In 2013, small 
demonstrations against bus fares evolved into a series of large protests expressing 
generalized dissatisfaction with conditions in the country. Following the reelection of 
center-leftist Dilma Rousseff, another wave of protests returned in 2015, this time with a 
clear agenda: the removal of the President.  
Communication research has long examined the “protest paradigm,” a pattern of 
news coverage that delegitimizes social movements. The Brazilian context provided a 
chance to assess the extent to which the paradigm holds when protests take on an elite-
driven narrative contesting a government in crisis.  
This project uses a quantitatively-driven mixed methods approach to provide a 
holistic understanding of how journalists went about covering the demonstrations. First,  
content analysis presents an overview of how coverage evolved over time. Then, a survey 
of journalists reveals their newsgathering routines and political attitudes. Finally, 23 
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journalists were selected for a matched data analysis linking survey data to the content 
they produced.  
Results reveal that when grievances evolved into coherent anti-government 
demands, official sources from opposition parties served to legitimize the movement, 
even when journalists themselves viewed protestors with skepticism. In fact, findings 
suggest that the more journalists supported demonstrations, the less favorably they 
covered them. This holds true even when controlling for their outlet’s editorial line, as 
measured by journalists’ own perception of their employers. Through in-depth 
interviews, journalists described how they continually self-assessed and corrected for 
bias, citing professional norms as the basis for critical coverage of protests they 
personally supported.  
This study departs from an understanding of protest coverage as paradigmatic 
towards a more complex view of the relationship between protestors and the press. The 
analysis helps elucidate the conditions under which the protest paradigm fails and how 
favorable coverage can occur. The experience of Brazil shows that when an elite 
opposition supports protests, journalistic norms and routines validate demonstrations, 
regardless of journalists’ own attitudes.
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Chapter 1: A country in crisis 
In the decades since the military relinquished control of the government in 1985, 
Brazil has been a politically stable democracy, with seven successful transitions of 
presidential power. In 2009, the country was among the first ones to recover from the 
global economic shutdown. Growth has been matched by a decline in poverty indicators, 
with income redistribution being the trademark of the last decade of leftist governments 
in the country. In 2014, Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup and in 2016 Rio de Janeiro is 
hosting South America’s first-ever Olympic games. But on the eve of the Olympics, the 
country faces a deep economic recession, an unprecedented corruption scandal, declining 
GDP per capita, and a political crisis likely to culminate in the impeachment of President 
Dilma Rousseff. 
 The history of this crisis started in the summer of 2013. A year before the FIFA 
World Cup, the world watched perplexed as thousands of Brazilians took to the streets in 
response to police repression of a small protest in São Paulo against a 20-cent increase in 
public transportation fares. While the unrest had its origins in demands of the lower class, 
it grew exponentially in scope. Protestors asked for political reform and anti-corruption 
measures, and criticized the exorbitant expenditures on infrastructure for the World Cup, 
as well as the lack of access to public spaces controlled by FIFA during the tournament 
(Romero & Neuman, 2013). Journalists also became targets of repression: according to 
the Brazilian Association for Investigative Journalism, more than 50 reporters were 
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assaulted and several were arrested by the police during the first month of protests. The 
second week of demonstrations was marked by large support from the population, less 
police repression, and more favorable media coverage (Moretzsohn, 2013). During this 
stage, conservative sectors started joining the movement and widening the scope of 
grievances against the government.   
From an organizational perspective, the 2013 protests were largely coordinated 
online, with MPL initially directing collective action through social media. After the first 
week, MPL quit its protagonist role and the movement gained the characteristics of 
“crowd-enabled connective action.” This form of protest does not depend on the role of 
any organizational actor; engaging in contentious politics becomes an act of personal 
expression, without the requirement of a shared common identity (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012, 2013). Beyond communication, digital media played an organizing and mobilizing 
role in connective action. Social media, thus, work as place where crowds work together 
to shape mobilization, allocate resources, and adapt the movement to their own personal 
meaning. 
After the reelection of President Rousseff in 2014, a second wave of anti-
government protests erupted in the country. Organized by a right-leaning group called 
Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL), the 2015 protests were a response to several years of 
economic recession and the biggest corruption scandal in history unveiled by a federal 
police operation called “Operation Car Wash” (Watts, 2015). During the demonstrations, 
MBL emerged as a semi-formal organization moderating collective action mainly though 
Facebook. Those protests had a diverse set of demands, from moderate ones such as 
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tougher anti-corruption investigations, to radical solutions like a military coup d’état  
following the impeachment of the elected President. By March, 2015, MBL and its allies 
brought more than 1 million people to the streets asking for the removal of the President. 
A year later, Rousseff’s impeachment proceedings were approved by the Senate and she 
was removed from power.  
STUDY PURPOSES 
This dissertation examined how journalists navigated this political turmoil to 
cover the demonstrations in Brazil. The goal was to analyze the various influences 
shaping journalistic work and how patterns of protest coverage manifested in the 
country’s press during the two demonstrations. Little is known about the way the 
Brazilian press portrayed the movements and how journalists perceived the 
demonstrations as they unfolded. Furthermore, very few studies, if any, have addressed 
the role of social media as a tool for reporting protests, which are now largely organized 
online. This project aimed to fill this gap, focusing on frame building, that is, the process 
of creation of frames by journalists (D’Angelo, 2011; Scheufele, 1999). Thus, this 
research project had three main purposes: (a) to analyze the way journalists framed the 
2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil; (b) to investigate the different levels of influences on 
journalists’ work; and (c) to assess the impact of social media for the work of journalists 
covering the protests.  
The first goal of this dissertation refers to content produced by journalists 
covering the protests in 2013 and 2015. Several studies have investigated media portrayal 
of protestors and found that news has traditionally presented mobilizations in a very 
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negative way. Stories emphasize violence and deviant behavior, and ignore the demands 
and grievances of protestors. Scholars call this pattern of coverage the “protest paradigm” 
(Boyle, McLeod, & Armstrong, 2012; Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). In this 
research, I was interested in the way Brazilian journalists adhered to the protest paradigm 
as protests grew in scope and demands shifted. Through a sociological approach rooted in 
the work of Benford and Snow (2000) on movement-specific and generic frames, this 
project linked media content to the evolution on protest frames behind the movements. 
Movement-specific frames are particular to an issue and only pertinent to particular 
protests, while generic frames go beyond specific events and themes and can be used by 
different social movement organizations over time and in different contexts (Benford & 
Snow, 2000; De Vreese, 2012). In this project, I analyzed how the evolution from 
movement-specific demands (bus fare rates) to generic frames (e.g. rights, political 
reform) affected journalistic coverage.  
The second purpose of this project was to assess the influences on journalists’ 
work following the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The 
hierarchical model uses concentric circles as a visual depiction of multiple influences on 
media content, taking into account micro, meso and macro influences. Through the 
results of a survey and in-depth interviews with Brazilian journalists, this research 
uncovered the different inputs and constraints on the way reporters perceive and go about 
covering contentious politics in the country.  
Finally, the relationship between reporting and social media was at the center of 
the third purpose of this project. Guided by the theory of normalization, the goal was to 
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investigate how social media served as an input for journalists covering protests, and how 
online discourse influenced the process of news production during demonstrations. 
Results from survey and in-depth interviews provided information on the way social 
media conversations were incorporated into reporting routines.  
This project addressed its three purposes though a quantitatively-driven multi-
method approach. First, a content analysis of news stories published by the four main 
newspapers in the country assessed how coverage evolved as the protests unfolded. Then, 
a survey of Brazilian journalists tapped into reporting routines and attitudes towards the 
movement. Finally, survey data from 23 selected journalists was matched with the 
content they produced in a model that simultaneously tests how variables from all levels 
of the hierarchical model predict actual content.  
Findings are particularly relevant given the recent increase of similar types of 
protests in developing countries including Venezuela, Egypt and Mexico. As US politics 
and media become more polarized, the insights from this research may also shed light on 
the way certain media organizations (e.g. Fox News, MSNBC) cover anti-government 
protests that are supported by elite groups (e.g. Tea Party).  
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
This project used the hierarchical model of influences to analyze how multiple 
inputs affected news coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil. The literature on 
the protest paradigm stems from studies in the United States and Europe, which found 
that negative patterns of protest news coverage arise from news routines favoring official 
viewpoints, conflict and spectacle. Brazil offers a unique opportunity in that North 
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American media norms and technological advancements are combined with a more 
dynamic political system, currently headed by a center-leftist political party. The 
Brazilian case is also different than the United States because coalitions and political 
parties are less stable; alliances shift between election cycles and new smaller parties 
emerge and disappear every few years. Political elites’ support of a social movements has 
less to do with ideological affinities with demands, and more to do with how they align 
with the government under attack. This context provided a chance to examine the extent 
to which media routines supporting the protest paradigm respond to political uncertainty, 
including elite-supported protests.  
My argument is that protests are covered more favorably if their frames are 
aligned with the preferences of anti-government elites, who subsidize information to 
journalists. Rather than understanding protest coverage as paradigmatic, this project 
assessed under which conditions negative coverage appears, and under which conditions 
demonstrations were covered more favorably.  
The 2013 and the 2015 protests are ripe for this analysis, as frames evolved from 
grievances of the lower class to those of the upper-middle class. Findings help elucidate 
not only how journalists cover street demonstrations, but how coverage responds in the 
face of a changing narrative negotiated by its supporters on social media. Through a 
media sociology approach, this analysis helps explain when more favorable media 
coverage happened, how media professionals perceived different types of protests and 
how those perceptions were reflected in the news.  
This research was contextually rooted in the evolution of master frames guiding 
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the protests in 2013 and 2015, accounting for weekly changes in the coverage. The 
quantitative approach treated variables from the levels of influence as stable and 
independent, but it is important to recognize that the relationship between media and 
protestor discourses is dynamic and complex. For this project, I treated news coverage as 
the outcome of the analysis, but with an understanding that this method was limited as 
media frames were not simply influenced by protest frames without in turn affecting the 
movement’s discourse.  
FROM 20 CENTS TO IMPEACHMENT 
The protests in 2013 and 2015 provided an ideal opportunity to compare how the 
same media organizations covered street demonstrations related to different sets of 
grievances and demands, and how coverage changed as the frames guiding the protests 
evolved. Here, it is important to make a distinction between media frames, the dependent 
variable of this dissertation, and collective action frames as the “action-oriented sets of 
beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimize the activities and campaigns of a social 
movement organization” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.164).When a collective action frame 
is abstract and flexible enough to be shared among many different social movement 
organizations, it starts operating as a master frame (Benford & Snow, 2000; Mooney & 
Hunt, 1996; Swart, 1995; Tarrow, 1994). The master frames guiding the protests in 2013 
and 2015 protests serve as the context in which media frames were negotiated.  
The label “master frame,” coined by Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 
(1986), refers to the function performed by collective action frames that orient the 
activities of multiple social movement organizations (Snow et al., 1986). According to 
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the authors, a master frame occurs when numerous movements share aspects of their 
collective action frames. In that sense, a master frame is not a concept in itself, but a 
stage that can be achieved by certain collective action frames when they are flexible, 
transferable and resonant. Only a few collective action frames are broad enough to be 
considered master frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), including “rights frames” that were 
used by civil rights (Valocchi, 1996), women’s rights (Freeman, 1975), and gay rights 
movements (Valocchi, 2005), and emerged as the guiding frame after the second week of 
the 2013 protests in Brazil.   
In Brazil, the  “rights” master frame elevated demonstrations from a small group 
of radical protestors asking for affordable bus fare rates to a massive wave of 
demonstrations that represented society’s general dissatisfaction with the government on 
the eve of the World Cup. Initial protests were not completely spontaneous, but a result 
of years of mobilization from Movimento Passe Livre (MPL). The violent police response 
to MPL’s small demonstrations was the catalyst that ignited mass popular revolt (Moraes 
& Santos, 2013; Moreira & Lima Santiago, 2013). Over the course of two weeks, the  
“rights” master frame was adopted and grievances expanded to encompass, among 
others, World Cup expenditures, human rights abuse, and rampant corruption. Steering 
away from the bus fare issue, protestors chanted “it’s not about 20 cents, it’s about 
rights.” Gradually, sectors of the middle-class joined the movement and by the end of 
June more than 1.4 million people had marched the streets of 120 cities in the country. 
This process is known as a “cycle of contention” (Tarrow, 1994). Cycles of contention 
are characterized by a phase of intense conflict, followed by rapid diffusion of collective 
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action frames from more mobilized (MPL and its original supporters) to less mobilized 
sectors (middle class), which in turn leads to the creation of new and transformed frames 
(“not about 20 cents, about rights”). For Tarrow (1994), protest increases when 
institutional access opens, rifts between elites appear, allies become available and state 
repression generates outrage, which is often followed by a decline in state’s capacity to 
repress the movement. Cycles of contention subside when there is exhaustion in the 
collective action frames and institutionalization of demands, which become coopted by 
elites (Coy, 2013).  
At the end of 2014, President Dilma Rousseff was reelected with 51 percent of the 
votes, and a new cycle of protests erupted in the following year. This time, protests were 
led by four organized conservative groups: Movimento Brasil Livre  (MBL), Revoltados 
Online, Movimento Vem pra Rua e Movimento Endireita Brasil. Protestors had a clear 
antigovernment agenda against President Rousseff’s Workers’ Party. As opposed to 
Movimento Passe Livre in 2013, this movement was elite-driven and did not clash with 
the police. Demands ranged from tougher anti-corruption laws to the impeachment of the 
newly-elected President. Radical dissidents also asked for a military intervention to put 
an end to the Party’s government (Gonzatto, 2015). Four months later, MBL, Revoltados 
Online and Vem Pra Rua organized a march that brought about 800,000 people to the 
streets. This time, politicians from the opposition party (Partido Social Democrata 
Brasileiro - PSDB), including the runner-up from the 2014 race, were acclaimed by the 
crowd (UOL, 2015 ⁠). Pro-impeachment protests gained strength after the federal police 
investigation from “Operation Car Wash” unveiled a $5.3 billion corruption scheme 
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involving the state-run oil firm Petrobras (Beauchamp, 2016). At the end of April, 
congress voted for the impeachment of the President. In the following month, President 
Rousseff was removed from power by the Senate, marking the beginning of the 
impeachment process. 
ORGANIZATION 
This dissertation uses a multi method approach to address its purposes: (a) to 
analyze the way journalists framed the 2013 and 2015 protests in Brazil; (b) to investigate 
the different levels of influences on journalists’ work; and (c) to assess the impact of 
social media for the work of journalists covering the protests.  
Chapter 2 provides the contextual background for this project, with an overview 
of the country’s media system, its journalism tradition and how protests have been 
covered in the past. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundations of this study: media 
sociology’s hierarchical model and the protest paradigm. Because social media was used 
as an organizing force during both demonstrations, this chapter also reviews the incipient 
literature on new media and protests, and how these platforms have been used by 
journalists in their reporting. In this project, I move from the analysis of social media as a 
organizing platform for protestors and towards its understanding as an input for 
journalistic coverage.  
Chapter 4 provides the methodological overview of this project, detailing the 
quantitatively-driven multi-method approach that combines content analysis and survey 
data. Then, results chapters are organized following the three purposes of the project. 
Chapter 5, titled “The Coverage,” brings the results of a content analysis of stories 
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published by four mainstream newspapers in the country. On chapter 6, “The Journalist,”  
results from a survey of Brazilian journalists analyze their attitudes towards the protests 
and how they went about reporting the demonstrations, including their use of social 
media for reporting. Then, Chapter 7 links these two elements via content analysis of 
stories produced by 23 journalists selected from the sample that answered the survey. 
This final step allows for the simultaneous testing of influences from all levels into actual 
content, the final dependent variable in this project.  
Throughout chapters 5, 6 and 7, insights from journalists’ responses to open-
ended questions and semi-structured interviews provide context to the quantitative 




Chapter 2: The protest and its context 
Because this dissertation focuses on journalists embedded in a very particular 
context, this chapter provides an overview of the Brazilian media system and its 
development after the decline of the military regime following the typology developed by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) and the concept of hybridity applied to journalism (García 
Canclini, 1997; Kraidy, 2002; Straubhaar, 2007). This section also provides a brief 
historical overview of how the press covered the most recent waves of massive urban 
protests in the country: the 1984 political opening demonstrations (“Diretas Já!”) and the 
impeachment of President Collor in 1992 (“Fora Collor!”). This overview is particularly 
relevant because these two cases were the only example of news coverage of 
demonstrations after the end of official censorship, and because the 2013 and 2015 
protestors often evoked historical narratives from 1984 and 1992. 
THE BRAZILIAN MEDIA SYSTEM 
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004) a country’s media system and its related 
degree of independence emerges in ways determined by its political culture and political 
system. Through a comparative analysis of the media systems in European and North 
American countries, the authors have found four dimensions in which media systems 
differ: structure of markets, political parallelism, degree of professionalism and the role 
of the state. Three models of press systems emerge from the combination of these four 
dimensions: democrat corporatist, polarized pluralist, and liberal model. A high 
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circulation press, early press development, strong professional associations, and some 
degree of official regulation and state intervention to promote pluralism characterize the 
democrat corporatist model from North and central Europe. The liberal model, 
characteristic of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, has a high circulation 
press, information-oriented internal pluralism, high levels of professionalism and market-
oriented outlets. On the polarized pluralist model, professional culture is weak, 
circulation press is low and aimed at elites, there is a high political parallelism and 
instrumentalization of the media by political actors. Journalists are expected to provide 
commentary and media owners are also political leaders, often starting outlets for 
political purposes. The polarized pluralist model is predominant in Southern Europe.   
While the models proposed by Hallin and Mancini are undoubtedly a useful 
analytical toolkit for comparative analyses of media systems, Alburquerque (2012) and 
Voltmer (2012) point out that broad attempts to apply them beyond the homogeneous set 
of Western countries analyzed risks converting the polarized pluralist model into a “catch 
all” concept ignoring important aspects that do not fit into the categories. Rather than 
treating the models as “ideal types,” Voltmer (2012) argues that most countries have a 
hybrid form of the categories proposed by Hallin and Mancini. Just as democratization 
did not lead to homogeneous forms of governments, the media systems that emerged after 
authoritarian rule do not fit easily into the models that were generated to explain media 
systems in developed democracies. 
 In an analysis applying the typology to Brazilian media, Albuquerque (2012) 
found that the political parallelism found in the polarized pluralist model does not 
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completely work in the country because of the reduced role of political parties, especially 
prior to 2010. With more than 35 parties currently existing in Brazil, their role is very 
limited if compared to the United States. However, during the 12 years of leftist 
government in the Presidency, political polarization has deepened, especially after the 
2014 elections. Following a tight race, Workers’ Party (PT) Dilma Rousseff was 
reelected with 51.6 percent of the votes, the slimmest in Brazilian electoral history. The 
runner-up, Aécio Neves, from Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), was the 
winner in most of the richer south and southeast regions, including São Paulo. The 2015 
protests were marked by anti-PT sentiment and Aécio Neves and other PSDB politicians 
were championed by the protestors. Between these two parties, Brazilian Democratic 
Movement’s Party (PMDB) recently left PT’s coalition and is currently leading the 
impeachment process alongside PSDB. Scholars have yet to assess how emerging 
polarization influences the degree of political parallelism in the country.  
In tandem with the polarized pluralist model, Albuquerque (2012) notes that none 
of the factors that originated the U.S. professional tradition of journalism existed in South 
America: newspapers were economically dependent on the state and military regimes 
suppressed freedom of speech (Azevedo, 2006; Mattos, 2002; Straubhaar, 1989). Most 
studies about the development of mass media in Brazil have identified the government as 
one of the main economic forces behind the growth of the media by giving economic and 
technical incentives (Mattos, 2002) and providing the necessary infrastructure for 
broadcast expansion (Straubhaar, 1989). After independence from Portugal in 1822, the 
burgeoning press in the region was characterized by opinion, following the French model 
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of political activist press. At the end of World War II, the press gradually started adopting 
the US model of professionalism, a process that was intensified with economic 
liberalization of the media in the late 1980s. But different from the polarized pluralist 
model, media organizations were private from their inception, and the leading 
corporations have adopted a “catch all” attitude regarding their markets, avoiding explicit 
partisan coverage. In sum, the press in the country was no longer partisan per se, but low 
circulation levels made it depended on government for economic viability. Unable to 
thrive based solely on private advertising, newspapers depend on government 
investments, state advertising and bribes. During privatization, certain groups associated 
with political elites gained advantage in the process, with many affiliates being owned by 
politicians themselves (Albuquerque, 2012; Waisbord, 2000).   
The development of Brazilian journalism after the 1980s was shaped by two 
parallel forces: local politics and globalization (Fox & Waisbord, 2002). With 
liberalization and privatization of media markets, some old political alliances were 
weakened, while new ones were formed. Lima (2006) argues that economic uncertainty 
forced family-based companies to professionalize, moving further away from explicit 
partisan coverage. Others content that Brazilian media companies still reflect oligarchic 
configurations, with patronage practices still predominant in newsrooms (Kucinski, 
1998). Similarly, Waisbord (2000) explains that national and local politics mediate 
globalization processes through accommodation and the politics of mutual benefits.  
Currently, Brazil’s media markets are dominated by a few conglomerates that 
have benefited from the politics of quid-pro-quo privatizations; that is, access to the 
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media apparatus via allocation of television affiliates and official advertising in exchange 
for political support. Allocation of official advertising also work as a system of punishing 
or rewarding media organizations (Waisbord, 2000). 	
 Mainstream media are owned by a limited number of powerful families and 
oligopolies, most notably the Marinhos, the Civitas, the Mesquitas, and the Frias. The 
Marinho family owns Grupo Globo, a mega-conglomerate that includes TV Globo, the 
newspapers O Globo, Extra, and Valor Econômico, two radio stations, Época magazine, 
and one web portal. The Civitas own Editora Abril, which publishes several magazines, 
including Veja, the leading weekly publication in the country. The Mesquitas own O 
Estado de São Paulo. Folha de São Paulo is owned by the Frias family, which also 
control the web portal Uol, and other smaller newspapers (Matos, 2008).  
The government controls the airwaves and the Brazilian Ministry of 
Communications awards broadcast licenses to companies or individuals. Radio and TV 
stations are frequently awarded to politicians or religious groups. Although the country’s 
legislation forbids senators or congress members to own television or radio affiliates, a 
report from 2008 revealed that 20 senators, 103 congressmen, and 147 mayors were 
directors, owners or stakeholders of media companies. Several other politicians have 
relatives associated with radio and television affiliates (Matos, 2008). 
While in the United States the development of broadcast communications led to 
the hegemony of the “big three” (NBC, ABC and CBS), in Brazil, the development of the 
medium led to the dominance of TV Globo. TV Globo is the only network in the world to 
maintain hegemonic media dominance in a large democratic society (Kucinski, 1998). 
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After 1985, other networks started trying to break into television markets. Rede Record, a 
network owned by the protestant church Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, is currently 
the biggest competitor to TV Globo’s leadership. Currently, Globo owns 128 radio 
stations, 122 TV affiliates, 17 cable news channels, several newspapers, magazines and 
the biggest online portal in the country (G1).  
More recently, the country has gone through a rapid technological transformation, 
with widespread social media adoption. The digital turn has also been promising to 
Brazilian news organizations: in 2013, 22 percent of online users reported having paid for 
online news content (Newman & Levy, 2014). The first ones to experiment with online 
news were the mainstream Brazilian newspapers in the late 1990s. In 1995, Jornal do 
Brasil was the first newspaper in the country to publish a full online edition. The first real 
time news portal - called “Brasil Online” - debuted in 1996 by internet provider Universo 
Online (UOL). A few years later, Brasil Online changed its name to Folha Online, 
publishing content from the largest newspaper in the country, Folha de São Paulo. 
Meanwhile, regional newspapers like Zero Hora published online on a weekly basis 
(Barbosa, 2016). In the following years, magazines, radio and television organizations 
also launched their online ventures. By the early 2000s, the first digital native news 
organizations, Terra and IG, consolidated their “portal journalism” characterized by 
multimedia content, aggregation and minute-by-minute breaking news. The two main 
television conglomerates in the country, Globo and Record also released their own 
portals as a place of convergence for their news and entertainment content. In 2012, 
Folha de São Paulo launched a paywall for online content, followed by Zero Hora. Also 
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in 2012, 90 percent of Brazil’s main newspapers abandoned Google News, arguing that 
the indexing platform works like a home page and competes directly with their own news 
sites (Barbosa, 2016).  
To recap, using Hallin and Mancini (2004) typology, the Brazilian press is 
characterized by some elements of the polarized pluralist model, most notably low 
circulation press aimed at elites and economic dependency on the state. However, rather 
than high levels of political parallelism, in a country with a high number of political 
parties, media organizations adopted a “catch all” attitude. Instead of the opinion-based 
model found in the Mediterranean, the press in Brazil after the 1950s operates in a more 
business-oriented scheme (Waisbord, 2000; Albuquerque & Silva, 2009). Furthermore, 
rather than having a partisan professional culture that characterizes the press in the 
polarized professional model, Brazilian journalists have defined their identity with 
reference to the American model, although they have reinterpreted concepts like 
objectivity and neutrality, as described in the section below (Albuquerque, 2012, p.73).  
THE BRAZILIAN JOURNALIST 
This adoption of North-American professionalism was not a unidimensional 
imposition of foreign norms, but instead was characterized by hybridization, with 
journalists and corporations selectively adapting some routines, while ignoring others. 
Hybridization is the blending of the desired modernity with traditions that elites and 
masses maintain (García Canclini, 1997). In the context of modern globalization, 
Straubhaar (2007) argues that “as these [global] forces enter a new country or cultural 
space, they hybridize, interacting with previous forces and becoming localized, enacted, 
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and received by local people with their own identities, histories, and agendas” (p.3). For 
Kraidy (2002), hybridity is a space where communication practices are negotiated 
through interactions of differential power. Currently, Brazil’s hybrid approach champions 
the adoption of fact-based reporting (objectivity) and balance of sources, but rejects the 
idea that journalism should be impartial. Instead, editors and reporters argue that 
journalistic coverage should take “sides with the facts” (Waisbord, 2000). For news 
organizations, modernization meant to adapt to competitive markets, but maintaining 
political alliances (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009).  
The adoption of US norms of professionalism also solved a practical problem: 
most of older literary journalists lacked the skills of producing news as a technical 
product, and publishers in the 1960s resorted to communist journalists who provided 
professional and disciplined labor. According to Albuquerque and Silva (2009), “the 
rhetoric and practices of the American model of independent journalism provided the 
basis for conservative publishers and communist journalists to strike a bargain” (p. 377). 
In 1969, the military regime passed the Decree Law 972 establishing that journalists in 
the country must have an undergraduate degree to be allowed to work. Some scholars 
contend that the Decree aimed to undermine the role of leftist political organizations in 
newsrooms by replacing them with journalists from an upper socioeconomic status who 
had access to college education (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009). With the increase in 
journalism schools across the nation, emphasis was placed in technical training. This did 
not, however, lead to the desired result: at universities, students were exposed not only to 
Marxist ideas, but also to the American principles of Journalism that were rooted in the 
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notion of freedom of expression, which was severely limited by the military government. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled for the end of the diploma requirement for journalists. 
Throughout this process, ideals like objectivity and fact-based reporting norms helped 
professional journalists navigate the dichotomy between their own political leaning and 
that of their employers. 
The Brazilian journalist’s relationship with objectivity and impartiality has 
traditionally been conflicting and cynical. Some scholars argue that Brazilian 
professional reporters view objectivity as an in an ideal that is more about free markets 
than ideas (“liberdade de imprensa é, na verdade, liberdade de empresa” [freedom of the 
press is, in fact, freedom for business]), but also used the concept to gain autonomy in the 
newsrooms (Albuquerque & Silva, 2009; Waisbord, 2000). For Waisbord (2000), 
reporters in Latin America do not follow the orthodoxy of U.S. journalism, preferring to 
focus on consequences rather than methods of reporting in a utilitarian perspective that 
emphasizes anonymity and overlooks the motives behind sources. This hybrid approach 
champions the adoption of balance of sources, but rejects impartiality with stories often 
openly supporting one side (Waisbord, 2000).  
For the Brazilian journalist, Albuquerque and Silva (2009) explain that North-
American journalistic norms and routines, especially objectivity, are often invoked to 
reaffirm journalism’s ability to prevent bias. This is not unique to Brazil: In the United 
States, Reese (1990) found that reassertion of journalistic norms has been used to repair 
occupational paradigms in the case of Kent McDougall’s revelation that he was a 
socialist while working for The Wall Street Journal. Findings from this study suggest that 
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values and news making routines were mentioned in seeking to reinforce that the news is 
unbiased, even when a journalist openly says he is not (Reese, 1990). In Brazil, Kucinsky 
(1998) argues that it is self-censorship that prevents leftist journalists to produce material 
that is contrary to their outlet’s conservative positions. According to the author, 
journalists actively hide information from their audiences in an effort to survive in media 
markets dominated by conservative families.  
 In addition, authoritarian legislation, economic pressures, violence against 
journalists, and absence of legal mechanisms to access official records limit journalism 
practice in the region. As a result, stories are dependent on elites’ willingness to wage 
battles in the media ring, with the bulk of reporting being based on accounts from official 
powerful sources, with limited space for fact-checking and data reporting (Fox & 
Waisbord, 2002; Sinclair & Straubhaar, 2013; Waisbord, 2000). Reliance on official 
sources is not exclusive to the Latin American case, but in the United States, the 
dominance of institutionally positioned sources comes from news routines aiming to 
reduce reporting costs by constantly seeking officials who subsidize information. This 
beat system of newsgathering fosters a symbiotic relationship between reporters and their 
institutional sources (Bennett, 1990; Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; Lawrence, 
1996, 2012). In Brazil, the symbiotic relationship between press and government is not so 
symmetrical: economically, journalists face governments pulling official advertising; 
from a legal standpoint, libel laws severely limit freedom of speech; and from a personal 
standpoint, physical violence against journalists is an ever-present threat.  
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Because various forms of libel and defamation remain criminalized, the threat of 
lawsuits leads to self-censorship for journalists who lack the resources to face legal 
processes. Politicians and business people have also used the law to preemptively block 
the publication of certain information. According to Freedom House, this constitutes as a 
form of “judicial censorship,” with courts barring media outlets from publishing 
information or demanding removal of material from news articles. Journalists are often 
subject to threat and physical violence, especially those covering the link between 
political corruption and organized crime. In 2014, three journalists were killed because of 
their work covering corruption and protests (Freedom House, 2015).  
The last times Brazilian reporters covered massive urban protests was in 1992, 
during the “Fora, Collor!” movement asking for the impeachment of President Collor 
and in 1984, during “Diretas Já!,” asking for end of the military regime. The following 
section reviews the literature on the way the press portrayed these two demonstrations.  
COVERING PROTESTS IN BRAZIL 
This dissertation focuses on the way Brazilian journalists covered protests, but in 
order to proceed with this analysis, it is important to overview the literature on “Diretas 
Já!” and “Fora Collor!.” Because they are so rooted in popular imaginary, the 2013 and 
2015 protests often evoked their symbols and discourses, from the yellow and green 
“painted faces” to the 2015 logo “Fora Dilma!.” 
1984 - Diretas Já! 
The 1984 popular movement Diretas Já! (Direct Elections Now!) marked a 
decisive moment in Brazilian democratic history and its relationship with the media. 
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Although the coverage of the protests is often remembered as a prime example of media 
manipulation against protestors, studies reveal a much more heterogeneous coverage 
throughout outlets in the country (Matos, 2008; Straubhaar, 1989). After two decades of 
military control, “Diretas Já!” was a civil movement that demanded direct elections for 
President in 1984. Although the protests were unsuccessful – the law for direct elections 
was rejected due to a lack of quorum – they served as a catalyst to the end of the 
authoritarian regime (Matos, 2008).  
The first mainstream newspaper to support the movement and openly criticize the 
military regime was Folha de São Paulo. The newspapers Estado de São Paulo and O 
Globo, as well as magazines Veja and IstoÉ more discretely supported the protests, 
mainly in order to cut ties with the vanishing military regime (Matos, 2008). According 
to Matos (2008), Folha de São Paulo saw the civil unrest as an opportunity to capitalize 
journalistically by reinforcing its role as the leading news organization behind the 
protests, marking the peak of the paper’s militant journalism. Through a textual analysis 
of 871 stories about the campaign printed by Folha, O Globo, O Estado de São Paulo, 
Veja, Isto É and Jornal do Brasil, the author found that, overall, print media coverage 
endorsed democratic reform. In particular, the coverage of the protests helped Folha 
establish its news identity and boost circulation numbers. Discourses that supported a 
gradual and moderate democratic transition, as proposed by the military government, 
were predominant in the press (Matos, 2008).  
Accused by journalists and academics of downplaying the political importance of 
the protests (Abreu, 2002; Bucci, 2000; Conti, 1999), TV Globo’s coverage remains an 
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important moment for political communication scholars interested in Brazilian television. 
Local affiliates covered the protests in the capitals, but stories were ignored during the 
network’s main nightly newscast and absolute audience leader at its time slot. Globo’s 
infamous coverage of the protests often serves as the exemplar of the media’s efforts to 
omit or downplay social movements in the country (Bucci, 1996; Conti, 1999; Lima, 
2005; Mattos, 2005; Miguel, 2002; Straubhaar, 1989). The network’s decision to 
broadcast a 2-minute story on Praça da Sé’s protests while emphasizing the festivities for 
the city of São Paulo’s anniversary led to accusations that the network was not only 
ignoring the national rallies, but also distorting the motives behind the protests (Conti, 
1999; Straubhaar, 1989).  
Two months later, the network abruptly shifted its editorial line and offered in-
depth national coverage for the protests in Rio de Janeiro (Lima, 2005). Straubhaar 
(1989) explains that when the elites fragmented and major events pointed to the advent of 
a civilian rule, Rede Globo followed its own economic interests and changed the 
coverage from omission or negative portrayal to support of a moderate military-civilian 
elite. All media outlets connected to Organizações Globo started covering the movement 
after the television network changed its position (Miguel, 2001). 
Though the “Diretas Já!” movement did not achieve its goal of direct elections, it 
did mark the beginning of the end for the military regime. Moderate leader Tancredo 
Neves was elected by the Electoral College and guaranteed that the military would not 
only maintain its elite status, but also not be investigated for its crimes (Miguel, 2001). 
Neves died before his inauguration and left the presidency to vice-president José Sarney. 
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Direct elections came four years later in 1989, when Brazil elected Fernando Collor. In 
1992, the masses went to the streets once again, this time to ask for Collor’s 
impeachment.   
1992 - Fora Collor! 
 The coverage of President Collor’s crisis marked a watershed for Brazilian 
media. Following a series of stories on corruption and electoral fraud, student unions 
went to the streets to demand for Collor’s resignation. According to Azevedo (2006), the 
media not only covered the collective actions, but also mobilized public opinion and 
essentially served as a watchdog of the political system. Matos (2008) considers the 
coverage of the impeachment as the national media’s attempt to affirm their political 
independence and establish their watchdog function. 
By 1990, Folha de São Paulo and O Estado de São Paulo began printing a series 
of stories on corruption and electoral fraud during Collor’s first months in the 
government. Six months later, Isto É magazine published an investigative piece on 
Collor’s treasury secretary.  Kucinski (1998) compares the coverage of the corruption 
scandals during Collor’s government to Watergate in the United States. For the author, it 
was the media, more precisely the magazines Veja and Isto É, that led the public 
campaign culminating in the impeachment of the President. As the anti-Collor movement 
grew, student protests contributed to pressure more reluctant elites, thus becoming a 
turning point in Collor’s fate (Conti, 1999). By the end of the impeachment process, the 
main newspapers in the country enthusiastically celebrated the movement (Conti, 1999; 
Matos, 2008). It is important to note that, with the exception of Folha de São Paulo and 
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the weekly magazines, most print and television outlets started only started covering the 
protests when certain that the Congress would vote for impeachment (Kucinski, 1998). 
Despite the differences in the nature, the media portrayal of the 1984 and the 1992 
protests share some commonalities. In both instances, even outlets associated with 
conservative sectors eventually shifted their coverage when they realized political 
changes were inevitable. Led by the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, outlets gradually 
transitioned to support the end of the military regime and the impeachment of Collor. For 
these movements, media coverage of protests progressed from omission to partial 
coverage, and to militant journalism at the end of the cycle of contention.  
Overall, these findings suggest that the media provided a heterogeneous coverage 
of mass urban protests, with newspapers gradually changing the coverage as movements 
gained force. These studies did not, however, empirically address those changes as the 
result of how the movements transformed and how elites relate to protestors, as indexing 
would predict. Instead, they are mainly descriptive and often treat Brazilian media as a 




Chapter 3: Media sociology, the protest paradigm and new media 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the way journalists framed the 2013-2015 
protests in Brazil; to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists’ work; 
and to assess the impact of social media for the work of journalists covering the protests. 
The previous chapters described the 2013 and 2015 cases, the country’s media system 
and a recent historical overview of protest coverage. In this chapter, I explore the 
theoretical foundations of this study: media sociology’s hierarchical model and the 
protest paradigm. Then, the following section provides a literature review of the way new 
media has been incorporated into social movements and how it serves as an input to 
journalists. The final section of this chapter brings these literatures together into the list 
of research questions and hypotheses driving this dissertation. 
WHAT INFLUENCES CONTENT? 
Media sociology’s investigation of “what influences content” dates back to the 
1920s, with the Chicago School of Sociology and Robert Park’s investigations on 
journalism as a locus for urban sociology inquiry (Zelizer, 2004). Yet, with the 
dominance of Columbia’s paradigm of media effects research in the United States, 
communication has traditionally placed the message itself as the independent variable, 
with its effects on individuals as the dependent variable (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In 
media sociology, scholars consider how the message is influenced by a wide variety of 
factors, becoming the dependent variable of inquiry (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).  
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Earlier sociological inquiry is marked by studies that focused on gatekeeping 
(Shoemaker, 1991; Snider, 1967; White, 1950), social control (Breed, 1955) and news 
selection (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Simultaneously, occupational studies have evaluated 
the values, ethics, roles and demographics of journalists (Tunstall, 1970, 1971; Weaver 
& Wilhoit, 1986, 1996; Weaver & Wu, 1998; Weaver, 2015). The second stage of 
inquiry focused on organizational settings and patterns of interactions among journalists. 
Newsroom ethnographies offered a view of what it is like to be a journalist, focusing on 
conditions and news making decisions (Fishman 1977; Tuchman, 1978). The third stage 
of sociological research investigated institutional and ideological questions, with loci 
shifting from newsrooms to broader sociocultural aspects (Zelizer, 2004). Studies on 
ideology, hegemony, consensus and political economy of the media emerged in this 
period (Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1982; Herman & Chomsky, 2002).  
This project uses the “hierarchical model” of news making, proposed by 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996; 2014) as a framework for media sociology research. 
Overall, the hierarchical model addresses the core concern of media sociology: how “the 
message, or media content, is influenced by a wide variety of factors both inside and 
outside of media organizations” (Reese & Shoemaker, 1996, p. 9). The model comprises 
five levels of influence on content production, arranged from macro to micro: social 
systems, social institutions, organizations, routines, and individuals. Visually, the model 
uses concentric circles for describing different levels of influence (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1 – The hierarchical model (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) 
 
The first level, “social systems,” refers to influences at the level of subsystems of 
society, such as ideology, economics, politics and cultural aspects. The study of 
communication at this level is often done comparatively or through critical and 
interpretive approaches (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In this dissertation, the work of 
Brazilian journalists covering the protests is to be understood as part of the unique 
context of a media system dominated by a few powerful conglomerates and a hybrid 
professional journalism that blends forces of globalization with volatile national politics, 
as described on Chapter 2. 
The second level, “social institutions,” refers to forces outside the media structure 
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itself, such as the economic environment in which the media operate (circulation, market 
size, profitability, competition with other media), the influences by government, social 
movement organizations, advertisers, interest groups, market characteristics and media 
policies. This level focuses on understanding the relationship between journalism and 
other social institutions. In this project, I focus on the influence of social movement 
organizations on news content. More specifically, how coverage evolved as demands and 
grievances changed, and the “rights” master frame started guiding the movement. 
 The “organizations” level focuses on influences stemming from media 
organizational roles, structures, and policies. Influences at the organizational level refer 
to how institutional ownership, goals, actions, rules, and membership influences content. 
The way organizations are structured and the policies that sustain this structure are at the 
center of the “organizational” level (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The primary goal of 
media organizations is profit; therefore, economic pressures play a great role in 
determining content (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In the United States, economic 
pressures place an indirect influence on content, as organizations typically have a 
separation between editorial and commercial arms (Gans, 1979). Studies in Latin 
America reveal this separation to be more blurred, and journalists constantly report 
economic and political ownership pressures as one of the main constraints on their work 
(Saldaña & Mourao, 2015; Waisbord, 2000). In addition, a small number of families 
closely associated with political groups owns most of the media organizations in the 
country and often politicians themselves own affiliates. News outlets remain dependent 
on government advertising, which adds to the pressure to align their coverage to official 
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viewpoints. In this study, organizational level influences on journalists’ work covering 
protests will be assessed in two ways: First, news coverage between four different 
newspapers will be compared. Then, the characteristics of journalists’ organizations will 
be entered in the final regression models.  
The fourth level, “routines,” comprises influences that result from newsgathering 
and transmission routines. News values, the beat system, pack journalism, and reliance on 
official sources are some of the elements that affect news content at this level. Overall, 
scholars recognize journalistic norms and routines as the main force behind the protest 
paradigm, as news values favor conflict, spectacle and quotes from official sources 
(Mcleod, 2007; Tuchman, 1978). Shoemaker and Reese (2014) argue that norms and 
routines do not happen in a vacuum; they are structured themselves in social systems. 
The persistence of this coverage pattern across time and different social movements with 
different degrees of public support (Boyle et al., 2005) has led scholars to consider norms 
to be rooted in deeper ideological resistance to groups that challenge the status quo 
(Gitlin, 1980; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). In general, journalists in Brazil follow routines 
based on U.S. notions of professionalism. For this project, I am particularly interested in 
the ways social media has been incorporated into news-gathering routines, and what does 
that represent for the protest paradigm. More specifically, I assess how journalists used 
social media to keep up with information about the protests, find sources and disseminate 
their own work. 
Finally, at the “individual level,” the analysis is centered on individual journalists’ 
characteristics. Only a handful of studies have attempted to match individual 
 32 
characteristics of journalists with the news content they produce, mostly finding this to be 
a weak relationship (Craft & Wanta, 2004; Rodgers & Thorson, 2003). According to 
Weaver and Wilhoit (1991), the effect of personal characteristics on content is minor 
because of routines that constraint individual’s inputs on news stories. For Shoemaker 
and Reese (2014), demographic factors may influence content indirectly through shaping 
personal attitudes and values. At this level, this study links results from a survey of 
journalists with their actual coverage of protests, which allows for statistical analyses to 
isolate demographics and personal attitudes from variables from the other levels of 
influence.  
THE PROTEST PARADIGM 
Communication and sociology scholars have long examined news treatment of 
protests and social movements, with several studies showing that media routinely 
marginalize social movement organizations. Scholars refer to this pattern as the “protest 
paradigm,” characterized by episodic narratives favoring spectacle, featuring official 
sources, marginalization, delegitimization, and demonization (Boyle, McLeod, & 
Armstrong, 2012; Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Episodic coverage focuses on 
separate, individual actions of social movements and not their policy-driven grievances 
and demands. News highlights protestors’ deviance by emphasizing looting, private 
property invasion and obstruction of other citizens’ daily routines, even when such 
actions do not characterize the bulk of the social movement’s activities (McLeod & 
Hertog, 1992; Mcleod, 2007).  
In his pivotal book “The Whole World is Watching,” Gitlin (1980) analyzed the 
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nature of the media coverage of the Students for a Democratic Society (New Left) 
movement, emphasizing the relationship between protestors and media, and the 
consequences of the coverage to the internal cohesion of the SDS. According to the 
author, the media fomented suspicion of the New Left through a series of devices, 
including trivialization, highlighting counterdemonstrations, emphasizing internal 
dissension, marginalization, disparagement by numbers (undercounting), and 
disparagement by effectiveness (characterizing the movement as useless).  
After the movement gained some power, marginalization and demonization were 
intensified, and stories started to focus on statements from official sources, emphasizing  
the “communist threat,” accentuating violence and giving considerable attention to right-
wing opposition. The New York Times, for example, initially treated the SDS as a 
serious political movement and then switched the coverage to focus on its marginality, 
ineffectiveness and oddity. As a response to President Johnson’s escalation of the 
Vietnam War, coverage portrayed the movement as an undoubted menace, often linked to 
“the communist threat” (Gitlin, 1980). 
Similarly, Entman and Rojecki (1993) found that the media follow the protest 
paradigm more closely when protestors begin mobilizing larger groups and exercising 
effective political power (Entman & Rojecki, 1993). In an analysis of the U.S. anti-
nuclear movement, the authors found that news judgment is greatly influenced by official 
sources and an underlying professional ideology that is suspicious of public participation 
in social movements, findings that are consistent with Bennett’s (1990) analysis of The 
New York Times’s coverage of the contras in Nicaragua.  
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Overall, scholars explain that journalistic norms and routines are the driving force 
behind the protest paradigm and news values favor conflict, spectacle and official 
discourse (Tuchman, 1978; McLeod, 2007). The paradigm is naturalized by journalistic 
socialization and has its origin from the routines that shape news production, leading to 
homogeneous news coverage across independent media (Sparrow, 2006; Cook, 2006). 
According to Gitlin, negative frames spread from medium to medium in a pack-like 
behavior that is consistent with the hegemonic view subsidized by public officials.  
For the protestors, media coverage operates like a double bind: movements need 
media coverage to matter and reach prospective supporters, but what they receive usually 
harms the protestors’ legitimacy, affects the movement’s internal cohesion, and repels 
public opinion (Gamson, 2008; Gitlin, 1980). According to Gitlin (1980), when the media 
cover a movement, the movement is both actor and acted upon: coverage exaggerates the 
sense that there is an extremist character to the movement, parts of the movement pursue 
confrontation for strategic reasons, new members are recruited,  and the state escalates 
repression. More importantly, media coverage can be devastating to the movement’s 
internal cohesion, both by converting leadership into celebrities and by inflating the 
movement’s rhetoric and tactics in an attempt to get news attention (Gitlin, 1980). For the 
anti-war movement, the media helped SDS grow in numbers and public support, but 
leadership disintegrated. 
The protest paradigm is set on four pillars: marginalization devices, predominance 
of official sources, protest frames and negative evaluations. Marginalization devices are 
recurring elements used by journalists when covering protests (Dardis, 2006; McFarlane 
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& Hay, 2003; Weaver & Scacco, 2013). According to the literature, protest 
marginalization devices can refer to tactics, depictions of protestors, and depictions of 
public opinion (Dardis, 2006). The first type of marginalization device emphasizes 
protest violent tactics, including mentions of vandalism, looting, trespassing, blocking 
streets and general lawlessness. Violence can also be accentuated by coverage 
highlighting the confrontation between protestors and police (Dardis, 2006; Hertog & 
McLeod, 2003; McFarlane & Hay, 2003). Another type of marginalization device comes 
from depictions of protestors’ appearance and mental capacity. Coverage of the anti-war 
movements, for example, emphasizes physical oddities (piercings, tattoos, etc.) or 
childlike behaviors  (dancing, playing Frisbee, etc.). Similarly, coverage may portray 
protestors as “idiots,” unintelligent, immature and incapable of providing substantive 
opinion about serious issues facing society (Dardis, 2006; Hertog & McLeod, 2003; 
McFarlane & Hay, 2003). 
Depiction of public opinion is another device used to marginalize protestors, 
implying that they do not speak for the general public’s perceptions of the issue at hand. 
Public opinion can be depicted through actual polls or statistics on the issue, or appear as 
“common sense” generalizations about the way the population perceives the contested 
issue. Eyewitness or bystanders’ quotes can be used to illustrate public opinion that is 
seemingly unfavorable towards the social movement. Quotes are often limited to 
questions about the legality of actions, such as blocking the streets, than the morality of 
the issues (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Informal negative representations of public opinion 
happen even when polls reveal that the majority of the public shares the same views as 
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the protestors (Entman & Rojecki, 1993).  
The adoption of official sources is also at the core of the protest paradigm. 
Several scholars have shown the way reliance on official viewpoints relates to critical 
coverage of social movements. Critical theorists, for example, explain that the media 
marginalize dissent and suppress oppositional voices in their stories (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1978). Media sociology’s newsroom ethnographies 
have also documented journalists’ reliance on official sources (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 
1978). 
 Reliance on official sources is a point of convergence between protest paradigm 
literature and the theory of “indexing,” which predicts that the range of debate about 
political issues in the news depends on the range of elite debate about the issue. In other 
words, the degree of agreement among elite sources (such as elected and government 
officials) determines critical coverage of the issue. When elites reach consensus, the 
coverage will reflect this agreement. When elites disagree and their views range, 
coverage expands to accommodate dissent (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2007; 
Bennett, 1990; Lawrence, 1996; Lawrence, 2012). There is a mutual dependency between 
newsmakers and official sources in the negotiation of newsworthiness. On one side, the 
media depend on the government for information subsidies. On the other, the government 
needs the media for publicity (Tuchman, 1978; Cook, 1998).  
Indexing studies have applied the theory in various settings. A study by Entman 
and Page (1994), for example, found that coverage of the Persian Gulf conflict focused 
on conflict between elites rather than evaluating actual policies. In the book When the 
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Press Fails, Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston provide an in-depth examination of news 
coverage during the George W. Bush administration and found that news leading to the 
2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was largely driven by key sources from the administration.  
Conversely, social movements and media have an asymmetrical relationship. As 
opposed to the media-government nexus, movements are more dependent on the media 
than the reverse (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980).  
Together, sources and devices organize into frames that have been largely 
documented in the protest paradigm literature (Boyle et al., 2012; Dardis, 2006; Hertog & 
McLeod, 2003). Frames are “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent 
over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social work” (Reese, 
2003, p.11). This project focused specifically on journalistic frames, which emerge from 
the processes behind news production: selection, exclusion, editing, and organization. As 
opposed to advocacy frames, journalistic frames focus on procedures rather than on the 
topics social movements are trying to promote (De Vreese, 2012). In this case, the frames 
analyzed do not assess the actual demands pursued by movements (e.g. bus fare prices or 
corruption measures), but instead focus on the way their political strategies are presented 
in the news (e.g. conflict or peace, riot, confrontation). 
Common protest paradigm journalistic frames include: 
1. Circus or freak show: portrayal of protestors as spectacle; emphasis on 
oddity, funny appearance, celebrity participation, and childlike behavior. 
2. Riot: emphasis on the conflict between protestors and society; lawlessness, 
looting, violence by protestors, disruption of daily life, destruction of property, 
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etc. 
3. Confrontation: portrayal of protestors as combatants versus the police; 
emphasis on the clashes between the two groups. 
Hertog and Mcleod (2003) also identify two frames that legitimize social 
movements, deviating coverage from the protest paradigm: 
1. Protest: centers on the conflict between protestors and powerful political 
institutions; protestors treated as a legitimate group with valid grievances and 
demands. 
2. Debate: this frame puts the social critique brought by the social movement 
at the center of the coverage. 
Finally, evaluations refer to how stories generally appraise protestors, their cause 
and the group they are challenging. Evaluations can be negative, neutral or positive 
(Shahin et al, 2016). Rather than about specific devices, evaluations refer to the valence 
given to a story when talking about the actors and the motives involved in the protest.  
Empirical evidence has revealed that the more radical a group and its tactics, the 
more the news coverage will follow the characteristics of the “protest paradigm” (Boyle, 
Armstrong & McLeod, 2012; McLeod & Hertog, 1999). Peaceful marches with goals that 
do not challenge the status quo are prone to receive less negative coverage, although the 
level of confrontation is also determined by the police response to the protests (Laschever 
& Boykoff, 2011). Yet, a theoretical article analyzing the evolution of the protest 
paradigm between 1960 and 1999 found that, even though protests became less deviant 
and radical, the coverage of social movements did not change over time, suggesting that 
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newspapers actually became more critical of less deviant actions (Boyle, Mccluskey, 
Mcleod, & Stein, 2005). Boyle et al. (2005) also found that war and labor protests were 
covered more negatively than social protests (e.g. abortion), despite the level of 
radicalism.  
The vast majority of the existent literature on the protest paradigm focuses on 
newspaper and broadcast television coverage of protests and social movements in the 
United States. As such, findings are limited to the way a specific set of journalists cover 
social movements, largely ignoring the role of alternative press, partisan media and social 
media. When it comes to international research, in a recent study, Shahin and colleagues 
(2016) found that the protest paradigm does not as closely apply to other nations. 
Through a comparative analysis of China, India and Brazil, the authors found variance in 
marginalization devices, although reliance on official sources and focus on violence 
remained constant across nations. Marginalization devices like circus, focus on 
appearances and bystanders’ accounts were rarely used outside of the United States, but 
protestors were blamed for excessive violence in all countries analyzed.  
More recently, studies have started taking a less deterministic view of the 
paradigm, suggesting that media outlets’ ideological affinity with the government of the 
day is also determinant of negative coverage (Shahin et al, 2015; Weaver & Scacco, 
2013). For the Tea Party movement, for example, MSNBC was the most likely to portray 
protestors as “idiots,” and CNN was more likely than Fox News to use marginalization 
devices (Weaver & Scacco, 2013). In a cross-country comparative study on the protest 
paradigm, Shahin et al. (2016) concluded that “the historical legitimacy of informal 
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political negotiations in a nation reduces the likelihood of its news media following the 
protest paradigm” (p.158). This line of research challenges the idea that the paradigm 
comes from news values and routines (McLeod, 2007) or from a general suspicion of 
movements that challenge the status quo (Gitlin, 1980). For these scholars, patterns of 
protest coverage are more dependent on which group is being challenged and the 
alignment between news organizations and the government. Interestingly enough, the 
original study using the term “protest paradigm” found that the outlet’s political ideology 
mattered for the 1970s protests in Hong Kong: right-leaning newspapers had a negative 
portrayal focused on tactics, and left-leaning outlets portrayed protestors more positively 
(Chan & Lee, 1984). This view, nevertheless, assumes all protests are left-leaning, and 
conservative newspapers will always be critical of social movements (Shahin et al., 
2016). 
This dissertation aims to further the theoretical understanding of the protest 
paradigm in the context of the Brazilian media ecosystem, marked by a hybrid 
combination of North American journalistic values and fluid political alliances. Results 
help elucidate which elements of the paradigm stem from media routines and how 
negative patterns hold in response to elite-supported demonstrations. But before delving 
into specific research questions, the following section addresses the final element of the 
2013 and 2015 protests that could affect coverage patterns: the use of new media for 
mobilization. 
NEW MEDIA AND PROTESTS  
It is impossible to understand the scope of the demonstrations that took over 
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Brazil after 2013 without assessing the mobilizing role of social media for social 
movements. Facebook, the absolute preferred network in the country, was used to 
organize protest events and debate ideas in both 2013 and 2015. On Twitter, users 
followed the stream of information in real time. Videos of the police brutality against 
protestors went viral in these platforms, contributing to the national outrage that led 
millions to the streets in both years (Costa, 2013; Stauffer, 2013).  
The use of social media as an organizing force is by no means unique to the 
Brazilian case. A recent body of communication research has focused on the relationship 
between online networking and social movements, particularly after the Arab Spring and 
the Occupy Movements. At the individual level, several studies have found that social 
media use has a positive relationship with numerous forms of individual protest 
participation, including public demonstrations, petitions and boycotts (e.g. Valenzuela, 
Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012). These studies are based on cross sectional survey data 
about self-reported online networking and political participation (see Boulianne, 2015 for 
an overview). However, when analyzing the relationship between social media and 
protests from a macro-level perspective, Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer (2013) found that 
social media use actually increased only after main street mobilizations took place during 
the Arab Spring, debunking the idea that social media led to the protests. This study 
assumes a linear relationship and concludes that increase in the use of new media is more 
likely to follow protest activity rather than precede it. 
Rather than thinking of a causal relationship between social media use and protest 
participation, another body of literature focuses on an organizational perspective; that is, 
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how technology have transformed the way social movements operate. These changes 
could signify an expansion of the collective action repertoire of contention, understood as 
the various tools and actions available to a movement at a given time frame (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012; Harlow & Harp, 2012; Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004). The Internet also 
allows for the emergence of online-only protest tactics, like petitions, hacking of official 
websites, culture jamming and trending of hashtags (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010), just 
to cite a few. Tufecki (2014) argues that social media sites have empowered movements 
by facilitating access to public attention, evading censorship and allowing for 
coordination of logistics. 
In a radical reassessment of collective action theories, Bennett and Segerberg 
(2012) argue that the role of social media goes beyond facilitating the organization of 
traditional protest tactics. The authors identify a new model of organization that is 
directly enabled by digital media, which they named connective action. Through an 
analysis of Occupy, Arab Spring and Indignados movements, the authors proposed a 
typology for large-scale protests based on the role of communication for the way 
protestors organize. The first type, “organizationally-brokered networks,” are 
characterized by strong organizations coordinating the actions and using communication 
technologies to spread their collective action frames. The second type is a hybrid form 
“organizationally-enabled networks,” in which action is moderated by loose formal 
organizations that sponsor causes and actions around a general issue, but invite 
participants to personalize them individually. The third type, “crowd-enabled connective 
action,” is characterized by social movements that do not depend on the role of any 
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organizational actor; digital media platforms are the organizational mechanism behind 
action. In the past, movements needed to engage in frame alignment by strategically 
linking efforts to the interests of prospective constituents (Snow et al., 1986). In 
technology-enabled connective action, networks are individualized and do not require the 
symbolic construction of a single collective identity. Engaging in contentious politics 
(protesting, boycotting, etc.) becomes an act of personal expression, with people 
connecting in elastic ways, taking what they want of existing movements and re-shaping 
issues to their own meaning (Papacharissi, 2010, 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2012).  
The challenge becomes to understand the actual political impact of these digitally-
networked actions, as they often lead to sporadic protests and chaotic demands. For 
Tufecki (2014), technological affordances have weaknesses for social movements: new 
media allow movements to put together sizeable protests without the levels of 
organizational capacity that marked old successful social movements. But these protests 
result in very few fundamental policy changes, as protestors are unable to organize 
around a set group of demands and exert political pressure.  
Some social movement scholars have met the “logic of connective action” with 
resistance. Tarrow (2014) argues that the impact of new forms of communication for 
social movements is not different than the impact of the pamphlet, hand-held radio and 
television. As for the “crowd-enabled actions,” scholars are reluctant to even label them 
“social movements.”  Tarrow (1994), for example, defines social movements as 
“sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and 
resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained 
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challenges against powerful opponents” (p.2). If social movements are marked by 
continuity and organization (Tilly, 2008; Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004), protests represent 
only one element of social movements’ inventory of actions. Digitally-networked 
protests, based on individualized politics and temporary solidarity, do not provide 
sustained unified challenges against opponents and cannot, therefore, become an effective 
social movement.  
Solving the definitional problem of what constitutes a social movement is not 
within the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I am interested in the coverage of a specific 
act of contentious politics – the street demonstration – that characterized social unrest in 
Brazil in 2013 and 2015. In this project, I argue that the logic guiding the protests 
followed a connective action approach, both organizationally-enabled (during the first 
days with Movimento Passe Livre) and crowd-enabled (during the massive 
demonstrations) in 2013. In 2015, crowd-enabled connective action gave space to the 
return of formal organizations, most notably Movimento Brasil Livre, which used social 
media to invite engagement, but without losing control of its organizational role.  
Despite disagreements over the scope of the impact of new technologies for 
contentious politics, evidence has shown that the use of social media signifies a change in 
the asymmetrical relationship between movements and mainstream media, as protestors 
are able to bypass news gatekeepers (see Garrett, 2006 for an overview). Tufecki (2014), 
for example, found that new media ecologies allow for autonomous content production 
by social movement organizations to be delivered directly to prospective supporters, 
circumventing mainstream media. In addition, social media can work as an awareness 
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system for journalists alerting media professionals about trends and stories under the 
news radar (Hermida, 2010). Online networks provide a way for social movements to 
signal to reporters ”Hey, we matter!” through the trending of hashtags and cyberactivism. 
According to Chadwick (2013), social movements use new media to make interventions 
in news making processes, rather than completely replacing journalists’ role in producing 
the news. In this project, I am shifting the locus of analysis from social movements’ use 
of social media to journalists. Instead of analyzing the role of online networks for 
protestors, this analysis focuses on how they were used by journalists in their process of 
news production. The final section of this chapter focuses on what we know about the use 
of social media for reporting.  
NEW MEDIA AND JOURNALISM 
Scholarly work on how journalists adopt digital technologies and social media has 
been guided by the theory of “normalization,” which predicts the adoption of old norms 
and routines in new platforms (Singer, 2005; Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton, 2012; Hermida, 
2010). This body of research suggests that, rather than a space for disruption, social 
media sites are adapted by journalists to fit traditional norms and routines, often 
reinforcing gatekeeping practices (Lawrence et al., 2014; Lasorsa, Lewis & Holton, 2012; 
Artwick, 2013; Hermida, 2010). Expanding on this line of research, studies have found 
that journalists may strategically deviate from traditional norms in an effort to gain 
attention for themselves online, but not to the point of allowing participatory 
transparency. In other words, the disruptions by journalists on social media are 
performative — usually in the form of job talk, self-branding and humor — but do not 
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significantly involve the audience in the news production itself (Molyneux, Mourao & 
Coddington, 2016; Molyneux & Holton, 2015; Lawrence et al., 2012; Mourao, Diehl & 
Vasudevan, 2014; Rogstad, 2014).  
The literature on journalists’ uses of social media identifies two main 
applications: social media as gatekeeping and social media as an awareness system. 
When used as an “awareness system,” journalists passively maintain social media 
conversations in their peripheral view, constantly checking what others are saying and 
monitoring shifts in the conversation (Hermida, 2010; Lawrence, 2012). Borrowing from 
the literature on computer science systems, Hermida (2010) calls this use “ambient 
journalism,”  which is always turned on in the background and can alert journalists of a 
breaking news story through disturbances in the tone of the system. 
For gatekeeping, journalists actively use social media platforms to “claim 
jurisdiction over the ability to objectively parse reality” (Hermida, 2013, p.303). While 
these platforms could provide a participatory space for audiences, there is limited 
evidence that social media challenged journalists’ role as gatekeepers. Instead, reporters 
use social media sites to exert their power on deciding what to pass to others via retweets 
and replies, who is a credible source of information, and what qualifies as news, 
effectively acting as curators of digital information (Lawrence et al., 2012; Molyneux, 
Mourao & Coddington, 2016; Zeller & Hermida, 2015). While social media have 
undoubtedly augmented the pool of sources available to journalists, traditional voices 
remain dominant and journalists often still prefer to interact with each other and other 
political elites, largely excluding the general public from conversations (Lawrence et al., 
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2014).  
The exception seems to be during breaking news events, like protests and natural 
disasters, when journalists can be more open to crowdsourcing practices. Acting like 
“gate watchers,” they ask for, evaluate, curate, and immediately pass along information 
from the general public, performing the role of “informational hubs” (Bruns, 2005; Vis, 
2012; Hermida, Lewis & Zamith, 2014). However, only a few journalists consistently 
engage in this type of collaborative crowdsourcing, with the vast majority limiting their 
use of social media to more traditional forms of gatekeeping: information gathering and 
filtering, finding elite sources, sending users back to organization’s main website, and 
getting audience feedback on traditional content (Hermida, 2013; Hedman & Djerf-
Pierre, 2013).  
It is important to note that the evidence presented in this literature is limited in 
two ways. First, because of accessibility, the bulk of this research is based on content 
analyses of Twitter. The platform allows access to one percent of its content via an 
application programming interface (API), and scholars often use lists of “most 
influential” journalists to collect the data. As such, this work focuses on the practices of 
journalists who are already successfully using the technology and may not be 
representative of the profession as a whole (Hermida, 2013). The focus on Twitter can 
also be problematic: with 23 percent of internet adults in the platform, Twitter is only the 
fifth most used network in the United States and Brazil, behind Facebook, Pinterest,  
Instagram and LinkedIn (Duggan, 2015). Second, the vast majority of research has been 
conducted in the United States and Europe, despite social networking being more 
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prevalent per capita among online populations in many developing countries, including 
Jordan (90%), Indonesia (89%), Philippines (88%) and Brazil (79%) (Pew, 2016).  
In Latin America, scholars have used surveys to tap into social media adoption by 
journalists. Herscowitz (2012) found that Brazilian journalists mostly use social media 
for basic news tasks: reading other outlets, getting press releases, accessing databases, 
finding traditional sources and disseminating their work. At that time, about 67 percent of 
journalists had a Facebook account, 47 percent had a Twitter account and 53 percent had 
a blog. Another study found that journalists in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina used social 
media for news gathering, research and fact-checking (Schmitz-Weiss, 2015). In a study 
analyzing how Latin American journalists use social media for investigative reporting, 
Saldanã and colleagues (2016) found that reporters are using these platforms to keep up 
with the news, find ideas for stories and publicize their own work, with Twitter being the 
most used platform for reporting in 2012. Overall, evidence from surveys is starting to 
suggests that, similar to North-American journalists, Latin American reporters have been 
using social media as an awareness system, with Brazilian journalists more likely to use 
Facebook, YouTube and LinkedIn for reporting. 
In this project, I assess the role of social media as an input for journalists covering 
the protests. Because protests are a breaking news event, it is possible that journalists 
engaged in “gate watching,” using online networking platforms at a higher rate than usual 
to find sources, ask for information, and publicize their work. As an awareness system, 
social media can provide protestors with some direct access to journalists.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation uses a multi-method approach to address which factors 
influenced the way Brazilian journalists covered the 2013 and 2015 protests. The first set 
of research questions aims to describe the outcome of media work, identifying patterns of 
the protest coverage. First, two questions refer to the presence of marginalization devices, 
frames, sources and evaluations in 2013 and 2015.  
RQ1: What a) marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources and d) evaluations  
were employed by media outlets when covering the 2013 Brazilian protests? 
RQ2: What a) marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources and d) evaluations  
were employed by media outlets when covering the 2015 Brazilian protests? 
Second, two additional questions inquire about the evolution of those 
characteristics over time within each year: 
RQ3: How did the use of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources and 
d)evaluations evolve over time in 2013? 
RQ4: How did the use of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources and 
d)evaluations evolve over time in 2015? 
Recent studies have found that negative media coverage can vary depending on 
political leanings of outlets: conservative networks like Fox News were less likely to 
portray the Tea Party movement negatively, for example. Based on previous findings in 
the literature suggesting that the protest paradigm may be contingent on the political 
alignment of the outlet with the government (Shahin et al, 2016; Weaver & Scacco, 
2013), two hypotheses were tested using a previous content analysis measuring the level 
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of support for the government by four mainstream newspapers:   
H1: The more adversarial to Rousseff’s government the outlet, the more 
legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be in a) 2013, and b) 2015. 
This research also examines the direct relationship between sources and the 
protest paradigm, and how official voices can lead to delegitimizing coverage. According 
to protest paradigm literature, negative portrayal of protestors is driven by official 
sources who marginalize the movement. As such, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H2: The more stories use official sources, the more they will adhere to the 
protest paradigm in a) 2013, and b)2015. 
H3: The more stories use non-official sources, the more legitimizing to the 
protestors they will be in a) 2013, and b)2015. 
Finally, this project compares the coverage of 2013 and 2015. Because the 2015 
protests were more elite-driven, the fourth hypothesis predicts: 
H4: Newspapers will be more likely to adhere to the protest paradigm in 2013 
than 2015.  
Next, research questions and hypotheses turn to the journalist. First, I assess the 
use of social media for reporting during the demonstrations. 
 RQ5: How did journalists use social media for reporting? 
Previous research has indicated that social movements are able to intervene on 
news making processes through social media, which serves as an awareness system for 
journalists (Tufecki, 2014; Hermida, 2010). Through online networks, journalists become 
aware of protestors’ grievances and demands, which can influence their perceptions on 
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the movement. As such, this project hypothesizes: 
H5: The more journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, 
the more supportive they will be to the protests. 
Results of the survey of Brazilian journalists tap into journalists perceptions of the 
protests, their outlet’s coverage and mainstream media coverage of the protests though an 
analysis of self-reported attitudes.  
RQ6: What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2013 protests, 
b) their outlet’s coverage of the 2013 protests, c) mainstream media’s coverage of the 
2013 protests? 
RQ7: What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2015 protests, 
b) their outlet’s coverage of the 2015 protests, c) mainstream media’s coverage of the 
2015 protests? 
Then, this project tests hypotheses that journalists individual alignments can have 
an impact on their perceptions of the movements as protests shifted from left to right-
leaning demands: 
H6: Journalists who are more aligned with the left will be more supportive of 
the 2013 protests than those who are aligned with the right. 
H7: Journalists who are more aligned with the right are more supportive of the 
2015 protests than those who are aligned with the left. 
Finally, the last set of research questions brings these two pieces together by 
linking content to its producers. First, RQ8 asks about journalists’ characteristics and the 
average characteristics of the content they produce: 
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RQ8: How do journalists’ characteristics relate to their coverage of protests 
regarding a)marginalization devices, b)frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations? 
Then, Hypothesis 8 tests if social media for reporting leads to actual less 
adherence to the paradigm, effectively changing news content:  
H8: The more journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, 
the less they will adhere to the protest paradigm. 
Finally, the last research question refers to the multi-level analysis of what 
predicts content, linking results from the survey to results from the content analysis. The 
final regression model will have variables representing all levels of influence, and their 
standardized coefficients will be compared: 
RQ9: How do influences at different levels influence coverage of protests 




Chapter 4: The Quantitatively Driven Mixed Approach  
This dissertation poses several research questions related to a) how the coverage 
of the 2013 and 2015 protests compare, b) how coverage of protests evolved overtime, 
and c) how journalists’ individual characteristics relate to this coverage. This chapter 
describes how each of these purposes were assessed via a quantitatively driven mixed 
methods design. The following sections briefly describe the steps of the design and how 
they were used to answer research questions and hypotheses. Because this dissertation 
has two loci of study - the news and the journalist - a detailed description of the methods 
and measures used is presented at the beginning of each of the results chapter.  
Following a deductive approach rooted in the protest paradigm literature, this is a 
quantitative-dominant project. The core of the results comes from numerical data 
analyses, which are then triangulated with qualitative data to attempt to overcome bias 
and ensure validity (see figure 4.1). According to Johnson et al. (2007), quantitative-
dominant mixed methods research  “relies on a quantitative, postpositivist view of the 
research process, while concurrently recognizing that the addition of qualitative data and 
approaches are likely to benefit most research projects” (p.124). This approach allows 
this project to not only answer the general question of “what is going on here?,” but also 
to slice a portion of that reality and explore its causal relationships (Tracy, 2013).   
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Figure 4.1 – Graphic of the Three Major Research Paradigms, Including Subtypes of 
Mixed Methods Research (Johnson et al., 2007) 
 
The mixed methods design, also known as multi method, integrative, triangulated 
or blended, combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in the same project. 
Following the definition by Hunter (in Johnson et al., 2007), the term is used here not 
only to indicate the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, but also the 
different styles of research within the quantitative tradition. In this case, this study 
combines two quantitative methods - survey and content analysis - with a qualitative 
assessment of answers to open-ended questions and semi-structured interviews by the 
same subjects who answered the survey. The main rationale for combining methods here 
is the search for complementarity for quantitative findings, seeking “elaboration, 
enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results from one method with results from 
the other method” (Johnson et al., 2007, p.115).  
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OVERVIEW  
This project follows three basic steps. First, a content analysis of stories produced 
by the four main newspapers in the country was conducted to analyze the way coverage 
of the 2013 and 2015 protests compared and evolved over time. Second, a survey of 
Brazilian journalists revealed their attitudes regarding the protests, their views on their 
outlet’s coverage and how social media were used for reporting. Third, a content analysis 
of the stories produced by 23 selected journalists in the sample was conducted, which 
allowed me to link individual, organizational and routines levels of influence to actual 
content.  
The final quantitative multiple regression model, with blocks representing the 
different levels of influences, provides the relative strength of each factor controlling for 
all other influences. Throughout the results, answers to open-ended questions and semi-
structured interviews with journalists from the sample elucidated numeric findings, 
providing additional context and interpretation. This approach allowed me not only to 
provide an empirically-based assessment of the coverage and journalists’ self-reported 
characteristics, but also a holistic view of the process for the selected journalists in the 
sample.  
In the sections below, I provide a brief overview of the different components of 
the multi-method approach used here. For organizational purposes, the detailed 
methodology for each section – including measures, reliability tests and descriptive 




The outcome of the process of frame building is located in the media content, 
which is the final dependent variable of this study. This dissertation uses a content 
analysis of news articles posted by the four most-circulated newspapers⁠ in Brazil: Folha 
de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, O Globo and Zero Hora. Chapter 5 has more 
details about the codebook, training, intercoder reliability and descriptive statistics for all 
the variables. 
This project is guided by the definition of content analysis by Riffe, Lacy and 
Fico (2005) as “the systematic assignment of communication content to categories 
according to rules, and the analysis of  relationships involving those categories using 
statistical methods” (p.3). As such, the analysis does not address implicit meanings or the 
motivations behind producers, but instead focuses on the statistical analysis of manifest 
content.  
Following a deductive approach, each story was coded for the characteristics of 
the protest paradigm: marginalization devices, sources, frames and evaluations. 
Newspapers were compared to test if alignment to the government actually influences 
protest coverage. Then, content was analyzed over time for the course of four weeks after 
the initial demonstrations began in both 2013 and 2015. Statistical tests were also 
conducted to assess the relationship between sources and negative coverage. Finally, 
results from 2013 and 2015 were compared to test if coverage changed as protests 
became more elite-driven. Appendix A has the codebook for this analysis. 
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Survey 
The main input (independent variables) for this project comes from the results of 
an online survey of Brazilian journalists conducted in December, 2015 - January, 2016 
through a collaboration with the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas at The 
University of Texas at Austin. This data includes self-reported news gathering routines, 
attitudes towards the protests and evaluations of the coverage by journalists’ outlets and 
mainstream media. Chapter 6 has the details about the survey sampling strategies, 
participation rate, date administered and descriptive statistics of the variables.  
The quantitative measures on this survey stem from the literature on media 
sociology, most notably the work of Weaver and Willnat (2012), Herzcovitz (2012) and 
the Worlds of Journalism project (Moreira & Rodrigues Helal, 2009). Questions 
specifically designed to measure protest attitudes were based on research conducted by 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2014). Hosted at Vanderbilt, 
LAPOP is the main academic institution conducting public opinion research in Latin 
America. Their Americas-Barometer questionnaire has been carried out for more than 30 
years in 26 countries in the region. For this project, I used the project’s battery on protest 
attitudes and political participation. Appendix B has the full questionnaire for this study.  
Chapter 6 (The Journalist) brings the “self-contained” results of the survey 
analysis, with individual attitudes as the outcome of the models. I am particularly 
interested in the gap between individual journalists’ personal support for the 
demonstrations and the way they perceived the support given by their news outlet. 
Models in this chapter address which variables lead to different degrees of self-reported 
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support for the protests, and which variables account for the personal-outlet attitudinal 
gap.  
Linking content to creators 
The last set of research questions and hypotheses connects individual 
characteristics and actual content, which has been rare in communication research 
(Weaver, 2015). Previous studies have attempted to include multiple levels in the same 
analysis (Fahmy & Johnson, 2012; Voakes, 1997), but relied exclusively on self-reported 
data for both the dependent and independent variables, similar to the results presented in 
Chapter 6. For example, in a study about the Iraq Coverage, Fahmy and Johnson (2012) 
analyzed the multiple influences that lead to self-reported performance attitudes using 
responses from individual workers. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by connecting 
survey results from a selected sample of individual journalists to content analysis of news 
stories produced by them.   
Twenty three journalists who answered the survey were selected for this analysis, 
yielding 90 stories with their byline.  The journalists were selected based on convenience 
sampling. First, the data was scanned for journalists who a) answered the full survey, b) 
covered the protests, and c) worked at a mainstream newspaper or online news outlet at 
the time of the protests. Journalists who are currently not working, worked at alternative 
outlets or television/radio were not used. Then, using Factiva and Google, stories by 
those journalists were collected. Priority was given to the journalists who worked for the 
four newspapers analyzed in the content analysis portion. 
  The analysis was conducted at two levels: individual journalist and individual 
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story. At the level of the individual journalist, correlations addressed the link between 
journalists’ characteristics and the average content they produced. At the story level, 
hierarchical regression analyses assess how individual level, organizational level and 
routines level variables increase the odds of a certain protest paradigm characteristic 
appearing in the coverage.  
Two biases must be addressed in this method. First, only journalists working for 
print outlets - web-based, newspaper or magazine - were included. This analysis, 
therefore, excludes visual elements (video, photo, infographics, etc.). Second, it tends to 
favor mainstream larger organizations whose material is available online, and 
underrepresent journalists working for smaller local publications or alternative media.  
QUALITATIVE METHODS 
After the quantitative analyses from survey and content analysis, a combination of 
qualitative methods was used on data from two sources: answers to open-ended questions 
in the survey and semi-structured interviews with journalists. As mentioned before, this 
analysis was done to complement, contextualize and clarify relationships identified in the 
quantitative models. Therefore, I do not fully follow an inductive methodology actively 
seeking patterns emerging from the data, as advocated by interpretive, critical or 
constructivist approaches. Instead, qualitative results are used here to reduce bias and 
ensure accuracy and validity (Tracy, 2013). More specifically, the interviews addressed 
specific findings from the quantitative models, and journalists were asked to explain the 
processes behind them.  
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Open-ended questions 
The survey of journalists included two sets of open-ended questions that were 
asked referring to the 2013 and 2015 protests separately: 
1 - Overall, what do you think the 2013/2015 protests were about? 
2-  How do you think the media covered the protests in 2013/2015? 
3 - How do you think media coverage of the protests in 2013/2015 evolved over 
time? 
Journalists were also asked: “What were, in your opinion, the main differences 
between the 2013 and 2015 protests?” 
For this project, I focus only on responses by journalists who are or were formally 
employed at the time of the protests. The list compiled by the Knight Center includes 
journalism educators, students and former journalists who are not currently working for a 
news organization, but their responses were not included in this analysis. This decision 
was made because, ultimately, this project does not seek to explain general attitudes 
towards the protests and the media. Instead, I focus on how members of a specific group 
– mainstream professional journalists – assess the demonstrations and the work of the 
institution they are part of. It is worth noting that in Brazil, anyone with a journalism 
diploma is generally considered a journalist, even if they work as a public relations, for 
example. To avoid confusion, this project opted for the most conservative route to ensure 
validity of the qualitative findings and consider only those working for a news 
organization at the time of the survey.  
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Interviews with journalists  
Finally, the last step of this project involves interviews with selected journalists 
who answered the survey and were selected for the linked analysis. Interviews were 
conducted after the results from quantitative analyses were finalized and sought to 
specifically address the processes that were identified. These conversations were semi-
structured, with questions based on the literature and theoretical foundation of this 
research project (Appendix C), but also allowing follow-ups and particular details that 
may arise from interview responses (Tracy, 2013). More importantly, this step put 
quantitative results in the context of a first person perspective – the verstehen – regarding 
the influences on journalists’ work.  
Semi-structured interviews addressed more nuanced ways in which journalists 
perceived the protests, their work, their roles and the importance of social media for their 
reporting practices. Interviews were conducted, recorded and transcribed by myself, and 
results were weaved through the chapters, providing accounts, rationales, explanations 
and justifications for the findings. A total of eight journalists were interviewed for this 
project, all from the subsample of 23 mainstream journalists who were used for the linked 
analysis. Some journalists were contacted for follow up questions. Interviews and follow-
ups were conducted by phone, Whatsapp, Skype and email and generally lasted about one 
and a half hour.  
HUMAN SUBJECTS AND SAFETY 
This project received approval from The University of Texas Institutional Board 
Review (IRB) before proceeding with any human subject data collection. Participation in 
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the survey was voluntary and participants were informed of the nature of the study. This 
study involved no vulnerable populations and the potential risk to the participants was no 
greater than everyday life. Survey identifiers and interviews were recorded, but 
participants were assured that the data would be kept anonymous. Identifiers, including 
the name of the journalist and the media organization they work for, along with all other 
survey information, were not mentioned in the final manuscript. This is particularly 
important because only a handful of journalists working for each organization covered 
the protests, and revealing the name of the outlet would jeopardize their anonymity. The 
data is currently stored on a password protected cloud service. Unobtrusive methods 




Chapter 5 - The Coverage  
This chapter focuses on coverage of the protests in 2013 and 2015 from the four 
most-circulated mainstream newspapers⁠1 in Brazil: Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São 
Paulo, O Globo and Zero Hora. In this chapter, I analyze stories based on the four pillars 
of the protest paradigm identified by the literature: marginalization devices, reliance on 
official sources, frames of protest and negative evaluations. Then, I assess how these 
characteristics changed by week within each protest wave and how the use of official 
sources relates to negative coverage. Finally, I compare the coverage in 2013 and 2015 
looking for larger patterns of differences. Results reveal that the coverage in 2013 
emphasized violence, but sometimes blamed the police for starting it. As protests 
evolved, news stories became more legitimizing to the protestors in 2013. In 2015, 
coverage was thematic, putting the demonstrations into the larger context of the political 
crisis facing the country. Official sources from opposition parties were used to legitimize 
the movement in 2015. 
Historically, each of the four newspapers analyzed has a different tradition in 
covering protests. Folha de São Paulo is the largest newspaper in circulation in Brazil 
and has usually been supportive of massive urban protests, openly campaigning for the 
                                                
1 Source: IVC – Instituto Verificador de Circulação available at: http://www.anj.org.br/maiores-jornais-do-




“Diretas Já!” movement at the end of the military regime, and the “Fora, Collor!” 
demonstrations for the impeachment of President Collor (Matos, 2008; Azevedo, 2006). 
Published in Rio de Janeiro, O Globo is the flagship publication of the largest media 
conglomerate in Brazil, Grupo Globo. Initially supportive of the military regime and the 
election of President Collor, O Globo was the last daily to give space to both “Diretas 
Já!” and “Fora, Collor!” (Conti, 1999; Matos, 2008). Published in São Paulo, O Estado 
de São Paulo openly supported the military coup in 1964, but gradually started 
supporting the direct elections movement, albeit coverage remained skeptical of 
protestors’ motives (Matos, 2008). Together, the three newspapers are elite-oriented and 
pivotal in defining the news agenda in the country (Kucinski, 1998). Zero Hora is the 
only regional paper in the sample, published in Rio Grande do Sul by Grupo RBS. 




The articles for this study were selected via Factiva, a research tool owned by 
Dow Jones & Company that aggregates content from more than 32,000 sources in 28 
languages. Articles were identified by using a string of key words derived from the words 
“protests” “protestors” and “demonstrations” in Portuguese: (protestos OR protesto OR 
manifestacao OR manifestacoes OR manifestante OR manifestantes).  For each case, the 
sampling covered a 30-day period beginning with the first day of street demonstrations. 
For the 2013 protests, this period ranged from June 6, 2013 to July 4, 2013. For the 2015 
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protests, it ranged from March 15, 2015 to April 11, 2015. This query yielded 4,082 
stories for 2013, and 1,180 for 2015.  
Since one of the goals of this project is to assess coverage variation over time, 
sampling using randomly selected weeks would not be appropriate; i.e., by chance, it 
could be that two or three days of the randomly constructed week were from the same 
week, and no days from other weeks were selected. In order to capture daily and weekly 
variations, this project uses multistage sampling combining two different techniques: 
proportionate sampling and systematic random sampling within strata. This procedure 
was done in the following way: first, the frequency of articles from each week was 
counted to assess for proportion by time period. For example, if 10 percent of the total 
population was published on week 1, then the sample would reflect that same 
distribution. The same procedure was done for the proportion of coverage stemming from 
each outlet. This technique, called proportionate sampling, allows for the selection of 
sample sizes from within strata based on the stratum’s proportion of the population 
(Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). Finally, using systematic random sampling (every nth 
article), a 15 percent random sample was selected considering time and outlet 
proportions, following the recommendation of Neuendorf (2012). Table 5.1 contains the 
number of articles retrieved within each strata, the proportion they account for in the 
population and in the sample. The final sample contained 727 stories, 550 from 2013 and 
177 from 2015.  
Before coding for the article, coders identified if the story was about the 2013 
protests in June or the 2015 protests in March. Stories about other protests (e.g. Arab 
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Spring, Ukraine protests, landless protests in the country, etc.) were not coded further. A 
total of 378 stories for 2013 and 104 stories for 2015 were relevant to this analysis, 
yielding a precision rate of 0.67 to the string search (Percent Agreement = 98%, 
Krippendorff’s alpha=0.87, Cohen’s kappa=0.87).  
Table 5.1 – Proportional sampling strategy by time frame and by outlet 
 
2013 
Proportionate sampling by time Proportionate sampling by week 
Week N total 
retrieved 
Proportion  N stories 
in the 
sample  
Outlet N Total 
retrieved  
Proportion N stories 
in the 
sample 
1  233 6.36% 35 Folha 1018 28% 153 
2  814 22.2 122 Estado 920 25 138 
3  1417 38.65 213 O Globo 1148 31 171 
4  1202 32.79 180 Zero Hora 580 16 88 
Total 3,666 100% 550 Total 3,666 100% 550 
        
2015 
Proportionate sampling by time Proportionate sampling by week 
Week N total 
retrieved 
Proportion  N stories 
in the 
sample 
Outlet N Total 
retrieved  
Proportion N stories 
in the 
sample 
1  505 42.80% 76 Folha  331 28% 50 
2  240 20.34 36 Estado  307 26 46 
3  193 16.36 29 O Globo 389 33 58 
4  242 20.51 36 Zero Hora 153 13 23 
Total 1,180 100.% 177 Total 1,180 100% 177 
 
For the 2013 protests, the final sample of relevant stories (N=378) had 122 
(29.6%) articles from  Folha de São Paulo, 116 (30.7%) from O Estado de São Paulo, 92 
(24.3%) from O Globo, and 58 (15.3%) from Zero Hora. The sample in 2015 had 104 
stories from 2015, 31.7% (N=33) from Folha de São Paulo, 27.9% (N=29) from O 
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Estado de São Paulo, 26.9% (N=28) from O Globo, and 13.5% (N=14) from Zero Hora. 
Intercoder reliability and training 
Coding was divided among three coders who are native Portuguese speakers and 
graduate students at the University of Texas at Austin. After three training sessions, 
intercoder reliability was established on a subsample coded independently by each 
trained coder and the author of this dissertation. Reliability tests were performed using a 
representative sample of population containing 52 stories, following the recommendation 
of Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005) for 95% level of probability. Krippendorff’s alpha and 
Cohen’s kappa scores were used to calculate inter-coder reliability (Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007) using ReCal (Freelon, 2013). Alphas ranged from 0.67 to 1 and the 
specific values for each variable are described below. 
Measures 
The codebook for this study contained four types of variables accounting for the 
parts that form the protest paradigm: devices, frames, sources and evaluations. Overall, 
the coding scheme included the presence or absence of frames and devices, the count of 
sources mentioned and an ordinal assessment of evaluations. This codebook (Appendix 
A) is based on previous studies on protest coverage (Hertog & McLeod, 2003; Dardis, 
2006; Shahin et al, 2016; Weaver & Scacco, 2013). The unit of analysis for this study is 
the individual news article. 
Devices. Stories were coded for the presence or absence of marginalization or 
legitimization devices; stories could have one or more devices as they are not mutually 
exclusive: 
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a) Appearance: does the story mention how the protestors look? (Percent 
Agreement = 96%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.88, Cohen’s Kappa=0.88) 
b) Idiot: Does the story portray the protestors as “idiots;” that is, whether 
protesters engage in behaviors that make them appear less than serious, politically 
extreme, unintelligent, or immature about their cause? (Percent Agreement = 
92%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.67, Cohen’s Kappa=0.67) 
c) Peaceful: Does the story say the protests were peaceful? (Percent Agreement 
= 96%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.87, Cohen’s Kappa=0.87) 
d) Violent: Does the story say the protests were violent? (Percent Agreement = 
90%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.80, Cohen’s Kappa=0.80) 
e) Cause mentioned: What was the mentioned reason why protests are taking 
place or the mentioned goals of the protestors? If not present, code 0. (Percent 
Agreement = 84%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.79, Cohen’s Kappa=0.79) 
Frames. Stories were coded for the presence or absence of each frame of protest: 
 a) Circus: the portrayal of protests as spectacle, carnival or odd/deviant (Percent 
Agreement = 98%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.79, Cohen’s Kappa=0.79). 
 b) Confrontation: emphasis on the conflict between protestors and police; 
protestors as combatants, focusing on clashes between the two groups (Percent 
Agreement = 90%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.76, Cohen’s Kappa=0.77). 
 c) Riot: highlights conflict between protestors and society; mentions of looting, 
violence by protestors, law-breaking behavior (Percent Agreement = 94%, 
Krippendorff’s alpha=0.87, Cohen’s Kappa=0.87). 
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 d) Debate: the social critique brought by the protests is at the center of this 
frame, protestors treated as legitimate political actors (Percent Agreement = 94%, 
Krippendorff’s alpha=0.84, Cohen’s Kappa=0.84). 
 e) Thematic/Episodic: this item measures if the article was mostly thematic or 
episodic; most stories will have a combination between episodic and thematic 
frames, this item measures the predominant one. Episodic: the sum of the article 
describes a specific event or moment in time; the who, where, when and what of 
particular events; episodic frames focus on individual behaviors and events. 
Thematic: coverage places political issues and events in some general context, 
focusing on “grand scheme” of the issue or the issue over time (Percent 
Agreement = 94%, Krippendorff’s alpha=0.84, Cohen’s Kappa=0.84). 
Sources. For each story, how many of these types of sources were directly 
quoted? 
a) Official: Elected officials or those appointed by elected officials, including 
police (Krippendorff’s alpha for ratio = 0.98). 
b) Protestor: protestor or social movement leaders (Krippendorff’s alpha for ratio 
= 0.75). 
c) Bystander: eyewitnesses who are neither officials nor protesters, but passers 
by or other “common people” affected by protests (Krippendorff’s alpha for ratio 
= 1). 
d) Social media: sources from social media (Krippendorff’s alpha for ratio 
=0.66). 
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e) Other: other sources like experts, scholars, other NGOs, etc. (Krippendorff’s 
alpha for ratio = 1). 
Evaluation. Stories were coded for the way they portray protestors, their cause 
and their opponents (administration), as well as who is to blame for violence when 
present. Evaluations can be 1 (negative), 2 (neutral or balanced) and 3 (positive):  
a) Violence blame: who does the story blame for the violence from 1 
(protestors), 2 (balanced) to 3 (police/administration)? (Krippendorff’s alpha for 
ordinal = 0.76) 
b) Protestor: Overall, how does the story evaluate the protestors, from 1= 
negative, 2 = neutral or 3= positive? (Krippendorff’s alpha for ordinal = 0.74) 
c) Cause: How does the story evaluate the cause from 1= negative to 3= 
positive? (Krippendorff’s alpha for ordinal = 0.72) 
d) Administration: Overall, how does the story evaluate the administration 
(police, government, etc.), from 1= negative, 2= neutral or 3= positive? 
(Krippendorff’s alpha for ordinal = 0.77) 
Data analysis 
Research questions 1 and 2 ask about the use of marginalization devices, frames, 
sources and evaluations in news about protests in 2013 and 2015. Descriptive statistics by 
year were used to assess the frequency of those elements in the coverage. RQ3 and 4 
inquire about the evolution of the use of marginalization devices, frames, sources and 
evaluations over time. Chi square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences 
in coverage by week for each protest cycle.  
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that the more adversarial to Rousseff’s government the 
outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be in both years. To test this 
hypothesis, this study uses a content analysis by the group Brasil de Fato2 measuring the 
level of support for the President during the 2014 elections in the news. Between August 
28 and September 27, 2014, O Globo did not publish any headline supportive of 
Rousseff’s government, 70% of its coverage was negative and 30% was 
neutral/unrelated. O Estado de São Paulo published 73% negative stories about the 
President, 30% neutral/unrelated and 3% positive. About 60% of the headlines published 
by Folha de São Paulo in that period was negative towards the President, 33% was 
neutral and 7% positive. The study did not analyze the content from Zero Hora, but RBS 
group is affiliated to Organizações Globo. As such, this study predicts that coverage by O 
Globo and Zero Hora will be more supportive of the protests than coverage by Estado 
and Folha de São Paulo. Chi-square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the 
differences by outlet. 
Based on the indexing theory, the next set of research hypotheses assesses the 
relationship between official/protestor sources and the protest paradigm. H2 predicts that 
the more stories use official sources, the more they will adhere to the protest paradigm. 
Conversely, H3 predicts that stories that use non-official sources will be more likely to be 
legitimizing to the protestors. Hypotheses were tested using t-tests.  
Finally, H4 inquiries about differences between the coverage in 2013 and 2015. 
                                                
2 Brasil de Fato is an activist research project that focuses on raising awareness to media portrayals of 
leftist groups in Brazil. This study is a content analysis of headlines during the 2014 elections and is 
available at: www.brasildefato.com.br 
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Because all newspapers tend to be opposed to Rousseff’s government and the 2015 
protests were not characterized by the violence seen in 2013, this study predicts that 
newspapers will be more likely to adhere to the protest paradigm in 2013 than 2015. 
Once again, Chi-square and ANOVA tests were used to assess the differences by year.  
RESULTS – 2013 
Data Characteristics 
RQ1 inquiries about the devices, frames, sources and evaluations in the coverage 
of the 2013 protests. Overall, the coverage in 2013 tended to focus on tactics 
(violence/peace) rather than protestors’ characteristics (appearance/idiot) or ideas 
(demands/grievances). Of the stories analyzed, 11.1% mentioned the “appearance” of 
protestors, 7.4% treated them as “idiots,” and 40.5% did not mention any “cause” of the 
protests. When it comes to tactics, 15.9% said the protests were “peaceful” and 44.7% 
said protests were “violent.” Of those, 52.7% blamed the protestors for the violence, 
21.3% blamed the police, and 26% blamed both. When it comes to frames (RQ1b), only 
4% of the stories had the “circus” frame, while 27.5% had the “riot” frame, 32% had the 
“confrontation” frame, and 30.5% had the “debate” frame. In 2013, only 18.3% of the 
stories were predominantly “thematic.”  
Stories were coded for the number of quoted sources who are official, protestor, 
bystander, social media and other (experts, NGOs, etc) (RQ1c). About half of the stories 
(N=180), had no sources at all. The average number of sources per story was 0.32 for 
official sources, 0.26 for protestors, .02 for bystanders, 0.03 for social media, and .33 for 
other sources. However, the absolute number of sources provides a limited account of 
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how much each story relies on each type of source; i.e., a story could have three protestor 
sources but accompanied of a equal or greater number of official sources. A better 
measure of patterns of representation is to consider share or proportions of all voices 
reported belonging to each group in the coverage. In order to do this, all sources 
mentioned in a story were added (N total) and a proportion for each group was calculated 
(N group/N total). Stories without sources were not computed. Stories with sources had 
an average of 36% of its voices coming from official sources, 23% from protestor 
sources, 35% from other sources, such as academic experts or opinion leaders, 3.76%  
from social media sources, and 1.5% from bystanders. Because only two stories had 
bystanders’ quotes, they were removed from the analysis, which would violate chi-square 
assumptions of five observations per cell.  
For evaluations (RQ1d), stories were coded from 1 ‘negative’ to 3 ‘positive’ in 
regards to their portrayal of the protestors, their cause and the administration 
(government/police). The average evaluation for the protestors was 2.01, for the cause 
2.19 and for the administration 1.77. Appendix D has a table with operationalizations, 
means, range and standard deviations for all the variables in the content analysis. 
Coverage over time 
RQ3 asks about the evolution of a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources 
and d) evaluations overtime in 2013. Table 5.2 shows the results of chi-square tests for 
devices and frames by each week. For devices (RQ3a), results show that there was a 
statistically significant decrease on mentions of violence over time [χ 2 (3)= 28.34, 
p<.001]. To further probe these differences, the column proportions test assigns a letter 
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key to each category (week), and these proportions are compared using z tests. When a 
pair of columns is significantly different from another at the p<.05 level, they are 
assigned different subscript letters. For the violence device, weeks 2, 3 and 4 are 
statistically different from each other at the p<.05 level. When is comes to mentioning 
“peacefulness,” results also reveal a marginally significant difference across each week, 
with coverage on week 3 mentioning that protests were “peaceful” the most time [χ 2 
(3)=7.41, p<.10].  





Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4  
 Devices % %   %  %  χ 2 (df=3)  
 
Appearance 33.3 a 12.4 a,b  13 a,b 6.6 b 6.19# 
 
Idiot 0 a  7.6 a 10.3 a 4.1 a 4.12 
 
Peaceful 16.7 a,b 14.3 a,b 21.9 b 9.9 a 7.41# 
 




83.3 a, b 68.6 b 58.9 a,b  51.2 a 8.45* 
Frames      
 
Circus 0 a 5.7 a 4.8 a 1.7 a 3.05 
 
Riot 66.7 a 38.1 a,b  26.7 b,c  17.4 c 16.82*** 
 
Confrontation 66.7 a 53.3 a 27.4 b 17.4 b 38.62*** 
 
Debate 0 a 26.7 a 26.7 a 40 b 9.46*  
 
Thematic 0 a  19 a  15.1 a 22.3 a 3.71 
       #p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
a,b,c The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column 
variable. For each pair, the column proportions are compared using a z test. If a pair of values is 
significantly different (p<.05), the values have different subscript letters assigned to them. 
 
Stories were also more likely to mention the appearance of the protestors on week 
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1 (33.3%) than week 4 (6.6%). For the cause mentioned, stories on week 1 were more 
likely to mention a cause (83.3% did) and that gradually decreased as demands became 
broader.   
For frames (RQ3b), results show that weeks 1 and 2 were more likely to have the 
“riot” frame, emphasizing vandalism, looting, destruction of private and public property, 
etc. [χ 2 (3)= 16.82, p<.001]. Similarly, weeks 1 and 2 were also more likely to have the 
“confrontation” frame, which focuses on clashes between police and protestors [χ 2 (3)= 
38.62, p<.001]. This is closely associated with reality on the streets: on week 2, violent 
police response was emphasized in the news and on week 4, most mentions of violence 
were about the anarchic group “Black Blocs,” who were a minority, but used radical 
tactics to protest. Week 3 was characterized by less confrontations with the police. 
Therefore, coverage was responsive not only to the demands and tactics of the protestors, 
but also to the degree of police response to the protest.  
As emphasis on violence decreased, the legitimizing “debate” frame increased. 
On the first week of the protests, no stories were published treating protestors as 
legitimate actors. By week 4, 40% of the stories had the debate frame, which included 
stories not only recognizing the public transportation demand as legitimate, but also 
linking the protests to a generalized dissatisfaction with the government [χ 2 (3)= 9.46, 
p<.05].  
Table 5.3 contains the evolution of sources and evaluations over time. When it 
comes to sources (RQ3c), the only difference over time was that protestor sources were 
gradually less common in the coverage from week 1 to week 4 [F (3, 165) = 2.38, p < 
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.10]. This means that while coverage became more legitimizing, protestor voices were 
actually less common.  
When violence was present, an ANOVA test showed a statistically significant 
mean difference on who stories blamed for it overtime  [F (3, 165) = 5.86, p < .01]. Post 
hoc test using the Tukey HSD showed that violence blame on week 2 was statically more 
leaning towards neutral than week 4.  
Table 5.3 – Percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources in a story and 
evaluations in the coverage of the 2013 protests 
 
 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4  
Sources Mean Mean Mean Mean F(df=3) 
Official 40  35.93  32.88  41.10  0.38 
Protestor 26.67 19.20  31.73  15.11  2.38# 
Social Media 10  6.64  4.21  0   1.75 
Other 10 36.39  30.17 42.94  1.47 
Evaluation1      
Violence blame  1.6 2  1.46  1.56  5.86** 
Protestors 1  1.98  2.01  2.08  4.54*** 
Cause  2  2.18  2.16  2.24  0.56 
Administration  2  1.6  1.88  1.79  5.45*** 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
1Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive and violence blame was 
measures as 1= protestors, 2= balanced, and 3= police. 
 
Finally, for evaluations (ranging from 1= negative to 3= positive), coverage on 
week 1 was completely negative to the protestors (M=1), neutral to their cause (M=2) and 
to the administration (M=2). This gradually shifts, with coverage in week 4 being slightly 
positive for the protestors (M=2.08), very positive to their cause (M=2.24) and negative 
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towards the government (M=1.79). The differences for the way protestors [F (3, 378) = 
4.54, p<.001] and administration [F (3, 378) = 5.45, p < .001] were portrayed are 
statistically significant. Appendix D has the standard deviations of all variables 
mentioned.  
Coverage across outlets 
To test Research Hypothesis 1 (the more adversarial to Rousseff’s government the 
outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be), a series of cross 
tabulations was performed. Table 5.4 depicts the use of devices and frames by outlet.  




Folha  Estado  O Globo Zero Hora  
 Devices % %   %  %  χ 2 (df=3)  
 
Appearance 6.3 a 8.6 a,b 17.4 b 15.5 b 8.22* 
 
Idiot 2.7 a 10.3 b 6.5 a,b  12.1 b 7.05# 
 
Peaceful 9.8 a 12.1 a,b 21.7 b,c 25.9 c 11.03* 
 
Violent 44.6 a,b 35.2 b 52.2 a 51.7 a 7.32# 
 
Cause mentioned 
(1=yes)  55.4 a 62.1 a 59.8 a 62.1 a 1.27 
Frames      
 
Circus 2.7 a 1.7 a 6.5 a 6.9 a 4.91 
 
Riot 22.3 a 25 a 31.5 a 36.2 a 4.82 
 
Confrontation 31.3 a,b  25 b 43.5 a 29.3 a,b  8.40 * 
 
Debate 30.4 a 19 b 35.2 a,c  46.6 c 15.26** 
 
Thematic 13.4 a 17.2 a,b  25 b 19 a,b  4.68 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
a,b,c The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column variable. 
For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a z test. If a pair of values is 
significantly different (p<.05), the values have different subscript letters assigned to them. 
 
 For devices, results reveal that Folha de São Paulo was statistically less likely to 
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mention the appearance of the protestors [χ 2 (3)= 8.22, p<.05] and treat them as idiots  
[χ2 (3)= 7.05, p<.10] than all the other outlets. When it comes to tactics, O Estado de São 
Paulo was less likely to mention violence and the difference was marginally significant  
[χ 2 (3)= 7.32, p<.10]. O Globo and Zero Hora were more likely to mention that protests 
were peaceful  [χ 2 (3)= 11.03, p<.05]. Because protests in São Paulo were more violent, 
with several days of clashes between police and protestors, it is possible that the 
geographical location of the outlets accounts for this difference. For frames, Zero Hora 
and O Globo were more likely to have the legitimizing “debate” frame, and O Estado de 
São Paulo was statistically less likely have the “debate” frame and also less likely to 
emphasize “confrontation” [χ 2 (3)= 8.40, p<.05 for confrontation, and χ 2 (3)= 15.26, 
p<.01 for debate].  
Table 5.5 – Percentage of quotes coming from different types of sources in a story and 
evaluations by outlet in 2013 
 Folha  Estado  O Globo 
Zero 
Hora  
Sources Mean Mean Mean Mean F(df=3) 
Official 49.55  28.21 29.18 45.76  3.13* 
Protestor 19.09  27.19 22.42 22.88  .45 
Social Media 1.52 5.83  4.97  0 1.12 
Other 28.94 36.89  42.12  29.09  .93 
      
Evaluation1      
Violence blame 1.84 1.59  1.75  1.46  1.69 
Protestors 1.93 2.03  2.18  1.84  3.39* 
Cause  2.1 2.13 2.24 2.39  3.41* 
Administration  1.81 1.78 1.70  1.81  .84 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
1Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive and violence blame was 
measures as 1= protestors, 2= balanced, and 3= police. 
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For sources, Folha and Zero Hora relied more heavily on official sources [F (3, 
165) = 3.13, p < .05]. For evaluations, ANOVA tests reveal a statistically difference 
between outlets for protestor evaluation [F (3, 378) = 3.39, p < .05] and cause [F (3, 378) 
= 3.41, p < .05]. Post hoc test using the Tukey HSD showed that cause evaluation was 
statistically more positive in Zero Hora than Folha and Estadão. For protestor evaluation, 
O Globo was more likely to portray protestors positively than Folha and Zero Hora. 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the ANOVA tests for sources and evaluations. 
Overall, these results suggest that, while Estado de São Paulo was the paper that 
emphasized violence the least and Folha de São Paulo did not focus on appearance or 
treated protestors as “idiots,” Globo and Zero Hora were more likely to have the 
legitimizing debate frame, be supportive of protestors’ cause and mention peaceful parts 
of the demonstrations (H1a was supported). As such, for the newspapers that are more 
adversarial to Rousseff’s government, coverage was more legitimizing. 
Sources and the protest paradigm 
Finally, H2 and H3 inquire about the relationship between sources and the protest 
paradigm. Table 5.6 shows t-tests from reliance on each type of sources and devices, 
Table 5.7 from frames, and Table 5.8 shows correlations between reliance on each type 
of source and evaluations.  
H2a tests if the more stories use official sources, the more likely they will adhere 
more closely to the protest paradigm in 2013. Results from Table 5.6 suggest that the 
more stories rely on official sources, the less they mention appearance [t(196) = -3.64, p 
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= .001] or treat protestors as idiots [t(196) = -2.13, p = .05]. The relationship between 
official sources and other marginalization devices and frames was not statistically 
significant. Hypothesis 2 was rejected for 2013.  
Table 5.6 – Relationship between percentage of quotes coming from different types of 
sources and presence of devices and protests frames in the coverage of the 
2013 protests 
  
Official Protestor Social Media Other 
Devices Mean t Mean t Mean t  Mean t  
 
Appearance -3.64***  5.93 ***  0.44  -2.04* 
 
Yes 7.05   62.18   5.13   18.59   
 




-2.13 *  5.17***  -0.5  -1.75# 
 
Yes 14.81   65.74   1.85   17.59   
 




- 0.93  3.45**  - 1.29  - 1.51 
 
Yes 29.08   45.63   0  23.56   
 




- 1.43   1.93*  .29    -.86 
 
Yes 31.15   29.24   4.16   32.04   
 




- 1.49  3.94 ***  - 0.54  -1.35 
 
Yes 32.69   31.19   3.27   31.92   
 
No 42.71   9.31   4.63  40.84   
 #p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
It is important to note that the tone of quotes from official sources also changed as 
protests increased. Initially, quotes from the governor of São Paulo - who is from the 
opposition party - harshly criticized the movement. A story from O Estado de São Paulo 
print:  
In the morning, during an event to announce a Police Operation in the 
countryside, [governor] Alckmin criticized MPL. “What we saw in the last few 
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days were acts of vandalism, violence, leaving a trail of destruction and a political 
movement,” he said. He also assured that the police worked to “protect” the 
protestors. (Rodrigues, 2013, my translation) 
 
About two weeks later, quotes from him were used to legitimize the protests: 
Alckmin said yesterday that society is “unsatisfied with its political 
representation. It is up to us to be humble enough to listen, to understand the 
demonstrations and to act. It’s not just talk, it’s is about working, governing, 
cutting budgets, increasing investments.” (Folha de São Paulo, 2013, my 
translation) 
 
For H3a, results show that the use of protestor sources is positively associated 
with all marginalization devices, suggesting that protestor’s quotes can be used to portray 
them as idiots [t(196) = 1.87, p = .001], for example.  
For frames (Table 5.7), a higher percentage of protestor voices is also associated 
with riot [t(196) = 3.15, p = .001], circus [t(196) = 3.30, p = .001] and negatively 
associated with the legitimizing debate frame [t(196) = -4.07, p = .001] and thematic 
coverage [t(196) = -2.89, p = .001]. This effectively means that access to the news via 
quotes do not benefit protestors. When they appeared, protestors’ quotes were 
characterized negatively and associated with coverage that delegitimized the movement. 
One story from Folha de São Paulo entitled “Por que vim? [Why am I here?]” published 
in June 18, 2013 exemplifies:  
Maiara Cesário, 22, faced her first demonstration wearing workout leggings, pink 
Nike shoes, Nike backpack and mascara. In her “protest kit” she also had a mask 
for tear gas, protection goggles, and vinegar. Maiara, who is a law student from 
Univap, came from Campinas in a chartered bus. Her sign said: “I represent you, 
seating on the couch.” 
“I’m here against corruption and for rights,” she said. Which ones? “Ah, all of 
them.” And the bus fare in Campinas, is it expensive?  “Camila, how much is the 
bus fare in Campinas anyways?,” she asked her friend. (Mello, 2013, my 
translation) 
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Table 5.7 –  Relationship between the percentage of quotes coming from different types 
of sources used and presence of protests frames in the coverage of the 2013 
protests 
 
 Official Protestor Social Media Other 
Frames Mean t Mean t Mean t  Mean t  
          
 
Circus  -1.25  3.30***  -0.64  -1.19 
 
Yes 16.67   66.67   0   16.67  
 
No 37.17   21.40   3.92   35.94  
 
Riot  -0.57  3.15***  -1.90*  -1.70 # 
 
Yes 33.30   37.33   0   26.23  
 
No 37.45   18.08  5.13   38.43   
 
Confrontation -0.77  1.29  -1.55  -0.30 
 
Yes 32.51   28.70   0.90  33.68   
 
No 37.96   20.91  4.98  35.79  
 
Debate  .32  -4.07***  .40  3.65*** 
 
Yes 38.27   5.19   2.88   53.65   
 
No 35.90   29.86   4.10  28.08   
 
Thematic 1.13  -2.89**  -1.50  2.08* 
 
Yes 43.92   6.85   0   48.84  
 
No 34.60   27   4.63  32.02   
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
The story brings several quotes from other protestors, all highlighting the 
contradictions between their demands, oddities in their behaviors and their physical 
appearance. At the end, it concludes: 
At Largo do Batata, a meeting place for the beginning of the demonstration, 
participants played samba, a few of them drank beers, and the atmosphere was 
festive, with police observing from far away. Some chanted: “what a shame, bus 
fares more expensive than weed.” That was actually not lacking: everywhere one 
looked there were people rolling joints. (Melo, 2013, my translation) 
 
For “other sources,” their presence was strongly associated with the debate frame 
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[t(196) = 3.65, p = .001], and also led to more thematic coverage [t(196) = 2.08, p = .05] 
and less emphasis on riot [t(196) = 1.70, p = .10] and appearance [t(196) = -2.04, p = 
.05].  These sources were mainly academic experts or opinion leaders.  
Correlations presented on Table 5.8 reinforce these findings: the presence of 
protestor sources were associated with negative portrayal of the protestors (r=-.16, 
p<.05). Conversely, correlations show that the presence of sources like experts, NGOs 
and other non-official opinion leaders is associated with positive portrayals of protestors 
(r=.20, p<.01) and their cause (r=.20, p<.05). 
Table 5.8 – Correlations between the percentage of quotes from different types of 
sources, violence blame and evaluations of protestors, their cause and the 
administration in 2013  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1.Violence blame  - 
       2. Cause 
Evaluation -.01 - 
      3. Protestor 
Evaluation .42*** .26*** - 
     4. Administration 
Evaluation -.47*** -.28*** -.24*** - 
    5. Official sources -.01 -.03 -.04 -.01 - 
   6. Protestor 
sources -.10 -.13 -.16* .01 -.41*** - 
  7. Social media 
sources -.02 .01 .05 .01 -.16* -.11 - 
 8. Other sources .12 .20* .20** -.04 -.58*** -.40*** -.13# - 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
Note: Evaluations are measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral and 3= positive. Violence blame 
is measured as 1=protestors, 2=balanced, 3= police.  
 
As opposed to protestor quotes, academics and other activists not associated with 
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the movement were frequently used to legitimize protestors’ motives. The following story 
from Zero Hora exemplifies:  
For activist Robert Kennedy Jr., nephew of President Kennedy, people are 
protesting because the country is growing economically and becoming more 
democratic. “Movements are a reflex of Brazil’s economic growth and represent 
people’s desire for changes in public policies,” the economist said. (Zero Hora, 
2013, my translation)  
 
Scholars, experts and NGO activists were frequently asked to comment on the use 
of social media for protests, police brutality, and transportation demands, just to cite a 
few. Overall, results suggest that when protestor voices are presented, they serve to 
delegitimize the movement. But when other non-official sources are cited, they are 
associated with more legitimizing coverage. As such, H3a (the more stories use non-
official sources, the more legitimizing to the protestors they will be in 2013) is partially 
supported.  
RESULTS - 2015 
Data characteristics 
RQ2 asks about the a) devices, b) frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations present in 
the coverage. About 11.5% of the stories mentioned protestor’s appearance, 7.7% 
portrayed them as idiots, 6.7% mentioned the protests were peaceful, 5.8% mentioned the 
protests were violent, and 75% mentioned the reason why protests were taking place. For 
frames (RQ2b), the legitimizing “debate” frame was the most common in the sample, 
present in more than 42% of the stories coded. The circus frame was present in 8.7% and 
the “riot” and “confrontation” frames were present in less than 5% of the coverage. 
Because demonstrators did not clash with the police - in fact, protestors were openly 
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supportive of the role of military police in Brazil - the “confrontation” frame was present 
in only two stories mentioning the arrest of a group of skinheads for carrying weapons 
during the demonstrations. The “riot” frame was present when protestors acted as a 
violent mob, threatening to hurt supporters of the government that crossed the marches. 
About 41.3% of the coverage was primarily thematic.  
When it comes to sources (RQ2c), about half of the stories did not quote any 
group. When sources were present, 59.69% came from official sources, 11.5% from 
protestors, 25% from other sources and less than 4% from social media. No bystander 
sources were mentioned. For evaluations (RQ2d), stories were on average supportive of 
protestors (M=2.10) and their cause (M= 2.14), and negative towards the administration 
(M=1.59). 
Coverage overtime 
RQ4 asks about the evolution of a) marginalization devices, b) frame, c) sources 
and d) evaluations overtime in 2015. For RQ4a, the devices “violent,” “peaceful,” “idiot” 
and “appearance” were mentioned in less than 10 stories (less than 5 units per category), 
violating the assumptions required to run chi-square tests. Regarding “cause mentioned” 
no statistically significant difference emerged between the weeks analyzed. RQ4b asks 
about the frames present in the coverage. Once again, because less than 10 stories 
contained the circus, riot and confrontation frames, this analysis focuses on the 
differences overtime regarding the debate and thematic/episodic frames. Results reveal 
coverage did not differ overtime when it comes to the debate frame, but it became more 
thematic in the period after week 1 [χ 2 (3)= 7.80, p<.05].  
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For sources (RQ4c) results presented on Table 5.9 show that official sources were 
used the most during the initial phase of protests [F (3, 50) = 3.21, p < .05]. Conversely, 
nonofficial sources like experts and NGOs were more used in weeks 2, 3 and 4 [F (3, 50) 
= 4.31, p < .001]. There were no significant differences in the use of protestor and social 
media sources overtime, and week 3 had no sources of these types.  
Table 5.9 – Evolution of the use of devices, frames, sources and evaluations in the 




Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4  
 Devices % %   %  %  χ 2 (df=3)  
 
Cause mentioned 71.4 a 80.8 a 66.7 a 84.6 a 1.82 
Frames      
 
Debate 46.4 a 42.3 a 33.3 a 30.8 a 1.39 
 
Thematic 32.1 a 57.7 b 66.7 b 30.8 b 7.80* 
       Sources Mean Mean Mean Mean F(df=3) 
 
Official 73.81  36.36  50  28.57  3.21* 
 
Protestor 9.52  9.09  0  28.57  0.83 
 
Social Media 5.71  0 0 0 0.37 
 
Other 10.95  54.55  50  42.86  4.31** 
Evaluation1      
 
Protestors 2.23  1.88  2  2  2.45 
 
Cause 2.05  2.19  2.33  2.27  0.71 
 Administration 1.57  1.65  1.56  1.54  0.16 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
a,b,c Note: The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column 
variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a z test. If a pair 
of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have different subscript letters assigned to 
them. 





As such, stories emphasized the 2015 protests from the viewpoint of official 
sources, mainly those of opposition groups, and experts. Finally, for evaluations (RQ4d), 
results show that coverage was consistently supportive of protestors and their cause, and 
critical to the administration, with no statistically significant variation overtime.  
Coverage across outlets 
Table 5.10 shows the cross tabulations and ANOVAS between the four outlets 
analyzed to assess the Research Hypothesis 1b (the more adversarial to Rousseff’s 
government the outlet, the more legitimizing to the protests the coverage will be).  
Table 5.10 – Use of devices, frames, sources and evaluations by outlets covering the  
2015 protests 
  
Folha Estado  O Globo Zero Hora  




Cause mentioned  75.8 a 82.8 a 67.9 a 71.4 a 1.8 
Frames 2      
 
Debate 39.4 a 44.8 a 39.3 a 50 a 0.63 
 
Thematic 24.2 a 51.7 b 46.4 a,b 50 a,b 5.99 
Sources Mean Mean Mean Mean  F(df=3) 
 
Official 55.44  66.67  75  25  2.23 # 
 
Protestor 8.89  0 12.50  37.50 2.81* 
 
Social Media 0  6.25  0  12.5  1.07 
 
Other 36.67  27.08  12.50  25  0.83 
Evaluations1      
 
Protestors 1.97  2.28  2.14  1.93  1.93 
 
Cause 1.92  2.29  2.11  2.4  2.38 
 
Administration 1.73  1.59  1.46  1.5  1.15 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
a,b,c The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column 
variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a z test. If a pair 
of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have different subscript letters assigned to 
them. 
1Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive. 
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For sources, O Globo and O Estado de São Paulo relied more on official voices 
[F (3, 51) = 2.23, p < .10] and Zero Hora relied more on protestor sources [F (3, 51) = 
2.81, p < .05]. No statistically significant differences emerged between the outlets in 
terms of frames, devices and evaluations. H1b was rejected. 
Sources and the protest paradigm 
Research hypotheses 2 and 3 ask about the relationship between sources and the 
protest paradigm. Table 5.11 shows that the only type of source that is significantly 
associated with a frame or device is the “other” (nonofficial experts, NGOs or groups), 
which is higher for thematic stories  [t(51) = 2.95, p = .01]. Table 5.12 shows that the 
presence of official sources is marginally and positively associated with support for the 
protestors (r=.23, p<.10); suggesting that the official sources quoted were from the 
opposition and, as such, supportive of the movement (H2b was rejected).  
Table 5.11- Relationship between proportions of sources used and presence of devices 
and protests frames in the coverage of the 2015 protests  
  
Official Protestor Social Media Other 




 -1.31  1.76#  -.65  .48 
 
Yes 54.27  16.24   2.56   26.92  
 
No 72.92   0   6.25  20.83  
  
        
Frames         
 
Debate  1.33  .49  -1.26  -1.30 
 
Yes 69.44   13.89   0  6.45   
 
No 52.15  9.68   6.45  16.67  
 
Thematic  -1.59  -.79  -0.91  2.95** 
 
Yes 43.75   6.25   0   50  
 
No 66.24   13.68   5.13  14.96   
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Quotes from the runner-up of the 2014 election, who obviously supported the 
anti-government demonstrations, were very frequent. One example from O Estado de São 
Paulo illustrates how senator Aécio Neves quotes were used: 
Aécio - who disputed the presidential election in 2014 and was defeated by Dilma 
- said once again that PSDB [his party] is only supportive of the protests, which 
are not partisan but instead “Brazilian.”  “PSDB is not behind this movement and 
it should not be, but it absolutely supports it and all its demonstrations. What I see 
today is an increasing presence of our militants, our friends, and our leaders in the 
movement. I will evaluate if I will attend this Sunday [demonstrations],” he said. 
(O Estado de São Paulo, 2013, my translation) 
 
Aécio Neves was not the only 2014 Presidential Election candidate to openly 
support the protests. Marina Silva - third place in the race - was interviewed many times 
by the outlets analyzed. Although Silva is a former Workers’ Party member and ran in 
2014 as part of a center-left coalition, her quotes were widely used to legitimize 
protestors’ demands: 
“It is evident that the president, her government and her coalition will have a lot 
of difficulty to solve this crisis. The main problem is that her government and PT 
[the Workers’ Party] abandoned politics as a form of dialog, negotiation, 
mobilization, and are not proposing a project for the country.” (Folha de São 
Paulo, 2015, my translation) 
 
Other non-official sources, like academic experts, were associated with thematic 
coverage, but this coverage was negative towards the protestors (r=-.32, p<.05) (Table 
5.12). As such, H3b is also rejected. Those were mainly quotes from scholars who 
disapproved the demand for impeachment and military intervention. For example, Zero 
Hora published:  
For journalist and writer Roberto Sander, demands for military intervention that 
were displayed in signs by protestors come from a “minority who is uninformed 
and has no political culture”…“The Impeachment would be too traumatic for 
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Brazil and for democracy. I think this is also the demand of a minority. We have 
to work for political reform, because campaign financing is the source of 
corruption.” (Zero Hora, 2015, my translation) 
 
Table 5.12 – Relationship between sources and evaluations of protestors, cause, 
administration and violence blame in the coverage of the 2015 protests 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Cause 
Evaluation 





-      
3. Administration 
Evaluation 
-.31** -.25** -     
4. Official sources -.13 .23 # -.08 -    
5. Protestor 
sources 
.16 .20 .02 -.43** -   
6. Social media 
sources 
.01 -.19 -.05 -.24 -.07 -  
7. Other sources .01 -.32* .10 -.70*** -.22 -.13 - 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
1Note: Evaluations were measured as 1=negative, 2=neutral, and 3=positive 
 
COMPARISON 
Research hypothesis 4 predicts that newspapers will be more likely to adhere to 
the protest paradigm in 2013 than 2015. This final section will address the differences in 
marginalization devices, frames, sources and evaluations by year. Table 5.13 shows the 
results of chi-square tests for differences in devices and frames, and t-tests for sources 
and evaluations between the two years.  
Results reveal that coverage in 2013 focused more on tactics, with mentions of 
“peacefulness” and “violence” statistically more frequent than 2015. About 15.9% of the 
stories in 2013 mentioned protests as “peacefulness,” compared to 6.7% in 2015 [χ 2 (1)= 
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5.70, p<.05]. In 2013, 44.7% of the coverage mentioned “violence,” almost nine times 
more than 2015 [χ 2 (1)= 53.48, p<.001]. This seemingly contradiction can be explained 
by stories that emphasize conflict, but also highlight that some protestors were peaceful. 
For example, O Estado de São Paulo published the following piece in June 19, 2013:  
The sixth day of demonstrations from Movimento Passe Livre in São Paulo started 
peacefully in Praça da Sé and ended with attempts to invade the City Hall, 
looting, the return of the riot police, and at least 47 arrested. According to the 
Police, most of the looters were homeless people and addicts. The Municipal 
Theater was vandalized. In Rua Augusta, protestors were dispersed with tear gas. 
The group was divided at the end of the afternoon. As opposed to the vandalism 
downtown, the group that marched Avenida Paulista was peaceful. (Estado de 
São Paulo, 2013b, my translation) 
 
Rather than viewing these two devices as mutually exclusive, their presence 
suggests an emphasis on the tactics used by the protestors in 2013, as opposed to their 
ideas. This becomes more evident when assessing the presence of a “cause mentioned:” 
in 2013, about 40% of the stories had no mention of protestor’s grievances and demands 
at all. This gradually went down over the four weeks analyzed in 2013. In 2015, only 
25% of the stories did not mention the cause of the protests. 
For frames of protests, results presented in Table 5.13 show that stories from 2013 
had a significantly higher proportion of the riot [χ 2 (1)= 24.03, p<.001] and confrontation 
[χ 2 (1)= 38.85, p<.001] frames. Conversely, the legitimizing “debate” frame was more 
prevalent in the 2015 coverage [χ 2 (1)= 5.13, p<.05], which was also twice more 
thematic than 2013 [χ 2 (1)= 24.38, p<.001]. Although uncommon in both years, the 
circus frame was more used in 2015 (8.7%) than 2013 (4%) [χ 2 (1)= 3.79, p<.05]. Figure 
5.1 depicts the differences between frames in 2013 and 2016. 
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Table 5.13 – Comparison between coverage of the 2013 and the 2015 protests by use of 




 2013 2015 χ 2 (df=1) 
Devices    
 
Appearance 11.10% 11.50% 0.01 
 
Idiot 7.40 7.70 0.01 
 
Peaceful 15.90 6.70 5.70* 
 
Violent 44.70 5.80 53.48*** 
 
Cause mentioned (1=yes) 59.50 75 8.37** 
Frames    
 
Circus 4 8.70 3.79* 
 
Riot 27.50 4.80 24.03*** 
 
Confrontation 32.00 1.90 38.85*** 
 
Debate 30.50 42.30 5.13* 
 
Thematic 18.30 41.30 24.38*** 
Sources Mean Mean t(df=251) 
 
Official 36.34 59.70 -3.33*** 
 
Protestor 23.23 11.52 2.05* 
 
Social Media 3.76 3.64 0.05 
 
Other 35.16 25.15 1.48 
Evaluation1    
 
Protestors 2.01 2.10 0.65 
 
Cause 2.19 2.14 -1.15 
 Administration 1.77 1.59 2.95*** 
#p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
a,b,c The column proportions test table assigns a subscript letter to the categories of the column 
variable. For each pair of media outlets, the column proportions are compared using a z test. If 
a pair of values is significantly different (p<.05), the values have different subscript letters 
assigned to them. 






Figure 5.1 – Comparison between frames of protest used in 2013 and 2015 by % of 
stories containing each frame 
 
 
When it comes to the use of sources (Figure 5.2), journalists relied more heavily 
on official sources in 2015 [t(251) = -3.33, p = .001], reinforcing the finding that, in this 
case, official viewpoints are not harmful to protestors. Instead, official sources from the 
opposition of Dilma Rousseff’s government were the leading voices in stories about the 
movement, successfully managing to exploit the street demonstrations.  
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Figure 5.2 – Proportion of quotes from different types of sources in 2013 and 2015 
 
Conversely, protestor sources were more common in 2013 [t(251) = 2.05, p = 
.01]. This means that, while coverage emphasized protestors’ ideas more in 2015, 
protestors’ voices were heard more in 2013. In 2015, the grievances and demands of the 
protestors were voiced by elected officials from opposition parties.  
 95 
Finally, when it comes to evaluations, overall coverage in both years tended to be 
slightly positive to the protestors and their motives (no statistically significant difference 
found). However, newspapers evaluated the administration much more negatively in 
2015 than 2013 [t(480) = 2.95, p = .001].  
DISCUSSION 
This section focused on the coverage of the 2013 and 2015 protests by four 
leading mainstream newspapers in Brazil, looking for patterns that characterize the 
“protest paradigm.” The findings presented here suggest that the presence of official 
sources and marginalization devices is not always harmful to protestors. Mentions of 
violence were often equally critical to the police, boosting public support for the 
movement in the face of intense police brutality. Similarly, official sources from 
opposition parties were used the most to legitimize protestors’ grievances and demands, 
while protestors’ quotes were used to ridicule them.  
In tandem with the literature on the protest paradigm, this study finds that when 
violence is present coverage will emphasize it. In 2013, both riot and confrontation 
frames were common, although stories often mentioned that demonstrations were 
“peaceful, with events of violence.” Protest paradigm scholars argue that focus on 
violence is detrimental to movements because it serves as deterrent for potential 
supporters, inflates the rhetoric and tactics used, and takes away space from protestors’ 
ideas in the story (McLeod, 2007; Gitlin, 1980). In the Brazilian case, this was not so 
straightforward: the more nuanced variable “violence blame” (who is to blame for the 
conflict?) revealed that emphasis on violence is not always equally delegitimizing to 
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social movements. Violence can be initiated by protestors or police, and the results 
presented here suggests that journalists are able to make that distinction. When police 
response increases - such as on the second week of the 2013 protest - coverage reflected 
that. Overall, the first week of coverage was characterized by emphasis on violence by 
the protestors, but it shifted to a more balanced violence blame after episodes of police 
brutality.  
In the semi-structured interviews, journalists working for these four publications 
revealed that they went to the streets with a checklist of what should be covered related to 
violence: which streets were blocked, how many episodes of looting, what was the 
damage to private or public property, confrontations with the police and number of 
arrests. According to one of them: “violence was a major editorial concern for the 
newspaper. It was always like: are there Black Blocs3 or not? Violence or not? Are 
people looting stores? Are they attacking the City Hall?”4  
Regarding the evolution of the “violence blame” over time, journalists explained:  
In the first demonstrations [in 2013], the narrative was that protestors initiated 
confrontation [with police]; they did not respect the police. In the following one, 
it was the police response. They [police] brought more people, were more 
prepared, had shields and all. And they came with more violence than normal. 
Downtown became a war zone. That exponentially increased the number of 
protestors and support for the group. … There were two moments in [name of 
outlet] and also mainstream media’s coverage. In the first one, we identified 
protestors as more violent, who assaulted police officers, destroyed buses, looted 
stores; our coverage reflected that. Something like ‘look, protests are legitimate, 
but the violence is going too far, protestors are going too far.’ This ended up 
giving support for the police to act more forcefully in the next protest. And that's 
                                                
3 Black Blocs were an extremist anarchic group that used masks to conceal their identity and resorted to 
violent tactics during the demonstrations 
4 Personal communication, my translation  
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when it [police] acted so strongly that it hurt journalists, hurt innocent people, and 
ended up using violence in an indiscriminate way. Then, [outlet] did an editorial 
condemning police violence.5 
 
Ultimately, findings presented here strongly suggest that when violence is present, 
it trumps all other information in the coverage. However, there was no evidence that 
emphasis on violence meant less space given to the ideas of protestors. In fact, presence 
of riot/confrontation frames and the legitimizing debate frame equally averaged 30% of 
the coverage. Newspapers that emphasized violence the most (O Globo and Zero Hora) 
were also the ones that had higher percentages of presence of debate frame and more 
positive portrayals of protestors. This effectively means that not all coverage of violence 
is equal: in the Brazilian case, coverage of violent police response served to legitimize 
the 2013 movement. In 2015, because there were no confrontations with the police, 
mentions of violence were virtually non-existent.  
Another important finding from this section refers to the use of sources. 
According to the literature, social movements do not have automatic standing in the 
media, and official voices’ dominance delegitimizes protestors (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 
1993). Findings here suggest that official voices were indeed dominant, but were used to 
legitimize the movement. In particular, politicians from opposition parties were quoted 
highlighting the validity of protestors’ demands in both 2013 and 2015. Quotes from 
other expert sources, like academics and NGO leaders, were also correlated with positive 
and thematic coverage. In the case of Brazil, when the demands of protestors and the 
interests of opposition leaders converged, quotes from these politicians commending the 
                                                
5 Personal communication, my translation 
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movement dominated coverage.  
Conversely, protestor quotes were used to ridicule them and strongly associated 
with a negative portrayal of the movement in both years. The quotes from protestors 
published were the ones in which their demands were portrayed as naïve, highlighting 
contradictions in their discourse. From a practical standpoint, these findings suggest that 
protestors are better off not talking to the media at all, regardless of the way the press 
portrays their movement. Even in 2015, when coverage was overall legitimizing, 
protestor quotes focused on the more extremist ideas, such as those asking for military 
intervention, even when they did not represent the majority of the movement. Instead, 
building strong alliances with political elites and academic experts is key to positive 
coverage as news grants automatic legitimacy to those sources. For the Brazilian 
protestors, key symbiotic alliances were formed with opposition party PSDB, specially 
senator Aécio Neves, who often became the spokesperson of the movement.  
Finally, this project also focuses on differences by year. In 2013, coverage 
emphasized protestors and their tactics. Initially, stories focused on Movimento Passe 
Livre and clashes with the police. By the end of June, as demands became unclear and 
leadership diffused, news stories focused on smaller conflicts between police and the 
radical fringe subgroup known as “Black Blocs.”  By the end of the month, the narrative 
of protests as a response to failures of Rousseff’s administration gained strength, 
although the range of demands encompassed left and right-leaning groups.  
In 2015, coverage was about the Workers’ Party administration, and protests were 
portrayed as part of a bigger anti-government narrative. News stories were thematic, with 
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overwhelming use of official sources that challenged the President. Very frequently, 
stories focused on corruption scandals and only briefly mentioned demonstrations to 
illustrate popular dissatisfaction with Rousseff’s administration. When I asked journalists 
about these differences, they explained: 
I think in 2013, no one knew what was going on. First, it was excitement, 
followed by fear of violence and we did not talk about demands a lot. I think in 
2015 demands were in the front page of every newspaper in the country: 
corruption and the “Car Wash Operation” [a corruption investigation by the 
Federal Police]. The Operation was the “filet mignon” in all newspapers. Protests 
were at the background of that political crisis…Newspapers tended to treat 
demonstrations within a macro perspective: look, the government is shit, Car 
Wash is revealing all the problems on Workers’ Party alliances, people are 
dissatisfied, unemployment is rampant…look, protests are legitimate.6 
 
For another journalist, the focus on violence was prevalent before June 2013, but 
this mentality changed as protests unfolded: 
Until June, our reporting mentality was this: we need to see what trouble 
demonstrations are causing. It was either confrontations with the police, or rioting 
around banks, or blocking traffic. Blocking Avenida Paulista [major avenue in 
São Paulo] during rush hour has a lot of impact, for example. After June, 
everything changed. A small protest is now newsworthy and we cover it because 
it became an issue in itself; [June] changed how we saw it [protesting]. It became 
part of our daily routine. Our views on protests changed, absolutely.7  
 
The findings presented here, therefore, strongly add to the recent literature that the 
protest paradigm has less to do with general suspicion of the protests and more to the way 
the government is seen, how rifts between elites play out it and how demonstrations fit 
within a larger political narrative in the country (Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Shahin et al, 
2016). Despite the emphasis on violence, which in itself was not followed by negative 
                                                
6 Personal Communication, my translation  
7 Personal Communication, my translation  
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coverage, all newspapers in Brazil were supportive of the protests after they became part 
of a larger criticism to the administration. In 2013, the more critical to Rousseff’s 
government the newspaper, the more positive the portrayal of the protests, even if the 
outlets are traditionally conservative, which is contrary to the bulk of research on the 
protest paradigm. Results here suggest that, rather than “paradigmatic,” negative 
coverage is contingent upon the relationship between protestors and powerful elites, who 
are then used by journalists to legitimize grievances and demands.  
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Chapter 6 - The Journalist 
This chapter focuses on a survey of Brazilian journalists examining news routines, 
reporting practices and political attitudes towards the 2013 and 2015 protests. The goal is 
to understand how individual, organization and routine-level influences impact the way 
journalists perceived the protests, their outlet’s coverage and mainstream media’s 
coverage of the demonstrations. Additionally, survey responses were used to assess how 
new media were incorporated into journalists’ routines when covering protests. The 
analysis proceeds in the following way: first, details on the methodological procedures 
used are presented. Second, I describe how journalists used social media for reporting. 
Third, a set of models assesses journalists attitudes towards the protests and how they 
perceive mainstream media coverage in general. This step was conducted for all 
respondents in the sample, regardless of employment status, that is, those who identify 
themselves as journalists but are not currently working on news organizations were 
included in this first analysis. Then, for employed journalists in the sample, the analysis 
includes how they perceived their outlet’s level of support for the movement. Throughout 
the chapter, quotes from open-ended questions and interviews with journalists are used to 
illustrate the findings.  
Findings reveal that journalists from the right viewed the 2015 demonstrations 
more favorably, while those who are younger were more supportive of the 2013 protests, 
regardless of their political alignment. Journalists from both sides of the political 
spectrum viewed mainstream media and their outlet’s coverage as adversarial to their 
own. Findings also reveal that social media was widely adopted as a reporting tool during 
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the demonstrations, serving as a “thermometer” to alert journalists about the importance 
of each scheduled event.   
METHOD 
Sampling and response rate 
Surveys capture individual characteristics and attitudes (Babbie, 2013; Weaver, 
2015), and results can be generalized to the whole population of journalists if sampling is 
representative. In some countries, there are complete lists of journalists who are required 
to belong to specific professional organizations, making representative sampling 
accessible. However, in countries like Brazil and the United States, there is no such list. 
The population for this study comes from a list of Brazilian journalists aggregated by the 
Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas at the University of Texas at Austin, which 
comprises more than 10,000 media professionals, journalism students and journalism 
educators in Brazil. This non-probability Internet panel includes the Center’s newsletter 
subscribers, alumni, members of email discussions lists, and people who participated in 
the Center’s Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). It is impossible to assess the 
representativeness of this convenience sample to the greater Brazilian journalist 
population, an issue that remains consistent for scholars interested in the state of 
journalism in Latin America (Herscovitz, 2012; Mellado, 2012, Schmidt-Weiss, 2015). 
However, the geographical distribution of this sample is very similar to the overall 
population in the country. The map presented in Figure 6.1 reveals this sample to be more 
geographically diverse than most studies of journalism in the region, which rely on 
 103 
findings coming primarily from the main cities like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and 
Brasília (Herscovitz & Cardoso, 1998).  




The survey was administered online using Qualtrics, a web survey software, from 
December 15th, 2015 to January 5th, 2016. An invitation was sent to approximately 
10,000 respondents, including journalists, journalism students and journalism educators 
in Brazil, yielding 1,250 responses. According to the American Association of Public 
Opinion Research’s guidelines (AAPOR, 2015) “response rates” should not be calculated 
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for non-probability samples, since they are not based on a known sampling frame with 
known probabilities of selection. Instead, AAPOR recommends the use of a simple 
measure of “participation rate” which is the number of respondents who have provided a 
usable response divided by the total number of initial personal invitations requesting 
participation. AAPOR cautions that “using such a rate as an indicator of possible 
nonresponse error makes little sense” (p.40). Instead, participation rate only measures the 
efficiency of a panel and how much effort is required to recruit members. Participation 
rates should be used primarily to detect inactive panel members for future surveys. As 
such, this metric has no utility as a basis for comparison across different studies 
(AAPOR, 2015). The participation rate for this study was 12.5% and detected about 300 
inactive participants (emails bounced). About 30% of the users opened the invitation 
email, suggesting that they are active users; that is, they a) get emails from the Knight 
Center, b) the email does not go directly into spam, and c) they actively open the 
messages. Although “response rate” standards are not appropriate for non-probabilistic 
samples, this study’s 12.5% participation rate is within the typical survey response range 
for web-based surveys (Dillman, 2007; Saldaña et al., 2016). The survey questionnaire 
took an average of 20 minutes to complete, with respondents ranging from 10 minutes to 
1 hour and 30 minutes for those who wrote longer responses for the open-ended 
questions. All questionnaires were conducted in Portuguese. The database does not 
distinguish between journalists, journalism students and journalism educators, and the 
invitation for the survey was sent to the three groups. This study uses responses from 
journalists only. Missing data was random (Little’s MCAR not significant), allowing 
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listwise deletion for final models. Given the large number of absolutely complete cases 
from journalists (N=798), no data imputation or missing data treatment was necessary.  
The measures on this survey are a combination of standardized demographic 
questions based on the work of Weaver and Willnat (2012), questions from previous 
work on journalists and political communication borrowed from Howard and Chadwick 
(2008) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), and questions specifically designed to 
measure protest attitudes and behaviors based on the survey by the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (2014). Appendix B contains a copy of the questionnaire with the 
exact wordings and presentations for questions used in the survey. Appendix D contains 
the descriptive statistics of the variables below, including standard deviation, range and 
operationalizations used.  
Independent variables 
Individual-level variables 
Demographics. Three key demographic variables were used in this study: age, 
gender and perceived social class. For age, respondents were asked to enter their age in 
years (M=33.08).  Females made up 52.5% of respondents. For social class, this item was 
measured with a question that inquired: “would you say that your household growing up 
was…1=lower class, 2= lower middle class, 3= middle class, 4= upper middle class, 5= 
upper class” (M=3.02). Social class is used in Latin American research instead of income 
(Canache & Allison, 2005; Cao & Zhao, 2005; Cramer & Kaufman, 2010) and it is 
especially useful when assessing class differences between people from the same 
profession, like the journalists in this sample.  
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Political variables. Political leaning was measured in a 10-point scale item where 
1= strong left and 10= strong right. Respondents were asked to think of their own 
political leanings and place themselves on this scale (M= 3.89). Political participation 
was measured using seven questions on a 10-point scale (1=never, 10=all the time). 
These items combine online and offline measures of political participation that the 
respondent may have engaged in the previous 12 months (“Please tell us how often you 
have been involved in the past 12 months in the following activities”). Voting is universal 
and compulsory in Brazil and, therefore, was not included:  
1. Attended a political protest  
2. Donated money to a campaign or political cause  
3. Been involved in public interest groups, political action groups, political 
clubs, political campaigns, or political party committees  
4. Created an online petition  
5. Changed your social media profile picture in support of a cause  
6. Joined a political or cause-related group on a social media site  
7. Tried to persuade your friends and acquaintances about a social cause, 
political cause or to support a candidate  
All responses were added into a single index (7 items averaged scale, Cronbach’s 
α=.79). The average political participation was 3.34.  
 
Overall, the average respondent in this sample was a middle-class 35-year-old 
woman who is slightly left-leaning and, on a scale of 1 to 10, averages 3.34 on political 
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participation levels.  
Organizational level  
Respondents were asked about the statements that best described their current 
work situation to assess organizational-level variables. About one-quarter of the sample 
described themselves as a journalist in a news organization, 10.7% work as 
trainee/interns, and 5.6% have their independent outlet. About 9.3% of the journalists 
interviewed work as freelancers and 14% work as public relations but consider 
themselves journalists. Unemployed journalists comprised 13.6% of the sample, and 
6.2% considered themselves primarily a journalist, but working exclusively as a professor 
at the moment. About 15% reported they were “other,” which included press secretaries 
for politicians and governmental institutions, consultants, data analysts, bloggers, and 
web designers for news organizations, just to cite a few.  
Given the lack of clarity on who is a journalist in the country, the survey also 
included a specific question regarding job status: “Do you currently work full time at a 
news organization?” and 39.7% of respondents marked “yes.” After pre-testing the 
questionnaire with a small sample of journalists, results revealed that several of them 
worked for multiple news organizations and government agencies, some full-time and 
some part-time. To overcome this, the questions regarding organizational level variables 
explicitly stated: “in case you work for more than one organization, choose the one you 
consider your primary employer.” 
Type of outlet. The majority of employed respondents in the sample work for print 
outlets (36.8%) and 28.2% work for online-only news media. About 14% work for 
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television networks and less than 8% work for radio, which were combined into a single 
TV/Radio variable. Journalists from news agencies comprised 4.7% of the sample, and 
9.1% reported they worked for “other.”   
Scope of outlet. Journalists working for national outlets comprised the majority of 
the sample (38.1%), followed by those employed by regional companies (32.7%). About 
14.3% worked for local organizations, and 14.8% worked for organizations with an 
international scope.  
Size of the newsroom. Respondents were also asked a question regarding the size 
of their newsroom, ranging from 1=very small (1 to 5 people) to 6=very large (more than 
100 people). The average was 3.20. 
Routines 
At the routines level, this project evaluates the impact of social media on 
reporting practices and how it may have affected the way journalists perceive the 
protests. All journalists in the sample were asked about their presence on social media 
platforms. Facebook was the most dominant platform, with 93.4% of the journalists in the 
sample, followed closely by Whatsapp, an instant messaging app, with 91.7%. Twitter 
users comprised 63% of the sample, and 70% had Instagram. About 67% of the 
journalists in the sample had an account on Linkedin, 64.4% on YouTube, 51.2% on 
Google Plus, 29.3% on Pinterest, and 25.7% on Snapchat. Other networks used were 
Flickr (22.1%), Tumblr (17.7%), and Reddit (3.5%). Only six (<1%)  journalists in the 
sample did not have an account on any social media site. 
Social media for reporting. Journalists in the sample were asked about their use of 
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social media for distinct reporting practices via eight questions asking “how often do you 
use social media for….” 
1. Receiving people’s feedback on the stories you write  
2. Publicizing your own work  
3. Finding sources for news stories  
4. Finding ideas for news stories  
5. Search or receive press releases  
6. Keep up with the news by reading other news organizations’ websites or social 
media pages  
7. Fact-check information  
8. Finding out what people are talking about  
For the matched analysis with the 23 journalists who covered the protests, more 
specific questions regarding their use of social media for reporting were asked: “In a 
scale of 1 to 10, how often did you use social media to…” 
1. Find out the details of the protest organization (date, location, etc.) 
2. Contact protest organizers  
3. Find sources for news stories  
4. Receive people’s feedback on the stories you wrote about the protests  
5. Find out what people are talking about regarding the protests  
Dependent variables 
This chapter focuses on how individual, organizational and routines-level 
variables impact attitudes towards the protests. The outcomes of this section also include 
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the way journalists viewed their outlet and mainstream media’s support for the 
movement.  
Protest attitudes 
Mainstream coverage. To evaluate the way journalists perceived mainstream 
media coverage, the survey asked:  “In general, do you think mainstream media coverage 
of the protests was: (1= totally unfavorable toward the protest, 10= totally favorable 
toward the protest).” The question was asked separately for the 2013 and 2015 protests. 
For 2013, the average response was 4.98. Overall, journalists perceived that the 2015 
protests mainstream media coverage was considerably more favorable (M=7.21). 
Outlet coverage. Employed journalists were also asked about their employer’s 
coverage through the following question: “In general, you think the editorial line of the 
media outlet you work for was… (1= totally unfavorable toward the protest, 10= totally 
favorable toward the protest).” Results reveal that journalists perceived their outlet’s 
coverage as fairly balanced for both protests, although the 2015 coverage (M=5.89) was 
rated slightly more positive that 2013 (M=5.82) 
Individual support for protests. Finally, journalists were also asked about their 
views on the protests (“In general, are you…1= unfavorable toward the protest to 10= 
favorable toward the protest?”). Respondents were in average more supportive of the 
2013 protests (M=7.72) than the 2015 protests (M=4.67).  
Data Analysis 
RQ5 asks about how journalists used social media for reporting. A factor analysis 
was conducted to identify the uses of social media for reporting. Then, ANOVAS and 
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correlations assessed the relationship between social media uses and journalists’ 
characteristics. 
The next set of RQs and Hypotheses assesses the impact of individual, 
organizational and routine variables on journalists’ attitudes towards the protests. These 
questions were answered in two ways. For all journalists in the sample, two hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted with each level of influence entered as a separate 
block to assess their influence on individual support and on their perceived level of 
mainstream media support for the protests. Then, for the journalists formally employed 
by a news organization in the sample, four hierarchical regression models were 
conducted to predict the following outcomes: perceived level of mainstream media 
support, perceived level of outlet support, and personal support for demonstrations. 
Variables were assessed by comparing their standardized coefficients (Betas). 
RESULTS 
Social media for reporting 
Research question 5 addresses the ways journalists incorporate social media into 
their reporting practices. A factor analysis identified two dimensions of the use of social 
media for reporting: social media for “awareness” and social media for “gatekeeping,” 
which are consistent with the literature on the topic (Hermida, 2013). As an awareness 
system, journalists use social media to passively monitor “what is going on?.” When used 
for gatekeeping, social media serves as a place where journalists actively parse 
information and reinforce their role as disseminators. Table 6.1 shows the rotated 
component matrix for these items.  
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Receiving people’s feedback on the stories 
you write  
.86 .16 
Publicize your own work .75 .04 
Finding sources for news stories .71 .37 
Finding ideas for news stories .69 40 
Search or receive press releases .45 .53 
Keep up with the news by reading other 
news organizations’ websites or social 
media pages 
.04 .86 
Get background information .20 .78 
Finding out what people are talking about .25 .57 
Initial Eigenvalue 3.69 1.15 
Percent explained variance 46.12% 14.32% 
Cumulative percent 46.12% 60.37% 
 
The first factor relates to finding sources, story ideas, receiving feedback and 
publicizing own work on social media. Those are activities related to gatekeeping 
(Eigenvalue= 3.69, Cronbach’s α=.80, M=6.80).  The second factor refers to activities 
associated with using social media as an awareness system. These include finding out 
what people are talking about, following news from other organizations, and getting 
background information (Eigenvalue= 1.15, Cronbach’s α=.70, M=7.73). The item 
“searching and receiving press releases” loaded more strongly on this factor, although it 
was also associated with the gatekeeping. 
The correlations table 6.2 reveals that journalists who are younger (r=-.15, 
p<.001), women (r=-.14, p<.001) and working for smaller newsrooms (r=-.21, p<.001) 
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use social media for awareness more. The use of social media for verification is not 
associated with gender, age, class, size of newsroom and outlet scope.   
Table 6.2 – Correlations between journalists’ characteristics and social media for 
reporting 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Age -       
2.Gender (male=1) .20*** -      
3.Social class .16*** .02 -     
4.Outlet scope .1 .03 .17** -    
5.Size of newsroom .03 -.05 .23*** .11* -   
6.Social media for 
reporting: Gatekeeping 
-.04 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.08 -  
7.Social media for 
reporting: Awareness 
-.15*** -.14*** -.07 -.04 -.21*** .57*** - 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
For the  journalists who covered the protests, another factor analysis was 
conducted with specific questions related to the demonstrations. Similarly, these items 
yielded two factors: gatekeeping and awareness. Table 6.3 displays the rotated 
component matrix. The factor analysis detected the use of social media to contact 
organizers to be more strongly associated with awareness practices. Additional 
Cronbach’s alpha tests of reliability were conducted including this item with the two 
possible factors, which confirmed that it was a better fit for “awareness” (Cronbach’s 
α=.76). When combined with the two “gatekeeping” factors, alpha was .68 and if the 
variable is deleted, it increases the consistency of the item to .85. The two factors were 
used as part of the “routines” block on regression analyses.  
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In general, journalists used social media as an awareness system to keep track of 
what was going on during the protests all the time (M=9.19), and also used the platform 
for gatekeeping very frequently (M=6.27). This rate of social media for protest reporting 
is vastly higher than the average daily use, especially when it comes to “awareness 
system.”  






Finding sources for news stories  .92 .05 
Receiving people’s feedback on the stories 
you wrote about the protests 
.94 .11 
Finding out what people are talking about 
regarding the protests 
.10 .73 
Finding out the details of the protest 
organization (date, location, etc) 
-.03 .79 
Contacting protest organizers .16 .95 
   
Initial Eigenvalue 2.31 1.53 
Percent explained variance 46.09% 30.62% 
 
For example, during the in-depth interviews, reporters explained that they started 
using Facebook when the scope of demands increased:  
In the beginning, Movimento Passe Livre would tell when the next protest would 
take place at the end of a demonstration. It was their practice to schedule that, tell 
the place, day, and time [of the next event]. But when demands increased, it 
became very difficult to do this because different groups scheduled protests. What 
helped a lot was Facebook. People would create an event and there was a 
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“thermometer” on how many people were interested.8  
 
A reporter from a mainstream newspaper in Rio de Janeiro also described the 
Facebook “Event” as one of the main reporting tools during the demonstrations, serving 
both as an awareness system and a place to find and contact sources: 
[During protests] I used social media a lot more than on daily life. I used 
Facebook every day to find protests, to find protestors, to interview them…I never 
used Facebook so much in my entire life than during the 2013 protests… I feel 
like the main reason why Facebook was so important was its capacity to “create 
an event.” What happened was that we saw an event tomorrow at Candelária with 
10 thousand confirmed, we knew that there would be about one thousand people 
there, so we had to send one reporter. It was usually like that, about 10% of 
Facebook confirmed people would show up. So if we saw an event with 100 
thousand confirmed, we would need to send more reporters. I think on Facebook 
we identified when the event was going to happen and, among those who 
confirmed, who were more active and could be used as sources. And we contacted 
them on Facebook itself.9 
 
As of WhatsApp, reporters identified the messaging app as a key tool for internal 
communication:  
The coverage was like this…for the first time I can remember, we created a 
WhatsApp group with all the reporters covering the protest, a guy in the 
newsroom, our editor, our assignment editor, photographers, everyone…there 
were groups with 20, 30 people. Each one of us would send information like: “I’m 
here at place X, walking with them, this road is blocked, I just saw a Black Bloc 
breaking an ATM…all the time, every minute, I would be sending WhatsApp 
messages. Then, someone in the newsroom would put those together in our 
LiveBlog.10 
 
Taken together, the evidence presented here shows that journalists in Brazil have 
widely adopted social media for reporting, using it both for awareness and gatekeeping. 
These uses are similar to those of U.S. journalists (Hermida, 2013), although journalists 
                                                
8 Personal communication, my translation  
9 Personal communication, my translation  
10 Personal communication, my translation  
 116 
in Brazil use Facebook and WhatsApp at higher rates. The journalists interviewed did not 
report using Twitter as a reporting tool during the protests. The next section addresses 
how social media use can impact the way journalists perceived the demonstrations.  
Individual attitudes towards the protests 
RQ6 to RQ8 and H5 to H8 assess the relationship between journalists’ 
characteristics and attitudes towards the protests in 2013 and 2015. The analysis will 
continue in the following way: first, descriptive statistics for individual attitudes, 
perceived outlet attitudes, and mainstream media attitudes will be displayed. Then, two 
linear regressions assess personal support for protests and journalists’ perception of 
mainstream media’s support. These models include all respondents in the sample, 
regardless of employment status. Third, regression analyses were conducted for 
employed journalists assessing their individual attitudes, the way they perceived their 
outlet’s attitudes and mainstream media’s attitudes. Appendix D contains the descriptive 
statistics for all the variables used, including standard deviations, operationalizations and 
ranges. 
Data characteristics 
Results show that journalists were more supportive of the protests in 2013 
(M=7.72) than in 2015 (M=4.67). However, they perceived mainstream media coverage 
of the protests as the opposite: 4.98 for 2013, and more favorable in 2015 (M=7.21). The 
graphs in figure 6.2 depict these relationships. For the employed journalists in the sample, 
they perceived their outlet as slightly more favorable to the 2015 coverage when 
compared to 2013. 
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Figure 6.2 – Journalists, outlets and mainstream media attitudes towards the protests as 
perceived by individual journalists (1= very unfavorable to 10= very 
favorable) in 2013 and 2015 
 
 
All respondents  
Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 further explore differences between individual, outlet and 
mainstream attitudes towards the protests. Table 6.5 shows the results of hierarchical 
regression analyses for all respondents in the sample, regardless of their employment 
status. Block 1 contained their demographics and block 2 their presence on social media 
platforms. Because they were not formally employed, the model does not have 
organizational level influences. The outcomes tested were individual support for protests 




Table 6.4 – Effect of demographics and social media use on perception of mainstream media and personal attitudes towards 
protests in 2013 and 2015 protests (1= very unfavorable, 10=very favorable). All journalists in the sample 
 
  2013 
2015 
  Perception of 
mainstream media  
Personal attitudes Perception of 
mainstream media  
Personal 
attitudes 
Model  Beta Beta Beta Beta 
Block 1: Demographics     
 Age 0.11** -0.16*** -0.10** 0.16*** 
 Gender 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 
 Class 0.03 -0.08* 0.05 -0.05 
 Political Ideology 0.24*** 0.01 -0.24*** 0.46*** 
 Political Participation -0.08* 0.07* 0.06 0.04 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.10*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.24*** 
Block 2: Social media use     
 Twitter 0.04 -0.08 0.07 -0.07* 
 Facebook -0.09** 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 Whatsapp 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.01* 0.01. 0.01 .0.01 
 Total R2 (%) 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.25*** 






For 2013, results reveal that journalists who are older (β= .11, p<.01), more 
aligned with the right (β=.24 . p<.001), and who participate less (β=-.08, p<.01) 
perceived mainstream media coverage as supportive of the protests, which is the inverse 
of their personal attitudes. Facebook use also emerged as a negative predictor of 
perceived mainstream media support: those who use the social network platform were 
less likely to view mainstream coverage as supportive of protests. For their personal 
attitudes, journalists who are younger (β= -.16, p<.001), with lower socioeconomic status 
(β=-0.08, p<.05) and higher levels of political participation (β=.07, p<.05) are more 
supportive of the 2013 protests. Political ideology did not predict individual support for 
protests in 2013 (Hypothesis 6 was rejected). The models explained 11.3% of the 
variance for mainstream media attitudes and 5% of the variance for individual attitudes. 
For the 2015 protests, these numbers flipped: those who were younger (β= -.10, 
p<.01) and more aligned with the left (β= -.24 p<.001) viewed mainstream media 
coverage as more supportive of the protests. Once again, the perceived mainstream media 
coverage was the opposite of one’s personal attitudes. This means that journalists were 
critical of mainstream media, and viewed coverage as adversarial to their own personal 
beliefs. Those who are older (β=.16, p<.001) and more aligned with the right (β=.46, 
p<.001) were significantly and strongly more supportive of the protests. H7, which 
predicts that “Journalists who are more aligned with the right will be more supportive of 
the 2015 protests than those who are aligned with the left” was supported. Social media 
use did not influence attitudes for this sample in 2015. The model explained about 8% of 
the variance for perceived mainstream media attitudes, and 25% for individual attitudes.  
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Taken together, these results confirm that the 2013 protests were viewed more 
sympathetically by those who are younger while the 2015 protests gained support from 
those who are older and aligned with the right. Both sides, though, viewed mainstream 
media support as adversarial to their personal attitudes.  
Employed journalists 
Separate analyses were conducted for the employed journalists in the sample. 
Table 6.5 shows results for 2013, with each column assessing perception of mainstream 
media, outlet, individual and the gap between individual and outlet support, answering 
RQ6 (What factors influence the way journalists perceived a) the 2013 protests, b) their 
outlet’s coverage of the 2013 protests, c) mainstream media’s coverage of the 2013 
protests?).  
Results show that those aligned with the right (β=.23, p<.001) perceived 
mainstream media as more supportive of the protests. No organizational level variables or 
social media for reporting practices were associated with perceived mainstream attitudes. 
For the way journalists saw their outlets’ support, those who are aligned with the right  
(β=14, p<.05) and who participate more frequently  (β=.20, p<.01) perceived their outlet 
as more supportive of the 2013 protests. Conversely, women (β=-.14, p<.05) and those 
who directly covered the protests (β=-.13, p<.05) perceived their outlet’s coverage as 
more negative. 
Organizational level blocks yielded a poor model fit for perceived mainstream 
media and outlet’s attitudes, suggesting those variables have a very small impact (R-
square change not significant) and do not predict outcomes beyond chance. When it 
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comes to personal attitudes, those who are older (β-.19= p<.01) and working for bigger 
outlets  (β= -.14, p<.05) were less supportive of the 2013 protests. Those working for 
national and international outlets were more supportive of the protests than those working 
for local and regional newspapers (β=.15, p<.01).  
Table 6.5 – Effect of demographics, social media use and organizational characteristics 
on perception of mainstream media, individual outlet and personal attitudes 
towards protests in 2013. Only journalists formally employed.  
 








Model  Beta Beta Beta 
Block 1: Individual Level    
 Age 0.06 0.05 -0.19** 
 Gender (1=male) -0.08 -0.14* -0.03 
 Class -0.01 0.06 -0.09 
 Political Ideology 0.23*** 0.14* -0.01 
 Political 
Participation -0.10 0.20** 0.05 
 Covered protests 
(1=yes) -0.03 -0.13* -0.19 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.09*** 0.06** .06** 
Block 2: Organizational level    
 Print (ref)    
 Radio/TV -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 
 Online 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
 Other -0.02 -0.15* -0.07 
 Scope -0.09 0.06 0.15* 
 Size 0.08 -0.11 -0.14* 
 ΔR2 (%) 0.02 0.03 0.04* 
Block 2: Social media use    
 Gatekeeping 0.02 0.15* 0.08 
 Awareness -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.01 0.01 0.01. 
 Total R2 (%) 0.11*** 0.11** .10** 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 6.6 shows the impact of different levels of influence on individual, outlet 
and mainstream media support for the 2015 protests (RQ7), as perceived by the 
journalists in the sample. At the mainstream media level, journalists who are older (β= -
.18, p<.01), more aligned with the right (β=-.22, p<.001), and who participate less (β=.18, 
p<.01) perceived mainstream media as less supportive to the 2015 protests. Overall, 
right-leaning and older journalists were more likely to be critical of mainstream media’s 
coverage of the 2015 protests. Neither organizational level variables nor social media for 
reporting use emerged as significant predictors of perceived mainstream media support 
for protests in 2015.  
For the way journalists perceive their outlet’s support for the 2015 protests, no 
demographics emerged as a significant predictor. At the organizational level, journalists 
working for bigger newsrooms perceived their outlet’s coverage as more supportive of 
the 2015 protests (β=.19, p<.01). Conversely, journalists working for online platforms 
viewed their employer company as less supportive of the protests (β=-.12, p<.10).  
When it comes to personal attitudes, the demographics block explains more than 
one-quarter of the variance observed. Those who are older (β=.18, p<.01) and more 
aligned with the right  (β=.45, p<.001) were more likely to support the 2015 protests. 
However, lower socioeconomic class is associated with more support for the 2015 
protests, counter to the idea that only richer segments supported the anti-government 
movement.  
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Table 6.6 - Effect of demographics, social media use and organizational characteristics on 
perception of mainstream media, individual outlet and personal attitudes 
towards protests in 2015. Only journalists formally employed.   
 
  Perception of 





Model  Beta Beta Beta 
Block 1: Individual Level    
 Age -0.18** -0.01 0.18** 
 Gender (1=male) 0.04 0.04 -0.02 
 Class 0.16** 0.02 -0.16** 
 Political Ideology -0.22*** 0.01 0.45*** 
 Political Participation 0.18** -0.01 -0.01 
 Covered protests 
(1=yes) 
0.03 -0.02 0.04 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.18*** 0.01. 0.29*** 
Block 2: Organizational level    
 Print (ref)    
 Radio/TV -0.03 -0.11 0.02 
 Online 0.01 -0.12# -0.09 
 Other -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 
 Scope -0.09 -0.05 0.02 
 Size 0.08 0.19** -0.11 
 ΔR2 (%) 0.01 0.06** 0.01. 
Block 2: Social media use    
 Gatekeeping 0.02 0.14* 0.08 
 Awareness -0.07 -0.08 0.01 
 ΔR2 (%)  0.00 0.01 0.01 
 Total R2 (%) 0.19*** 0.08* 0.31*** 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
DISCUSSION 
This section focuses on journalists reporting practices and attitudes towards the 
protests and the media. Two main findings emerged. First, social media was widely 
adopted for protest coverage, serving as a “thermometer” during demonstrations. Second, 
individual-level characteristics were the strongest predictors of journalists’ attitudes, and 
reporters, especially those who are left-leaning, viewed their outlet’s position and 
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mainstream media as adversarial to their own.   
When it comes to social media, results suggest that Facebook and WhatsApp have 
been incorporated into newsroom practices, and this use increased substantially during 
the protests. During in-depth interviews, journalists revealed that Facebook’s “Events” 
served as a thermometer indicating which demonstrations were taking place, how many 
people were going and who could be used as sources. WhatsApp groups became “virtual” 
newsrooms where reporters shared information from the streets with editors and each 
other. However, the impact of this adoption on attitudes towards the protest was 
statistically hard to detect: since social media use averaged 9.19 out of 10-point scale 
with a standard deviation of 1.09, there was not enough variance in the independent 
variable to assess effect sizes for attitudes in this sample. Hypotheses 5 (“The more 
journalists incorporate social media routines to their reporting, the more supportive they 
will be to the protests”) was rejected, although the next chapter will assess the impact of 
social media use for actual content in more nuanced ways.  
Research questions 6 and 7 ask about the relationship between journalists’ 
characteristics and protest attitudes. The models presented here reveal that demographic 
characteristics were the strongest predictors of support for protests and also of the way 
journalists perceived mainstream media and their outlets’ levels of support for the 
demonstrations. In general, journalists who are younger were more supportive of the 
2013 demonstrations and viewed mainstream and outlet’s coverage as negative. 
Conversely, journalists who are older and aligned with the right viewed the 2015 protests 
more positively, and mainstream media and their outlet as slightly less supportive of the 
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movement. As a whole, these results show that individual-level influences are the 
strongest predictors of support for protests, and journalists perceive mainstream media 
and their own outlet’s coverage as adversarial to their own, for both 2013 and 2015.  
From the organizational level variables, size of the newsroom was the main 
predictor of attitudes, with those working for bigger outlets perceiving them as more 
supportive of the 2015 protests and less supportive of the 2013 demonstrations. The 
discrepancy between personal, outlet and mainstream media attitudes suggests that 
journalists have a critical view of their outlet and of the press as a whole. When I asked 
reporters about the way they evaluated media coverage of the protests, a journalist from a 
mainstream newspaper explained that the criticism comes not from the actual stories that 
were published in 2013, but instead from the parts that were omitted: 
Maybe the criticism [from journalists toward outlet’s coverage] comes from what 
did not make it to the story. It’s not the final result, but about what didn’t make it 
that explains the conflict between reporters and editors. I remember that they 
[reporters and editors] would have heated arguments because the reporter wanted 
to have a graph saying this and that and the editor would say “no, this is not going 
to be there.” The criticism was more about the process than the final result.11 
 
In 2015, reporters across the political spectrum were critical of what they 
perceived as “disproportional attention” given to the protests:  
This time [2015], mainstream media gave a large space to protest coverage right at 
the beginning, maybe even because of the 2013 protests. Here, I think in some 
moments the media even contributed to expanding the movement, giving space to 
small demonstrations that would not normally be covered. Fearing being negligent, 
the press was forced to cover each step of the protestors exhaustively.12 
 
For left-leaning reporters, it was precisely the excessive space given to the 2015 
                                                
11 Personal communication, my translation  
12 Open-ended response, my translation  
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demonstrations that made the coverage biased, which in turn fueled the movement: “I 
believe that mainstream media coverage was partial, supportive of the [2015] movement 
and helped create a wave of discontentment towards the government. I believe media 
coverage helped foment a wave of protest that had already lost its force.”13 Conversely, 
right-leaning reporters viewed that mainstream media coverage was too episodic, but “not 
in-depth because journalists feared being seen as part of a coup d'état.” 14  
According to a center-right journalist: 
Mainstream media focused only on the size of the demonstrations, on how many 
people went to the streets. Part of the coverage showed that protestors were 
ignorant, did not know what was going to happen after Dilma falls, etc. Others 
focused on the fact that protestors “voted for Aécio.” They [mainstream media] 
‘enjoyed’ saying that people went to the streets wearing soccer jerseys, which 
became the new way of delegitimizing the protest [by highlighting the festive 
characteristics of the demonstrations].15  
 
In sum, journalists from both sides of the ideological spectrum were critical of 
mainstream media and, to a lesser extent, their own outlet’s attitudes towards the protests. 
They viewed coverage produced by others as adversarial to their own beliefs, and biased 
coverage happened through patterns of omission or overestimation of demonstrations. 
But beyond perceptions, how do those attitudes translate into actual content? How does 
this ideological struggle play out? The next chapter brings together journalists’ personal 
attitudes and organizational constraints into a predictive model that simultaneously tests 
the impact of variables from all levels of influences of the hierarchical model. 
  
                                                
13 Open-ended response, my translation  
14 Open-ended response, my translation  
15 Open-ended response, my translation  
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Chapter 7 - Linking journalists and coverage 
The last part of this dissertation connects journalists to the content they produced, 
simultaneously examining the various influences shaping their coverage. The models 
presented in this chapter come from a matched analysis combining independent variables 
from survey data to content generated by those same journalists. Twenty-three journalists 
were selected to represent a variety of newsrooms from different sizes, scopes, and 
geographical regions. Ultimately, the models presented here attempt to answer the 
following question: can variables coming from the different levels of the hierarchical 
model predict the protest paradigm? 
Results show that social media use is positively associated with coverage that 
emphasizes confrontations between police and protestors, but one that blames the police 
for starting it. Social media use for reporting is also correlated with a positive portrayal of 
protestors’ causes. At the individual level, findings reveal that the relationship between 
personal attitudes and coverage is inverse: the more a journalist supports the movement, 
the less legitimizing the coverage will be. This effect held true even controlling for the 
way journalists perceived their employer’s editorial lines to be.  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Using Factiva and Google search, stories produced by a subsample of journalists 
who answered the survey were collected for content analysis via identifying their byline. 
Only stories on the 2013 and 2015 protests were content analyzed. Table 7.1 has the 
name and type of outlet for the journalists in this subsample. The subsample's 
demographic and political characteristics closely match the general one: 56.5% women, 
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middle-class, and 31 years old. Politically, the subsample is more balanced than the larger 
sample, with a mean of 4.69 (range 1 ‘strong left' to 10 ‘strong right'). In the larger 
sample, the average was 3.89. The levels of support for the protests in the subsample 
ranged from 1 to 10, with an average of 5.86. 




in the sample Scope 
Type of 
outlet 
Correio Braziliense 4 National Newspaper 
Folha de São Paulo 3 National Newspaper 
G1 3 National Online 
RBS/Zero Hora 2 Regional Newspaper 
BBC Brasil 1 International Online 
Correio Bahia 1 Local Newspaper 
Correio do Povo 1 Regional Newspaper 
Diario de Santa Maria 1 Regional Newspaper 
Estado de Sao Paulo 1 National Newspaper 
Folha da Regiao 1 Regional Newspaper 
IG 1 National Online 
IstoÉ 1 National Magazine 
Jornal do Commercio PE 1 Regional Newspaper 
NY Times 1 International Newspaper 
Terra 1 National Online 
Total: 23 
  
     
The data analysis was done in two levels: the individual journalist (N=23 
individual journalists) and the individual story (N=90 news articles total). Because of the 
nature of the codebook, this analysis was limited to journalists who produced print 
content for newspapers, online-based outlets or magazines. As such, audiovisual elements 
were not coded. At the level of the journalist, correlations revealed how individual 
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characteristics and attitudes relate to the features of the content produced by that 
journalist. This procedure compares the correlations between journalists' characteristics, 
including the type of outlet they work for and their use of social media for reporting, to 
the percentage of their content containing various frames, marginalization devices, 
sources and positive/neutral/negative evaluations. For each journalist, all stories were 
averaged, e.g.,  if journalist A produced 10 stories and 6 of them contained the "riot" 
frame, then 60% was entered for the riot variable of journalist A.  
At the story level, hierarchical logistic and linear regression analyses assess how 
individual, organizational and routines-level variables relate to content. These models 
allow for the simultaneous testing of all variables, predicting how changes in independent 
variables increase the odds of a particular frame or marginalization device to appear in a 
story (logistic regression). For the way stories portrayed protestors, their cause and the 
administration (negative, neutral or positive), linear regressions were conducted. 
RESULTS AT THE INDIVIDUAL JOURNALIST LEVEL 
RQ8 asks how journalists' characteristics relate to their coverage of protests 
regarding a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources, and d) evaluations. Three sets 
of correlation tables were used to answer this research question, evaluating the 
relationship between demographics, outlet's characteristics, social media use for reporting 
and coverage outcomes. Table 7.2 shows the correlations between journalists’ 




Table 7.2 – Correlations between journalists’ characteristics and average use of marginalization devices in their coverage  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Age -              
2.Gender .29 -             
3.Income -.09 -.10 -            
4.Personal 
attitudes 
-.04 -.24 -.50* -           
5.Scope of 
newsroom 
.08 .47* .29 -.46* -          
6.Size of 
newsroom 
-.08 -.13 -.14 -.18 -.10 -         
7.Outlet attitudes .02 .01 -.15 .05 .21 .28 -        
8.SM 
Gatekeeping 
-.05 -.43* -.25 .04 -.59** .24 -.09 -       
9. SM Awareness .12 -.21 .27 .21 -.13 .01 .21 0 -      
10. Idiot 0 -.19 -.01 .17 .16 .01 -.23 -.27 .12 -     
11.Peaceful -.26 -.18 -.07 .00 -.29 -.09 .18 .06 -.20 -.26 -    
12.Violent .19 .29 -.08 .06 -.10 -.03 .09 -.08 .40 -.21 -.04 -   
13.Violence 
blame (+adm) 




-.16 -.05 .14 -.43* .09 .14 -.13 .25 .01 .26 .06 -.07 -.06 - 
* p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Results from Table 7.2 show journalists' use of social media for awareness was 
strongly and significantly correlated with blaming the administration for starting the 
violence (r=.51, p<.05), suggesting that following conversations on social media leads to 
coverage more critical of the police. Mentioning the cause of the protests was negatively 
associated with journalists' own views on the movement (r=-.43, p<.05). That means the 
more journalists support a movement, the less common is for their coverage to mention 
the cause of the protests. No other characteristic was significantly correlated with 
marginalization devices used. 
RQ8b) asks about frames used by journalists when covering the demonstrations 
(Table 7.3). The "confrontation" frame emphasizing the clash between police and 
protestors was correlated with the use of social media as an awareness system. Taken 
together, the evidence from "devices" and "frames" correlation tables suggests that 
journalists who turn to social media to find out what is going on with the protests will 
give more space to the confrontation between police and protestors, but also blame the 
administration for starting this confrontation. Research hypothesis 8 (The more 
journalists incorporate social media into their reporting routines, the less they adhere to 
the protest paradigm) was partially accepted.  
The legitimizing "debate" frame was negatively and strongly associated with 
journalists' personal support for the protests (r= -.53, p<.01). This effectively means that 
the more reporters supported the movement, the less they used legitimizing frames in 
their stories.  
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Table 7.3 – Correlations between journalists’ characteristics and average use of frames in their coverage  
 
Correlations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Age 1              
2. Gender .29 1             
3. Income -.09 -.10 1            
4. Personal 
attitudes 
-.04 -.24 -.50* 1           
5. Scope of 
newsroom 
.08 .48* .29 -.46* 1          
6. Size of 
newsroom 
-.08 -.13 -.14 -.18 -.10 1         
7. Outlet 
attitudes 
.02 .01 -.15 .05 .21 .28 1        
8. SM: 
Gatekeeping 
-.05 -.43* -.25 .04 -.59** .24 -.09 1       
9. SM: 
awareness 
.12 -.21 .27 .21 -.13 .01 .21 0 1      
10. Circus -.11 .23 -.12 -.35 .4 .11 .45* -.13 .01 1     
11. Riot .27 .26 .01 .20 -.28 -.23 -.06 -.18 .38 -.17 1    
12. Confront. .07 -.07 .16 .33 -.22 -.09 .04 -.14 .44* -.26 .67** 1   
13. Debate -.29 .09 .17 -.53** .39# .23 -.03 -.01 -.11 .38 -.43* -.51* 1  
14. Thematic/
Episodic  
.08 -.10 -.23 .33 -.33 -.23 .21 -.05 -.14 .14 .28 .16 -.61** 1 




While this could mean that journalists are under editorial constraint and were 
censored to match the outlet's views on the protest, results from correlations do not 
support that rationale: the outlet's degree of support for protests - as identified by 
journalists themselves - is not significantly correlated with coverage outcomes. Because 
correlation tables do not control for other levels of influence, this finding will be further 
probed later at the story-level regression analyses. Results also reveal that the scope of 
the newsroom (local, regional, national or international) is correlated with legitimizing 
coverage; that is, the broader the scope, the more the coverage will have the "debate" 
frame.  
For sources (RQ8c), organizational-level variables were associated with use of 
different source types. Correlations presented on Table 7.4 show that journalists who 
worked for outlets supportive of the protests used less official sources (r=-.42, p<.05). 
Those working for national outlets used protestor sources more (r=.43, p<.05). 
Finally, for evaluation of protestors (RQ8d), younger journalists in this sample 
had a coverage that was more positive to the protestors (r=-.45, p<.05). The coverage of 
those working for bigger newspapers was more critical of the administration (r=-.43, 
p<.05). For "cause evaluation" results show an inverse correlation with individual's 
support for the protests (r=.-.45, p<.05). Table 7.5 has the correlations between 
journalists’ characteristics and their portrayal of the protests.
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Table 7.4 – Correlations between journalists’ characteristics and average use of sources in their coverage  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.Age -            
2.Gender .29 -           
3.Income -.09 -.10 -          
4.Personal attitudes -.04 -.24 -.50* -         
5.Scope of 
newsroom 
.08 .48* .29 -.46* -        
6.Size of newsroom -.08 -.13 -.14 -.18 -.10 -       
7.Outlet attitudes .02 .01 -.15 .05 .21 .28 -      
8.SM: Awareness -.05 -.43* -.25 .04 -.59** .24 -.09 -     
9. SM: Gatekeeping .11 -.21 .27 .21 -.13 .01 .21 0 -    
10. Official sources -.33 .04 .28 -.21 -.08 .19 -.42* -.11 .22 -   
11. Protestor 
sources 
-.11 -.05 -.05 -.23 .43* .19 .36 -.18 .02 -.12 -  











 Table 7.5 – Correlations between journalists’ characteristics and average protestors, cause and administration evaluations in 
their coverage  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.Age -            
2.Gender .29 -           
3.Income -.09 -.10 -          
4.Personal 
attitudes 
-.04 -.24 -.50* -         
5.Scope of 
newsroom 
.08 .47* .29 -.46* -        
6.Size of 
newsroom 
-.08 -.13 -.14 -.18 -.10 -       
7.Outlet 
attitudes 
.02 .01 -.15 .05 .21 .28 -      
8.SM: 
Gatekeeping  
-.05 -.43* -.25 .04 -.59** .24 -.09 -     
9.SM:  
Awareness 
.12 -.21 .27 .21 -.13 .01 .21 0 -    
10. Cause 
evaluation  
-.31 -.15 .25 -.45* .39 .29 .26 .25 -.01 -   
11. Protestor 
evaluation 
-.45* -.09 -.06 -.10 -.16 -.18 -.03 .25 -.16 .40 -  
12. Adm. 
evaluation 
.28 .25 .03 .28 -.07 -.43* .13 -.40 .19 -.43 .05 - 
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Once again, journalists' individual attitudes seem to have a reverse impact on the 
way they portrayed the movement. Results here confirm findings from the "frames" 
correlations: the more a journalist support a movement, the more negative the coverage 
will be, but there is no indication that this comes from the way they perceive their outlet's 
support for the cause to be. This finding may seem counterintuitive, and the analyses 
presented in the next section will further explore if it holds when controlling for the way 
journalists’ perceive their outlet’s editorial position in regards to the protests. 
RESULTS AT STORY LEVEL 
The final set of research questions in this dissertation refers to how individual, 
organizational, routine and contextual variables together predict adherence to protest 
paradigm's patterns of news coverage. RQ9 (how do influences at different levels 
influence coverage of protests regarding a) marginalization devices, b) frames, c) sources, 
and d) evaluations?) requires the simultaneous test of variables from all levels of 
influence on content. To answer these questions, a series of hierarchical logistic and 
linear regressions were conducted. For the individual-level influences, the first block 
contained demographic variables (age, gender, class) and personal attitudes (degree of 
support for the protests). At the organizational level block, variables included the scope 
of the outlet and the size of the newsroom, as well as outlet's attitudes towards the 
protests as identified by the journalists themselves. At the routines level (block 3), the 
two factors for social media use for reporting were entered: awareness and gatekeeping. 
These were based on the factor analysis for journalists’ use of social media for reporting. 
Finally, the last block included contextual factors via assessing the sole importance of the 
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year of the protests (2013 or 2015), when controlling for all other variables.  
Because the outcome of "marginalization devices" and "frames" is dichotomous - 
presence or absence - this section uses logistic regression models. Logistic regressions 
can evaluate, for example, the probability of "violence" to appear in coverage given the 
patterns in outlet type, journalists' attitudes or social media use (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2013). For outcomes that are numeric - number of sources and evaluations ranging from 
negative to positive - multiple linear regressions were used.  
Devices  
The first model of Table 7.6 depicts the impact of the influences on the odds that 
the coverage will have specific devices: peaceful, violence and cause mentioned (RQ9a). 
“Peaceful” refers to mentions of protest tactics as non-violent. Conversely, “violence” is 
about stories mentioning looting, clashes between police and protestors, destruction of 
property, etc. “Cause mentioned” assesses if the story mentioned the reason why 
protestors were taking place.  
 For the presence of the "peaceful" device, the model fit was not good as indicated 
by non-significant chi-square tests. Chi-square tests here assess the difference between 
the logistic model with all predictors and one with no predictors. If the result is not 
statistically significant, the model with predictors is no better at predicting the outcome 
than the one with just the intercept (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  
For the presence of devices related to "violence," the odds increase by hundreds 
of times with an increase in the scope of the organization (p<.001). While this number 
seems very large, it is important to note that national and international organizations are 
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located in São Paulo, which is also the place where demonstrations were most violent. 
Regional protests, such as the ones in the Northern region, happened weeks later and 
were supported by the police already (Mesquita, 2013).  
The use of social media for awareness increases the odds of a story mentioning 
violence by 157%. From the contextual variables, a story from 2015 was 99% less likely 
to mention violence than a story of 2013, in tandem with findings from content analysis 
that showed violence was not present in 2015. In other words, violence in the coverage 
will always follow violence in the streets, regardless of individual or outlet's support for 
the movement, and social media use actually increases the odds of violence appearing the 
coverage. Not enough stories in this subsample had violence to allow for the testing of 
the more nuanced "violence blame" variable with a good model fit. 
Model 3 from Table 7.6 assesses if the cause of the protests was mentioned in the 
story. Results reveal that each year increase in the age of the journalists decreased the 
odds of the cause being mentioned by 22%. Organizational-level influences did not 
increase probability beyond chance (chi-squares not significant). At the routines level, 
each increase in the use of social media as an awareness system led to a 155% increase in 
the odds of a story mentioning the cause of the protestors. Because all stories from 2015 
mentioned a cause, there was no variance to assess the particular impact of contextual 
variables on the probability.  
For sources used (RQ9c), the models did not yield good fits, suggesting that there 
is no prediction for the presence of a type of source based on these variables beyond 
chance.   
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Table 7.6 – Logistic regressions assessing the impact of journalists’ characteristics on 
presence of marginalization devices 
 






     B  OR B  OR B  OR 
Block 1: Individual        
 Age -0.09 0.92 0.02 1.02 -0.12 0.88* 
 Gender (M= 1) -0.07 0.94 0.93 2.54 -0.30 0.74 
 Class 0.31 1.36 -1.98 0.14 -1.30 0.27 
 Personal support for 
the protest 
-0.35 0.71* -0.25 0.78 -0.55 0.58 
      
Block 2:Organizational           
 Scope         
 regional (ref)          
 national -2.55 0.08 3.30 27.06* 1.09 2.97 
 Size -0.36 0.70* -0.04 0.96 -0.24 0.79 
 Outlet  attitudes 0.18 1.20 -0.21 0.81 -0.03 0.97 
  
Block 3: Social Media Routines    
 Awareness -0.34 0.71 0.94 2.57* 0.94 2.55* 
 Gatekeeping -0.15 0.86 0.23 1.26 -0.28 0.76 
       
Block 4: Context             
 Year        N/A1  
 2013 (ref)         
 2015 -0.12 0.89 -4.40 0.01**   
       
Nagelkerke R-sq.  0.21   0.51   0.27  
Chi-square 15.23   42.05*** 6.23* 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 






A second set of logistic regressions was run to answer RQ9b, which relates to the 
presence of four frames of protest: riot, confrontation, debate and thematic/episodic. 
Table 7.7 depicts those results.  For the "confrontation" frame, results reveal that a year 
increase in the age of the journalist leads to a 14% increase in the odds of the story to 
emphasize the clash between police and protestors. Personal attitudes are also associated 
with the presence of the "confrontation" frame, with an increase in the level of support 
for the protests leading to an increase in 109% in the odds. Stories from national outlets 
are vastly more likely to have the confrontation frame (OR=17.39, p<.001). For the “riot” 
frame, Hosmer and Lemeshow tests of goodness of fit revealed that the model does not 
increase the odds of prediction beyond chance. In other words, the variables included in 
this model fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
For the "debate" frame,  results continue to confirm that each year of age 
decreases the odds of legitimizing coverage by about 10%. In other words, stories written 
by those who are older are less likely to have the legitimizing "debate" frame. Once 
again, personal support for the protests actually has a negative impact on legitimizing 
coverage (OR=0.72, p<.05).  
Only organizational-level variables predicted thematic coverage. One unit 
increase in the size of the newsroom led to a 90% increase in the odds of thematic 
coverage. Regional outlets are a lot less likely to have thematic coverage: only four 
stories in regional outlets provided context, explaining the odds ratio of 316.13 for the 
scope. Overall, national and international outlets with bigger newsrooms are more likely 
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to bring thematic coverage, while local newspapers are more likely to have episodic 
stories. 
Table 7.7 – Logistic regressions assessing the impact of journalists’ characteristics on 







B OR B  OR B  OR 






Age 0.13 1.14* -0.12 0.89# -0.06 0.94 
 
Gender (M=1) -0.01 0.10 -0.23 0.79 -0.72 0.49 
 
Class 1.28 3.58 -1.34 0.26 -0.81 0.44 
 
Personal support 
for the protests 0.74 2.09** -0.34 0.72* 0.43 1.54 
      
Block 2: Organizational           
 
Scope 











national 2.86 17.39* 1.44 4.22 5.76 316.13**  
 
Size 0.46 1.58 -0.20 0.82 0.67 1.96* 
 
Outlet att. -0.29 0.75 0.18 1.20 -0.42 0.66 
     
Block 3: Social Media Routines         
 
Awareness 0.76 2.13 0.63 1.87 0.77 2.17 
 
Gatekeeping 0.18 1.20 -0.11 0.90 0.15 1.17 
      
Block 4: Context             
 
Year  













N/A1   1.85 6.34 
Nagelkerke R-sq.  0.36  0.3   0.361   
Chi-square 27.44** 21.76*   23.86** 
# p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
1No stories in 2015 had confrontation and riot frames 
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Because it was so rare, there was not enough variance on the presence of the 
"circus" frame to generate models that can predict it beyond chance. The 2015 protests 
did not have any incidence of violence in this subsample, so the last block was not 
included in the models for "confrontation" and "riot" frames. Similarly, because all of the 
2015 stories in this subsample did contain the legitimizing "debate" frame, it was not 
possible to assess the impact of contextual variables on the analysis.  
Evaluations 
Finally, the set of linear regressions on Table 7.8 show the impact of each level of 
influence in the way stories evaluated the protestors, their cause and the administration 
that they were challenging. Evaluations ranged from 1= negative, 2= neutral to 3= 
positive. Results reveal that stories written by those who are younger (β=-.35, p<.01) and 
female (β=-.26, p<.05) were more likely to portray protestors more positively. However, 
once again, personal support for the protests was negatively associated with positive 
coverage (β=-.45, p<.01). The individual-level block accounted for 27% of the variance 
observed. Stories written by those who support the movement are more likely to be 
negative, controlling for everything else.  
Influences from organizational, routine and context levels did not yield a 
significant R-square change (F tests not significant). It is worth noting that in the final 
model, organizational-level influences are marginally significant, suggesting that national 
newspapers are more likely to portray protestors negatively. Stories written by journalists 
who think their outlet is supportive of the protests are also more likely to have a positive 
portrayal of the protestors. However, these effect sizes are much smaller. Overall, the 
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negative impact of a journalist's personal attitudes towards protestors goes beyond the 
way they perceive their outlets' attitudes to be. In other words, when a journalist is 
supportive of the movement, the coverage will be the opposite and this holds true beyond 
the outlet’s level of support for the movement as measured by the journalist. 
Table 7.8 – Linear regressions assessing the impact of journalists’ characteristics on 
evaluations of protestors, cause and administration  
 
  
 Protestor Cause Administration 
  
 Betas Betas Betas 
Block 1: Individual  
    Age  -0.35** -0.06 0.08 
 Gender (M = 1)  -0.26* -0.20 0.14 
 Class  -0.18 0.15 0.18 
 Personal attitudes  -0.45** -0.04 -0.05 ΔR2 (%)   0.27*** 0.08 0.21*** 
   
Block 2: Organizational     
 Scope      regional (ref)      national  -0.37
# 0.27 -0.25 
 Size  -0.19 0.38* -0.32* 
 Outlet attitudes  0.24
# 0.27 0.15 
ΔR2 (%)   0.04  0.02 0.04 
     
Block 3: Routines        
 
SM Awareness  -0.15 -0.16 -0.07 
 
SM Gatekeeping  -0.02 0.54** -0.12 
ΔR2 (%)   0.01 0.13* 0.01  
     
Block 4: Context        
 
Year   
   
 
2013 (ref)  
   
 
2015  -0.20 -0.43* -0.31* 
ΔR2 (%)   0.02 .077* 0.05* 
  Total R2  0.34*** .31** .31** 
 
# p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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For the portrayal of the cause defended by the protestors, results show that only 
social media use for gatekeeping practices - such as contacting sources, verifying 
information, and broadcasting own work - was associated with coverage that portray 
protestors’ causes more positively (β=.54, p<.01). For contextual variables, results reveal 
that 2015 protests had a more overall negative causal evaluation (β=-.45, p<.01). This 
seemingly contradictory results can be explained by the overall descriptives of this 
subsample: while the 2013 protests had an actual range of evaluations from 1 (negative), 
2 (neutral) to 3 (positive), no stories in 2015 had a negative cause evaluation (less than 2). 
As such, this variable only assesses the range from neutral (2) to positive (3).  
Finally, for administration evaluation, outlet size was positively and significantly 
more associated with negative (β=-.32, p<.05) portrayal of the government. The larger 
the outlet, the more critical of the administration its coverage will be. In 2015, portrayal 
of the administration was also substantially more negative (β=-.31, p<.05) than 2013. 
CONCLUSION 
The last set of research questions and hypotheses in this dissertation connects 
variables from a survey of journalists to the content they produced. Using data from 23 
journalists from various print and online-based organizations, the goal was to assess 
which variables have predictive power when it comes to the protest paradigm. Results 
reveal that individual-level variables and using social media for reporting have the 
strongest impact on coverage, and the relationship between personal attitudes and 
portrayal of protestors is negative. 
The first main finding of this chapter refers to the impact of using social media for 
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reporting during protests. Journalists who used online networks as an awareness system 
were more likely to emphasize violence, but also to blame the police for starting it. When 
used for gatekeeping, social media practices were associated with stories portraying the 
cause more positively. While the literature identifies the "confrontation" frame as part of 
the protest paradigm, the "violence blame" variable reveals that not all emphasis on 
violence is necessarily negative to protestors, as seen on Chapter 5. In this case, although 
social media use was linked to stressing clashes between police and protestors, it was also 
strongly correlated with journalists blaming the police for starting the violence.  
These findings may come from the influence of online activism during the 
demonstrations. In 2013, groups like the independent media collective Mídia Ninja 
broadcasted live from the streets confrontations between police officers and protestors 
(Mayotte, 2013). The impact of citizen journalists did not go unnoticed by journalists in 
this sample: 
[Mídia Ninja] was important part of alternative media, profoundly impacting the 
coverage of the 2013 protests and those after that, and changing mainstream 
media. They were relevant because they were closer to the demonstrations and 
showed facts that traditional media did not, but at the same time with strong 
political views. This is not necessarily a problem, but should be understood as 
part of their coverage16. 
 
While it is not within the scope of this paper to go into details regarding the 
relationship between citizen journalism (Mídia Ninja) and mainstream media, the results 
presented here add to the body of research suggesting social media could be used by 
activists to influence  news-making processes (Chadwick, 2013). In the case of Brazil, 
                                                
16 Open-ended response, my translation 
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this was done mainly by highlighting police brutality and pushing forward idea that 
protestors’ causes are legitimate. 
At the individual level, age was the primary demographic factor impacting 
coverage, with younger journalists more likely to mention demands and portray 
protestors positively. Women journalists were also more likely to produce coverage that 
was sympathetic to the protestors. While it is easy to speculate that because of age 
similarities younger reporters were more likely to take the student leaders from 
Movimento Passe Livre more seriously, future studies should further explore these gender 
and age differences. 
One of the most puzzling findings from this chapter comes from the relationship 
between individual attitudes and protest coverage. Results strongly suggest that the more 
journalists support the movement, the less legitimizing the coverage will be. At first 
sight, one could argue that journalists simply calibrated their coverage to match how they 
perceived their employer's attitudes to be, but regression analyses showed that the 
negative relationship holds even when controlling for organizational-level attitudes. In 
other words, the regression models revealed that the impact of personal attitudes goes 
beyond the way journalists see their outlets’ editorial lines, a finding that indicates self-
correction is more than attempting to please employers. It is important to note that the 
way journalists in the sample reported their employers’ biases is by no means an absolute 
measure of actual editorial leaning. In fact, findings from the content analysis (Chapter 5) 
showed that coverage was not extreme to any side of the political spectrum and had very 
similar characteristics across various outlets.   
 147 
In other words, the evidence presented here reveals that journalists tend to 
"correct" their coverage and this goes way beyond the way they perceive their outlet's 
editorial leaning to be. For the Brazilian case, this process happened by giving less space 
to the movement's ideas, portraying their cause more negatively and not using the 
"debate" frame. 
When I asked journalists about how they reconciled their personal attitudes with 
their professional role, they explained two processes happened at the same time: self-
correcting and ideological struggles with editors in the newsroom. 
First, self-correcting is a widespread practice, with journalists from mainstream 
media striving to be seen as objective and impartial, similar to the ways U.S. journalists 
would attempt to preserve their ideals of professionalism. According to a reporter from a 
weekly national magazine: 
Working for the big media, there is a type of “self-censorship” among journalists 
who avoid participating politically or taking sides publicly about political themes. 
I am afraid of showing support [on social media] for causes, for example, or give 
my opinion and be labeled as an activist journalists and, therefore, less 
impartial.17  
 
Mainstream media journalists also evoked professionalism to differentiate 
themselves from activist groups. As put by a journalist from a big newspaper: "Even if 
you write a story favorable to a cause, it is fundamental to give voice to those who 
oppose it. That’s what it means to be a journalist."18 For journalists, guaranteeing that 
their viewpoints do not spill over into the coverage is an integral part of their professional 
                                                
17 Open-ended response, my translation 
18 Open-ended response, my translation  
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identity, and they often justified negative protest coverage as a result of adhering to 
journalistic norms. For social movements more associated with the left, self-correction 
can have damaging results because most journalists in Brazil are politically aligned with 
them. Rather than negative coverage coming from an ideological resistance to groups that 
challenge the status quo – as argued by Gitlin (1980) in the United States – Brazilian 
journalists are very supportive of leftist social movements, but self-correct their biases to 
remain objective. 
Another explanation for coverage contrary to personal attitudes comes from 
ideological struggles in the newsroom, with a few journalists reporting that they 
disagreed with editors on the information to be published in the final product. 
Statistically, the impact of the outlet's editorial line was much smaller, but reporters 
explained that there was a battle regarding the focus on tactics or on ideas, which could 
account for the "cause mentioned" device. They reported that their editors would always 
prefer to emphasize conflict and violence, while limiting the space given to protestors’ 
grievances and demands.  
According to a reporter from a mainstream newspaper: 
In [outlet], we had reporters who were leftist and reporters who were very 
conservative, and editors who were leftist and others who were conservative. So 
at the end of the day, there was a conflict between the leftist reporter and the 
conservative editor on what to publish, for example. The editor wanted to 
emphasize violence, destruction, fire, rubber bullets, etc., and the reporter wanted 
to focus on why protests were taking place19.   
 
Another journalist revealed that it was harder for him as a reporter not to be 
                                                
19 Personal communication, my translation  
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sympathetic to protestors in 2013 because the scope of police brutality against them. But 
for the editor in the newsroom, that was a distant reality. At the end of the day, they 
already prioritized what they knew “the newspaper wanted to print [‘o que vai sair no 
jornal’].20” With the exception of one journalist who worked as a freelancer for an 
international news organization, all journalists interviewed reported feeling “guilty” 
about their coverage of the 2013 demonstrations.  
When stories they wrote highlighted demands, some journalists reported that it 
was common for them to be edited to fit editorial lines: "Mainstream media outlets have 
very defined editorial positions and it was common for my story to be edited (without 
asking me) to match those interests."21 It is possible that editors were harsher when they 
knew the reporter’s political leaning, which could account for negative coverage 
appearing more frequently on stories from reporters who support the movement. But 
overall, journalists in this sample viewed their outlets’ constraints as much smaller than 
their level of self-correcting. 
However, it is important to note that the processes of self-correcting and 
newsroom editorial conflict were more prevalent in 2013; in 2015, the anti-government 
narrative served to legitimize the movement, regardless of how aligned with it journalists 
were. Results presented here suggest that this was particularly true of larger national 
newspapers, who provided more thematic coverage critical of the administration.  
                                                
20 Personal communication, my translation  
21 Open-ended response, my translation  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter 8 – Toward a typology of protest coverage 
“Awareness of the media’s routines and frames is no guarantee that a 
movement will be able to achieve publicity for its analysis and program on 
its own terms ... But surely ignorance of the media’s codes condemn a 
movement to marginality”  
— Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, 1980, p. 287 
 
In the summer of 2013, a small demonstration against bus fare increases ignited a 
country-wide wave of protests in Brazil. Following outrage over intense police 
repression, citizens took to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with rampant 
corruption, human rights violations and excessive expenditures on the 2014 World Cup. 
After bus fare demands were met, right-leaning activists joined the demonstrations and 
widened the scope of the grievances against the government. By the end of the year, 
widespread participation in the protests had ceased, and would not begin anew until after 
the reelection of Dilma Rousseff in November 2014. In 2015, a second major wave of 
demonstrations hit the country. This time, protests were more elite-driven and with a 
clear anti-government agenda seeking the removal of the President. In May 2016, the 
senate voted to suspend Rousseff from power and began the process of impeachment.  
This dissertation examined the factors influencing journalists’ work covering 
protests in Brazil, with three goals in mind: (a) to analyze the way journalists framed the 
2013 and 2015 protests; (b) to investigate the different levels of influences on journalists’ 
work; and (c) to assess the impact of social media on the work of journalists covering the 
demonstrations. Guided by the literature on protest coverage, a media sociology approach 
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was employed to examine how protest coverage changes when movements become elite-
driven. The Brazilian case is particularly unique in that it combines a press guided by 
North-American professionalism with a democratic system marked by a recent history of 
military interventions and impeachments.  
This final chapter is organized in the following way: first, I present a review of 
the empirical findings from the content analysis, survey and matched data analyses. Then, 
I discuss the implications of those results for the literature on the protest paradigm and 
the impact of the findings for journalists and social movements. Finally, I address 
weaknesses and strengths of the study, along with the potential for future research. 
REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS 
The findings from this project came from content analysis (Chapter 5), survey 
(chapter 6) and a linked analysis combining the two (chapter 7). Chapter 5 focused on 
stories published on the protests by the four most-circulated newspapers in Brazil. News 
during the two protest waves was compared based on the four characteristics of the 
protest paradigm: marginalization devices, sources, frames, and evaluations. 
Marginalization devices refer to depictions of protestor tactics as violent or mentions of 
their appearance or naiveté. The protest paradigm is also characterized by quotes from 
official sources who usually delegitimize the movement. Four frames of protest were 
used in this study: confrontation (emphasis on clashes between police and protestors), riot 
(emphasis on deviance), circus (emphasis on oddity) and debate (legitimizing frame). 
Finally, evaluations refer to the valence (positive/neutral/negative) of the portrayal of 
protestors, their cause and the administration they were challenging. 
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 Three major findings emerged from the content analysis. First, the emphasis on 
violence was prevalent, but it did not necessarily lead to a negative portrayal of 
protestors. Second, official sources were used to legitimize the protests. Third, adherence 
to the protest paradigm had more to do with the way the government is viewed than with 
the movement per se.  
The first main result concerns the emphasis on violent tactics, present throughout 
the 2013 protests. As the protest paradigm predicts, stories highlighted rioting and 
confrontations with the police, usually in the lead. However, findings also suggest that 
journalists were able to make a distinction between violence initiated by protestors and 
the police, and coverage emphasizing confrontation was often accompanied by frames 
legitimizing the movements. Thus, the focus on violence worked in favor of protestors' 
agendas, generating outrage against police brutality, expanding public support of the 
movements and legitimizing their grievances. It is important to note that negative 
coverage of the police only occurred following the second day of protests in 2013, when 
riot police responded violently not only towards demonstrators, but also journalists and 
bystanders.  
The second main finding from the content analysis comes from the way official 
sources were beneficial to protestors when their interests aligned. As the protest paradigm 
predicts, quotes from official sources were predominant, but they were more often used 
in stories to legitimize the movement in both 2013 and 2015. Conversely, quotes taken 
from protestors were frequently used to ridicule them, even in 2015. For demonstrators, 
direct access to stories via quotes did not guarantee control over the discourse, even when 
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the press was sympathetic to the protests. A more effective strategy was to use official 
sources or academic experts to convey the movement's messages.  
Results from the content analysis show an evolution and expansion in the news 
frames over time, as the narrative behind the protests went from movement-specific - bus 
fare rates - to generalized opposition to the government. Initially, stories focused on 
tactics and confrontations with the police, though they often blamed police for the 
clashes. By the end of 2013, coverage became more thematic, providing context and 
connecting protests to larger criticisms of Rousseff's administration. In 2015, the vast 
majority of news situated the demonstrations within a broader political story about the 
crisis in the Workers' Party. Articles were longer, elite-oriented and rarely quoted 
protestors, but portrayed their movement as a legitimate part of a bigger picture.  
Chapter 6 discussed the results of a survey of Brazilian journalists, measuring 
their reported news gathering routines, their perception of the protests, and of the work of 
the press when covering the demonstrations. Because a great deal of protest activity was 
organized and negotiated online, I was particularly interested in how journalists 
incorporated social media into reporting practices.  
Results revealed that online networks, most notably Facebook and Whatsapp, 
have been extensively assimilated into reporters' daily routines, and even more so during 
breaking news events like protests. Journalists in the sample most often used the 
platforms as a system of awareness, monitoring conversations on social media as a 
"thermometer" to determine how to go about covering future events. During the protests, 
reporters also used social media to contact sources, discuss the logistics of reporting with 
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their peers, and parse information to pass along to their audience. 
About their norms, journalists consistently reported that violence was a major 
editorial concern in their outlet and intrinsically newsworthy to their audience. Reporters 
described how their news-making process started with a checklist of facts related to 
looting, destruction of private and public property, confrontations with the police, number 
of arrests, etc. In line with the literature, results show that norms and routines perpetuate 
a narrative of violence in coverage. 
Results from the chapter focusing on journalists also addressed the relationship 
between their backgrounds and their perception of the protests. As expected, left-leaning 
journalists were more supportive of the 2013 demonstrations, while right-leaning 
reporters viewed the 2015 protests more positively. Both groups had a critical view of the 
coverage by their outlets and mainstream media in general, suggesting an awareness of 
the gap between their personal attitudes and the attitudes of their employers and their 
peers. During in-depth interviews, journalists revealed that this criticism did not 
necessarily come from an assessment of the news product itself, but instead from their 
experience negotiating what information was highlighted or omitted. 
Finally, Chapter 7 linked the content to those who produced it by assessing how 
personal attitudes, organizational constraints, newsgathering routines and contextual 
variables translate into news stories. Results from regression analyses revealed a pattern: 
social media use for reporting was associated with coverage emphasizing violence, but 
also with blaming the police for escalating confrontations. In addition, journalists who 
used online platforms to contact sources were more likely to portray protestors' causes 
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more positively than those who did not. 
One of the most significant findings from this dissertation comes from the 
relationship between journalists' personal attitudes and the characteristics of their 
coverage. Results showed that the more a journalist supported a movement, the less 
supportive of the protests the coverage was. This link held true even when accounting for 
journalists’ perception of the editorial line of their employers. More specifically, the more 
a journalist supported a movement, the less coverage gave space to the protestors’ ideas, 
portrayed their cause positively or used legitimizing frames.  
Influences from the organizational level had a very limited direct impact on 
content. Instead, the results presented here show that, if present, organizational-level 
influences are mediated by individual-level characteristics. In other words, this study 
found that it is the individual set of characteristics that shaped stories, but not without 
acknowledging that organizational structures may have had an impact on those individual 
perceptions, which in turn influenced content. 
Through interviews, journalists from this sample explained that they continually 
self-assessed and corrected for potential bias, a correction that they believe differentiated 
them from “activist journalists.” In 2015, journalists also expressed a profound desire to 
avoid repeating mistakes from 2013, particularly in terms of dismissing legitimate 
grievances early on in coverage. According to them, the 2013 demonstrations altered 
journalists' views on protesting itself and how it should be covered. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, a few respondents reported that over-eagerness not to repeat mistakes may 
have led to coverage overestimating the importance of the initial demonstrations in 2015. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This case study provided an opportunity to examine how the protest paradigm 
responds to political uncertainty and when protestors’ agendas converge with the interests 
of other political elites. The overarching conclusion is that journalistic norms and 
routines can work in favor of protestors when demonstrations fit larger political 
narratives and against protests that are viewed positively by journalists themselves.  
Not all violence and official sources are equal 
The literature on the protest paradigm identifies journalistic norms and 
newsgathering routines as the bedrock of coverage delegitimizing social movements. 
Since social movements are not a formal “beat,” reporters do not develop a close 
relationship with protestor sources, as opposed to public officials who have automatic 
standing in the media (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Through newsroom socialization, 
journalists learn to cover demonstrations favoring spectacle to the detriment of 
movements' ideas (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1999; Boyle, Armstrong & McLeod, 
2012, McLeod, 2007). The persistence of the protest paradigm has led scholars to 
consider that journalists may have a deep ideological resistance to groups that challenge 
the status quo (Entman & Rojecki, 1993). As Gitlin (1980) puts it: “there is a journalistic 
squeamishness at the unscripted disorder of protests. Unreadiness to take protest seriously 
amounts to unwillingness” (p. xix).  
This study, however, moves away from understanding protest coverage as 
paradigmatic towards a more complex view of the relationship between journalists and 
protestors. Rather than treating frames as mutually exclusive, I was interested in whether 
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and how they appeared together in the same article. In the case of protests, stories 
contained frames emphasizing clashes between protestors and police, and simultaneously 
addressed the demands and grievances behind the movement.  
In 2013, news stories indeed prioritized violence, including rioting, looting, and 
clashes with the police. However, after the second week of demonstrations, coverage 
became more critical of the police and sympathetic to protestors' ideas. As such, news 
was determined not only by protestors’ actions but also by the police response to them. In 
the case of Brazil, the emphasis on violence neither took space away from ideas nor 
served as a deterrent for prospective supporters. In fact, it catalyzed public support for the 
initial demonstrators (Moares & Santos, 2013; Moreira & Lima Santiago, 2013). 
As the protest paradigm predicts, official voices were dominant in news coverage. 
But because protests evolved into a generalized antagonism to the government in power, 
elected officials from opposition parties served to legitimize the movement. This is 
contrary to the bulk of the literature on the paradigm, which assumes that official sources 
and protestors have diametrically opposed goals. This result is an interesting point of 
convergence between indexing theory and the protest paradigm, suggesting that 
legitimizing and thematic coverage of protests can be provided by officials who share the 
movement's grievances and demands (Bennett, 1990, 1996, 2011; Bennett, Lawrence & 
Livingston, 2007; Lawrence, 1995, 2012). In Brazil, as bus fare demands gave way to an 
anti-government narrative, news began portraying the movement's actions in a more 
thematic way, providing context behind protestors’ demands. I argue that this transition 
occurred as a function of demonstrations becoming a political issue within the larger 
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context of the conflict between the ruling Workers’ Party and oppositional parties.  
Even when the overall coverage of protestors was positive, protestors’ quotes 
were rarely used, and when used, served to ridicule the movements in both years. This 
finding speaks to the distinction between "access" and "meaning," an issue that indexing 
theorists have long been aware of (Lawrence, 2001). While sources are undoubtedly 
central to how protestors are framed, gaining access does not guarantee that coverage will 
be sympathetic to the movement. In fact, the results of this study suggest the opposite: 
protestor quotes were associated with an emphasis on physical appearance and 
highlighted contradictions in the movement’s ideas. For social movements, the evidence 
presented here shows that powerful alliances with elites or academic experts is a more 
fruitful strategy and one that assures quotes will not be used to ridicule the movement in 
the news. This approach, of course, risks allowing elites to transform cooperation into 
cooptation, inherently changing the nature of the social movement (Coy, 2013). From the 
perspective of media coverage, however, harnessing the power of elite and academic 
expert allies was the key to positive portrayal of the Brazilian demonstrations as 
journalists gave these sources automatic standing.  
Journalists’ balancing act: self-assessments and self-corrections 
Beyond describing coverage patterns, a media sociology approach focuses on how 
they happen. By matching journalists’ survey results to the content they produced, this 
study showed that the more Brazilian journalists supported the protests, the more 
negative their coverage was, even when controlling for the way they perceive their 
outlet's editorial line. Overall, journalists were personally more supportive of the 2013 
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protests than the 2015 demonstrations, but the content they produced – and that of the 
Brazilian media in general – was the opposite. This finding defies the logic of the protest 
paradigm, which is rooted a notion that the press has an ideological resistance to 
protestors (Gitlin, 1980; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). Fearing being seen as activists, 
reporters evoked professionalism to justify a critical approach to protests they personally 
supported. As one newspaper reporter explained: "[in 2013] fear - shared with colleagues 
in the newsroom- helped keep us in a constant state of alert so that coverage was not 
biased or used by protestors to stir up conflict." 
In 2015, journalists were also eager not to repeat mistakes from 2013. In 
particular, reporters from the four most-circulated newspapers perceive that their initial 
coverage and that of their outlet failed to report on demands and make sense of the chaos 
of the demonstrations. Interestingly enough, they also worry that correcting episodic 
patterns could have led to an overestimation of the 2015 protests, which were anticipated 
and promoted in the media even before the actual demonstrations took place.  
Journalists in this sample displayed a great deal of critical assessment of their 
work and the work of the press, constantly self-checking for potential bias and calibrating 
their coverage with others in the newsroom. Of course, there is nothing wrong with 
journalists self-correcting in an attempt to remain impartial. But for leftist movements - 
precisely those viewed very positively by the journalists in the sample - this pattern could 
be quite damaging. In 2015, despite journalists general suspicion of the movement, a 
larger anti-government narrative combined with a fear of repeating mistakes from 2013 
led to coverage that was more legitimizing to the movement. In other words, when 
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journalists were suspicious of protests, it did not matter: professionalism kept them at 
bay, and norms and routines actually weakened the protest paradigm in the sense that 
reporters could not ignore messages from official sources supportive of the movement. 
From a sociological perspective, patterns of self-assessment and calibration can 
be understood as part of Brazilian journalists’ processes of understanding their self-
identity as a reflexive process. According to Giddens (1991), self-identity comes from 
actively shaping, reflecting and monitoring ourselves to craft and understand our own 
biographies. Reflexivity in modernity manifests through the “chronic revision in the light 
of new information or knowledge” (Giddens, 1991, p.20). For the reporters in this 
sample, observations of their previous work, and evaluation and correction of their own 
biases is what defined their identities as professional journalists. These processes may be 
heightened by their intellectual training in communication schools in Brazil, which 
largely follow a critical tradition.  
The findings from this dissertation speak to what journalism scholar Bernardo 
Kucinski described as the “Brazilian paradox” – the constant tension between the 
country’s leftist journalist and the conservative mainstream press. The author describes 
self-censorship as an integral part of the ethos of journalists who intentionally hide 
information from readers as a survival strategy in newsrooms owned by conservative 
families: 
[leftist journalists] adopted a low profile approach, a rehearsed alienation, which 
implied patterns of self-censorship. For the politically aware journalist, 
participation must happen outside of the newsroom. ‘Journalists’ freedom of 
opinion is limited by their bosses’ political leaning’ and democracy is a bourgeois 
facade. (Kucinski, 1998, p.68, my translation) 
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I hesitate, however, to call the results here “self-censorship” for two reasons. 
First, journalists’ efforts to avoid political bias went way beyond the way they perceived 
bias from their employers. Second, differences between coverage in 2013 and 2015 did 
not come from actively hiding information from audiences in 2013, but instead from 
providing a more thematic coverage anchored in legitimizing discourses from official 
sources in 2015. 
Implications for the practice and social movements 
Beyond theory, this project has several implications for the practice and for social 
movements. In both years, protestor quotes continued to be employed in superficial ways, 
highlighting naivety and physical traits. Even when coverage was positive, the voices 
heard came from official sources and academic experts. To put it bluntly: Brazilian 
protestors were better off not speaking to the press at all, even when coverage seems to 
be sympathetic to their causes. In fact, protestors were more able to shape news narratives 
through social media than via in-person interviews. Because online platforms have been 
largely adopted by journalists during breaking news events, they provided protestors with 
a direct channel to news producers. The results presented here show that online strategies 
mattered: journalists who used social media for reporting were more likely to blame the 
police for confrontations and portray protestors’ causes more positively.  
Recently, protestor groups in the United States - most notably the students 
fighting racial discrimination at the University of Missouri -  have reacted to this pattern 
by creating "safe spaces" from the press and speaking to supporters directly via social 
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media (Starr, 2015). Similarly, during the Ferguson protests, activists were able to 
promote Black Lives Matter without relying on mainstream media (Freelon, McIlwain & 
Clark, 2016). The findings from this project provide support for those strategies. If 
journalists do not want to become irrelevant in protest coverage, they must seek to treat 
protestors in the same way they would treat an official source or an academic expert.  
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Much of the literature on protest coverage focuses on the content and its effects, 
and very few studies, if any, have attempted to understand how journalists on the ground 
navigate political turmoil to cover street demonstrations. The primary strength of this 
dissertation comes from its media sociology approach that shed a spotlight on how the 
norms and routines behind the protest paradigm operated in Brazil.  
One of the biggest contributions of this project comes from its multi-method 
design combining survey, content analysis and in-depth interviews. This approach was 
selected to provide both depth and breadth to this study. On a macro level, the content 
analysis of stories from four mainstream newspapers provided a picture of how protests 
were covered and how coverage trends evolved over time. Then, results from a survey 
with more than 1,250 Brazilian journalists revealed their reporting practices and attitudes 
towards the movement, their work, and the work of the press. Together, those two 
analyses provided the “big picture” of how protests were portrayed and seen by 
mainstream media professionals.  
Then, this project went into depth by linking survey responses to content analysis 
of stories produced by 23 selected journalists. The matched analysis, rare in 
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communication research, allowed for the simultaneous testing of influences from all 
levels of the hierarchical model into actual content. Following the quantitative analyses, 
in-depth interviews with journalists in this subsample allowed for clarification and 
elaboration of the processes behind their coverage. This method can be replicated in any 
study that attempts to quantitatively disentangle processes behind news making, allowing 
for hypothesis testing and replication. When combined with qualitative methods - such as 
in-depth interviews and ethnography - the matched analysis can provide a holistic and 
robust approach to studying journalistic production.  
Another strength of this project is that it addressed the importance of social media 
for mainstream news reporting practices. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the 
role of online platforms for protest organization, but only briefly mentioning its potential 
for disrupting the news routines followed by journalists when covering demonstrations. 
This study quantitatively assessed this potential, with findings that are encouraging to 
social movements.  
More broadly, this study matters because it undertook the question of under which 
conditions negative coverage appeared, and under which conditions the protest paradigm 
was weakened. The findings presented here are particularly relevant as similar protest 
dynamics unfolded in several countries, such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Egypt. For 
example, protests in Tahir Square ousted President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically-elected President of 
Egypt. Only a year later, after protests that many believed to be the continuation of the 
2011 revolution, a coup d’état ousted President Morsi, putting the military back into 
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power (Kingly & Chulov, 2013). Similar to Brazil, shifting and often unlikely alliances 
between protestors and powerful elites have led to fluid political systems with volatile 
governments. As electorates in the United States and Europe become more polarized, the 
findings from this project can also help in elucidating how the press covers right-wing 
protests with an anti-immigrant agenda, for example.  
The quantitative design of this study comes with some weaknesses. Looking at 
the bigger picture, this study treated media content purely as dependent variables, 
ignoring their role in transforming the social movement in return. This is one of the main 
weaknesses of the quantitatively-driven approach: it requires “freezing” the independent 
variables to assess their importance for content, but it does not take into consideration 
how content in turn influences protestors.  
Regarding the survey, Brazil does not have a comprehensive list of working 
journalists and results from the convenience sample compiled by the Knight Center for 
Journalism in the Americas cannot be generalizable to the whole population. Because the 
sample comes from users who subscribed to the Center’s newsletter, email discussions 
and online courses, it is possible that journalists here are more international, tech savvy 
and with better Internet access than average.   
Another caveat comes from the content analysis only including print media, 
especially because broadcast television remains the dominant source of news in the 
country. Although this study included newspaper O Globo, from the same conglomerate 
as TV-leader Globo, it is likely that coverage patterns had variations across platforms. 
Furthermore, refinements on the content analysis could include coding visual elements, 
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such as pictures and infographics, and front page placement.  
For the matched analysis, three main methodological limitations must be 
addressed. First, stories were selected for analysis based on availability and, therefore, 
privileging journalists working for larger organizations that have online archives. Second, 
because this study focused on the mainstream press, the work of journalists from 
alternative outlets was generally ignored. Third, newspaper stories do not always have 
bylines, and it is possible that the sample selected does not include all the stories 
produced by that journalist during that time period.  
Finally, this case study is about journalists embedded in a particular context: a 
developing country governed by a center-leftist Party on the verge of political crisis. The 
unique combination of U.S. journalistic norms and battling elites yielded theoretical 
insights suggesting that protest coverage can vary under different conditions. However, 
this was just a first step towards a typology of the relationship between press coverage 
and protests, and results cannot be generalized beyond the two waves of protests studied. 
I strongly urge scholars interested in the protest paradigm to replicate this design in other 
countries experiencing an upsurge of right-leaning protests, including those that do not so 
closely share U.S. norms of professional journalism. For Brazilianists, protests following 
President Rousseff’s removal provide an optimal scenario to assess if the power of elite 
voices remain even when protest allies are from the left. Will demonstrations be 
legitimized through quotes from Workers’ Party officials? How will the press respond to 
the “new” anti-government narrative during the vice-president’s term, especially 
considering that he is from a center-right party? Will emphasis on violence make it back 
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to coverage as the police responds to protests?  
Because this study is deductive and quantitatively-driven, in-depth interviews 
were only used to supplement numeric findings. Future studies should also address the 
process of news making during protests following an inductive approach. A qualitatively-
driven mixed design could start from in-depth interviews or ethnography, and then 
develop quantitative instruments to address the phenomena emerging from the data. For 
example, during in-depth interviews, journalists expressed concerns about their role in 
inflating the importance of protests in 2015. A qualitatively-driven design would allow 
for tailoring survey questions to address that attitude. Similarly, questions directly 
assessing journalists’ attitudes towards specific political parties could provide a more 
nuanced view of the relationship between their alignments, those of their outlets, and 
their coverage. 
Another opportunity for future research comes from the possibility of adding 
content from journalists’ social media accounts into the matched data analysis. With the 
help of data-scrapping tools, content produced by journalists on their personal social 
media accounts could be compared to content produced as a news product for their 
outlets. This provides a unique opportunity to further isolate influences that come from 
editorial policies and influences that come from individual characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
Mainstream media journalists in Brazil are constantly under attack for being 
“golpista” (pro-coup), anti-democratic and always supportive of conservative sectors. 
Coined by journalist Paulo Henrique Amorim, the term “Pro-Coup Press Party” is widely 
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adopted by the left to describe a press that “historically defends coup d'états whenever the 
Brazilian President is not elected from among members of the ruling elites.” In 2013 and 
2015, it was not different: numerous opinion leaders and members of the alternative press 
accused mainstream journalists of fomenting social unrest against Dilma Rousseff.  
Conversely, the literature on protest coverage produced in the United States and 
Europe predicts that news gathering routines combined with journalists’ skepticism 
towards social movements lead to coverage that is detrimental to protestors. Because 
Brazilian journalists are guided by U.S. norms of professionalism, this body of research 
foresees that news would closely follow the paradigm, especially as protests gained 
traction (Entman & Rojecki, 1994). 
In this dissertation, I argue that Brazilian media was not inherently pro-protest nor 
pro-government. This is because norms and routines worked in favor of protestors and 
journalists’ personal support for a movement was not associated with positive coverage. 
As such, guided by indexing theory and media sociology, this project moved away from a 
linear view of the relationship between protestors and the press, and towards a typology 
that can help predict when favorable media coverage happens and which processes are 
behind it. In this typology, ranging from completely favorable to completely unfavorable 
coverage, the case of Brazil would be an example of news stories that portray movements 
positively despite reliance on official sources and emphasis on violence traits.  
In Brazil, as protests evolved into a more coherent anti-government narrative, 
coverage became legitimizing. But the evidence presented here reveals that legitimacy 
did not come from closed-door agreements between politicians and news outlets that then 
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censor their journalists. In other words, negative portrayals of protestors had less to do 
with active manipulation of information, and more to do with how protestors fit within 
disputes between elites.  
As a result of constant scrutiny, Brazilian journalists’ work became a delicate 
balancing act involving correcting personal biases, learning from past mistakes, critically 
assessing their role as media professionals, bringing editors around to their point of view, 
and responding to criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. Because the 
majority of journalists in the country are left-leaning, this process of self-calibration 
worked in favor of right-leaning protests that had elite support. This was not self-
censorship in the sense that reporters were attempting to manipulate information to toe 
the editorial line of their bosses. Rather, it arose from notions of professionalism that 
privilege official sources and led to a deep preoccupation over being labeled an “activist” 
rather than a “professional journalist.”  
From a theoretical perspective, this project found that the process behind indexing 
– reliance on official sources – can challenge the negative patterns of coverage of the 
protest paradigm. When disaggregated, the components of the paradigm pulled coverage 
in different directions, but the narrative pushed by official sources prevailed over other 
marginalization devices. As a result, news was sympathetic to the demonstrations. The 
protest paradigm was, thus, contingent upon elite disagreement.  
At the core of this project was the opportunity to assess how the protest coverage 
responded when a small leftist demonstration morphed into a widespread anti-
government movement. The narrative presented here showed how the very same norms 
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and routines that sustain the protest paradigm can serve to validate demonstrations under 
one condition: that they are part of narrative put forward by elite groups contesting 
power.  
In a broader sense, protest coverage matters because it can foment radicalization 
of demonstrators as they struggle to get media attention. Traditionally, when movements 
get covered, news stories condemn them to marginality, leading to state escalating 
repression or protestors violently attempting to overthrow governments. The story 
presented here suggests that press coverage can also operate in a different way. News can 
help institutionalize protestors’ demands into more moderate forms of action aligned with 
interests of sectors of the political elite.  
The impact of those findings for democratic processes is not linear. On the one 
hand, when the press legitimizes movements and gives less emphasis to violent traits, it 
helps prevent social chaos by channeling grievances into moderate means of collective 
action. For democratic stability, even a controversial impeachment process is preferable 
to a military coup d’état or a violent revolution. On the other hand, this process only 
favors a certain type of protest: the one that overlaps with interests from opposition elite 
groups. For protestors outside of the range of elite disagreement, such as movements 
associated with minority groups in Brazil, police repression continues to escalate, 
coverage remains focused on violence and it is much harder for protestors to escape the 
protest paradigm. 
When social movements attempt to get news attention, resorting to violence and 
sensationalism is a risky strategy that can easily backfire. The lesson from Brazil is that 
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strengthening alliances with established sources and investing in social media content can 
be an effective way to use journalistic codes in protestors’ favor. While this tactic may be 
too much of a compromise for some groups, it does offer an institutional alternative to 




















































































































































APPENDIX B – SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Welcome to the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas’ survey 
 
Conducted by: Rachel R Mourao, School of Journalism, University of Texas - Austin, 
300 W Dean Keeton St. Austin, TX 78712. 512-471-1845, rachelmourao@gmail.com 
 
This is an online survey for journalists, journalism professors and journalism 
students who live and work in Brazil. You are invited to participate in a survey 
examining the influences on your work covering protests in 2013 and 2015. Participants 
will be contributing to critical knowledge of the way journalists in the country report on 
political events. Those who express an interest will be sent a copy of the final study and 
you are free to contact the investigator at the above address and phone number to discuss 
the study. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
This form provides you with information about the study. Participation in this study is 
voluntary and refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled. Also, you may discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. There are no anticipated 
risks to participants and your answers will be kept confidential. The principal 
investigator of the study will keep the data on her password-protected computer on the 
campus of the University of Texas at Austin. Participation is free.  
We estimate that it will take about 15 minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire.  
If you have any questions or would like us to further inform you about the results of this 
research, do not hesitate to contact Rachel R. Mourao at rachelmourao@gmail.com, or 
(+1) 512-471-1845. You may also request a hard copy of the survey via the contact 
information above.  To complete the survey, click CONTINUE (below) and follow the 
instructions.  This study has been processed by the Office of Research Support. If you 
have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or 
questions about the research please contact the Office of Research Support at (512) 471-
8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
  
Statement of Consent: 
  
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision 
about participating in this study.  By clicking YES below, I affirm that I am at least 18 
years old, and I consent to participate in this study.  
 
1. You are: 
___ Journalist        
___ Journalism educator 
___ Journalism student     
___ None of the above (leave the survey) 
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2. How many years have you been working in the news industry? 
(Pull down) 
 
3. Which of the following statements best describe your current work situation as it 
relates to the news business?  
___ I work as a journalist in a news organization 
___ I work as a trainee/intern 
___ I work as an independent journalist (I have my own news outlet) (skip next 6 
questions) 
___ I work as a freelancer (for news organizations) (skip next 6 questions) 
___ I am actually unemployed (skip next 6 questions) 
___ Other (Please specify)________ (skip next 6 questions) 
 
4. What type of news organization do you work for?  
___ Television Station 
___ Cable News Network 
___ Newspaper 
___ Radio Station  
___ Community Radio 
___ Magazine 
___ Newswire 
___ Online news media 
___ Other (Please specify) ________________________ 
 
5. In what state is your news organization located? 
(Pull down) 
 
6. What is the name of the organization you work for? _______________________ 
 
7. How many years have you been working in your current news organization?  
(Pull down) 
 
8. What is the geographic scope of the media organization you work for? 
___ Local                       ___ Regional                   ___ National                 
___ International 
 
9. What is your title? (editor, producer, reporter, etc.) 
______________________________________ 
 
10. How many people are employed in your newsroom? 
___ 1-5 people 
___ 6-10 people 
___ 11-20 people 
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___ 21-50 people 
___ 51-100 people 
___ More than 100 people 
Regarding your social media use 

















___ I don’t use social platforms (skip 4 next questions)
____ Other (Please list _______)
12. What do you use social platforms for? Rank the following from 1 to 6 according
to your main use:
___ To keep in touch with family/friends
___ To write/discuss about daily life events
___ To keep up with the news
___ To publicize your own work
___ To find ideas or sources for news stories
___ To find entertainment/distraction
12. On a scale where 1 is “Not reliable at all”,
and 10 is “Very reliable”, how reliable is the
information posted on social platforms by the
follow sources?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
12a. Information posted by journalists 
12b. Information posted by news organizations 
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12c. Information posted by politicians           
12d. Information posted by opinion leaders (other 
than journalists or politicians). For example, 
community leaders, personalities, intellectuals, 
writers, etc. 
          
12e. Information posted by users you know 
(family, friends) 
          
12f. Information posted by users you don’t know           
 
 
13. How often do you use social/digital 
platforms for: 







5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
13a. Finding ideas for news stories           
13b. Finding sources for news stories           
13c. Receiving people’s feedback on the stories 
you write 
          
13d. Finding out what people are talking about           
13e. Download databases           
13f. Interview sources via email or direct 
messages 
          
13g. Get background information for stories from 
online sources 
          
13h. Fact-check using the web or databases           
13i. Keep up with the news by reading other news 
organizations’ websites or social media pages 
          
13j. Search or receive press releases           
13k. Publicize your own work           
 
14. What do you do when you find story ideas on social platforms  
___ You ask your boss if you should investigate it further 
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___ You ask your boss if you can publish the information as soon as possible 
___ You don’t need to ask anyone and make your own decision to investigate or publish 
the information 
___ You never find information or story ideas on social platforms 
 
15. Does your news organization have policies regarding the use of social platforms 
such as Facebook or Twitter? 
____ Yes    ____ No (skip to 17) 
 
16. If yes, what are the main points of the policy?  
_______________________________________________ 
 
Now thinking about the 2013 June protests  
17. In general, do you think social platforms were a useful tool for covering the protests?  
(1= not at all, 10= a lot) 
 
18. Why? ___________________________________________________ 
 
19. On a scale where 1 is “Never” and 10 is “All 
the time”, how often did you use social platforms 
when covering the protests: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19a. Finding out the details of the protest 
organization (date, place of demonstrations) 
          
19b. Contact the protest organizers           
19c. Finding sources for news stories about the 
protests 
          
19d. Receiving people’s feedback on the stories you 
wrote about the protests 
          
19e. Finding out what people are talking about 
regarding the protests 
          
 
20. How often did you post material related to the 2013 protests on your personal social 
media account? 
1= never to 10= all the time 
 
21. In general, you think the mainstream media coverage of the protests was: 
 (1= unfavorable toward the protest, 10= favorable toward the protest) 
 
22. In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for was: 
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(1= unfavorable toward the 2013 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protest) 
 
23. In general, are you…  
(1= unfavorable toward the 2013 protests, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protests)? 
 
24. When thinking about the protests in June of 2013, can you rank the main grievances 
that led to the demonstrations? 
_____Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities) 
_____Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy) 
_____Infrastructure (public transportation, roads) 
_____Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, 
corruption) 
_____Security problems (crime, gangs) 
_____Human rights 
_____Environmental themes 
______Lack of public services 
______Other _______________________ 
 
25. Did you participate in the 2013 mobilization as a protestor? 
1 – yes 
2 – no 
 
26. In general, what do you think the 2013 protests were about? 
 
The next questions will refer to the way you covered the 2015 March protests  
 
27. In general, do you think social platforms were a useful tool for covering the 2015 
protests?  
(1= not at all, 10= a lot) 
 
28. Why? ___________________________________________________ 
 
29. On a scale where 1 is “Never” and 10 is 
“All the time”, how often did you use social 
platforms when covering the 2015 protests: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
29a. Finding out the details of the protest 
organization (date, place of demonstrations) 














29b. Contact the protest organizers           
29c. Finding sources for news stories about the 
protests 















29d. Receiving people’s feedback on the 



















29e. Finding out what people are talking about 
regarding the protests 















30. How often did you post material related to the 2015 protests on your personal social 
media account? 
1= never to 10= all the time 
 
31. In general, you think the mainstream media coverage of the 2015 protests was: 
 (1= unfavorable toward the protest, 10= favorable toward the protest) 
 
32. In general, you think the editorial line of the media outlet you work for was: 
(1= unfavorable toward the 2015 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2013 protest) 
 
33. In general, are you…  
(1= unfavorable toward the 2015 protest, 10= favorable toward the 2015 protest)? 
 
34. When thinking about the protests in June of 2015, can you rank the main grievances 
that led to the demonstrations?  
_____Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities) 
_____Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy) 
_____Infrastructure (public transportation, roads) 
_____Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, 
corruption) 
_____Security problems (crime, gangs) 
_____Human rights 
_____Environmental themes 
______Lack of public services 
______Other _______________________ 
 
35. Did you participate in the 2015 mobilization as a protestor? 
1 – yes 
2 – no 
 
36. In general, what do you think the 2015 protests were about? 
 





38. Now speaking about your own political engagement, listed below are some more 
activities that you may or may not have engaged in. Please tell us how often you have 
been involved in the past 12 months in the following activities. 
 



























a. Attended a political rally !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
b.  Donated money to a campaign or 
political cause 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
c. Been involved in public interest 
groups, political action groups, 
political clubs, political campaigns, or 
political party committees  
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
d. Changed your social media profile 
picture in support of a cause 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
e. Participated in an online question 
and answer session with a politician or 
public official  
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
38g. Created an online petition !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
f.. Tried to persuade your friends and 
acquaintances about political causes or 
a candidate 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
 !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  
 
 
40. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself politically more aligned to the 
left or right? Please rate yourself on a scale where 1 = Strong Left and 10 = Strong Right. 
 
41. How interested are you in politics? 
(1= not at all, 10= a lot) 
 
42. How much do you approve or disapprove? 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly 
approve) 
a. Of people participating in legal street demonstrations.  
b. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community 
problems. 
c. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest.  
d. Of people seizing private property or land to protest 
e. Of people boycotting a product as a form of protest 
f. Of people participating in sit-ins as a form of protest 
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g. Of people participating in a protest to impeach an elected government 
h. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected 
government. 
i. Of people signing online petitions as a form of protest 
 
43. In the last 12 months, how many times did you… 
a. Attend public demonstrations________ 
b. Block the roads to protest________ 
c. Seize private property to protest________ 
d. Attend political forums and debates ________ 
e. Sign a petition to authorities online________ 
f. Sign a petition to authorities offline________ 
g. Participate in meetings with authorities ________ 
h. Boycott a product________ 
i. Participate in a sit-in________ 
j. Send letters to the media about a grievance________ 
k. Share content online related to a social movement (e.g. Used the hashtag 
#VemPraRua) ________ 
 
44. Thinking about the most recent time you participated in a protest or demonstration, 
what was the main grievance of that demonstration? 
1. Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities) 
2. Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education 
policy) 
3. Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, 
exclusion, corruption) 
4. Security problems (crime, gangs) 
5. Human rights 
6. Environmental themes 
7. Lack of public services 
8. Other 
88. DK 
99. Never participated 
 
Now thinking about journalism and its role in society… 
 
45. Rank your level of agreement with the following statements, 1=  strongly disagree to 
10= strongly agree: 
 
a. My role as a journalist is to be a watchdog for society. 
b. My role as a journalist is to be objective. 
c. My role as a journalist is to give a voice to the voiceless. 
d. My role as a journalist is to advocate for social justice. 
e. Journalists should never make their standpoint transparent in a news article. 
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f. Journalists should never participate in political protests. 
 
46. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all and 10= is a lot, how much do you agree 
with the following statements? 
 
a. It is ethical for a journalist to take a stance against injustices, corruption, or other 
wrong-doings 
b. Journalists should always remain objective, or neutral 
c. Balance matters more than objectivity 
d. Transparency matters more than objectivity 
e. I consider myself to work for mainstream media. 
f. I consider myself to work for alternative media. 
g. Mainstream media do better journalism than alternative media. 
h. Alternative media are valuable in society. 
i. Alternative media are merely a supplement for mainstream media. 
j. Alternative media play an important role in furthering democracy. 
k. Mainstream media play an important role in furthering democracy. 
l. Alternative media journalists are more ethical than mainstream media journalists. 
m. Alternative media are more financially independent than mainstream media. 
n. Alternative media journalists are activists. 
o. Journalists should refrain from activism. 
p. Some observers believe the truest form of journalism is to advocate and be an 
activist for society. Rate your level of agreement with this idea. 
q. Alternative media use new technologies in more innovative ways than mainstream 
media. 
r. Alternative media lack the funding that mainstream media have to adopt new 
technologies. 
 
47. Now thinking about Midia Ninja, how much do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements… 
 
Ninja Media is practicing real journalism (1= strongly disagree, 10= strongly agree) 
Midia Ninja are activists, not journalists. (1= strongly disagree, 10= strongly agree) 
 
Finally, we have questions regarding your demographic characteristics: 
 
45. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
1. High school graduate 
2. Technical school degree 
3. Some college  
4. College graduate 
5. Some graduate or professional school 
6. Graduate professional degree 




46. Age: ____ years old 
 
47. Gender: ____ Female    ____ Male 
 
48.  Do you consider yourself as part of which social class? 
1. Lower 
2. Lower middle 
3. Middle 





APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Interviewee (Title and Name): ______________________________________ 
Sections Used: 
_____ A: Reporting protocol 
_____ B: Social media 
_____ C: Attitudes regarding the protests 
_____ D: Attitudes regarding media coverage of protests 




Good morning!  
Thank you for your interest in participating in the follow-up interviews for our study on 
how journalists covered the 2013-15 protests in Brazil.  
To help with our note-taking, we’d like to audio-tape our conversations today. For your 
information, I will be the only to have access to the tapes, which will be eventually 
destroyed after they are transcribed. You can withdraw from the study, without 
repercussions, before, during or after this interview is completed.  
Anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising your identity. Disguised extracts 
from your interview may be quoted in any subsequent publications, but neither your name 
or the name of your news organization will be used in the final study.  
Data collected during this study will be retained for about two years and I will be the 
only person to have access to this data. 
My guess is that this interview will take around twenty minutes. During this time, we have 
several questions we’d like to cover. Do you agree to continue participating in the 
interview? 
We will start with a series of questions about your experience covering the protests: 
Interview schedule 
A. REPORTING PROTOCOL:
1. Did you cover the 2013 protests in Brasil? (If no, skip to section C)
2. Walk me through your reporting of the 2013 protests…
a) How did you start covering them?
b) When did you realize it was a big story?
c) Which sources did you actively seek for when covering the protests?
d) What types of activities did you prioritize in the coverage?
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2. How about the 2015 protests? 
a) How did you start covering them? 
b) When did you realize it was a big story? 
c) Which sources did you actively seek for when covering the protests? 
d) What types of activities did you prioritize in the coverage? 
3. Tell me about some of the differences between the coverage of the 2013 and 2015 
protests 
 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA:  
1. How do you think social media has impacted your daily reporting routine? 
2. In a regular day in the newsroom, what do you use social platforms for? 
Probing: 
a. To find sources? 
b. Find additional information? 
c. To monitor what is going on? 
d. To get feedback? 
3. How did you use social media to cover the protests? 
4. How do you think covering protests was different before and after social media 
 
 C. ATTITUDES REGARDING THE PROTESTS:  
1. About the 2013 protests…. 
a) In general, what do you think the 2013 protests were about? 
b) What do you think about the protestors’ demands in 2013? 
c) What do you think about the protestors’ tactics in 2013? 
 
2. Now about 2015… 
a) What do you think the 2015 protests were about? 
b) What do you think about the protestors’ demands in 2015? 
c) What do you think about the protestors’ tactics in 2015? 
d) What were, in your opinion, the main differences between the 2013 and 2015 
protests? 
 
D. ATTITUDES REGARDING MEDIA COVERAGE OF PROTESTS 
1. About 2013 protests: 
a) How do you view the media coverage of the protests? 
b) How do you view your outlets’ editorial policies when covering the protests? 
c) How do you view your coverage of the protests? 
d) What would you say were some of the main constraints when covering the 
protests? 
 
2. About 2015 protests: 
e) How do you view the media coverage of the protests? 
f) How do you view your outlets’ editorial policies when covering the protests? 
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g) How do you view your coverage of the protests?
h) What would you say were some of the main constraints when covering the
protests?
E. CONCLUSION
1. Is there anything else you’d like to say about your experiences?
2. Is there anyone else you suggest I contact for this research
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APPENDIX D – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF MAIN VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Table D.1 – Descriptive statistics of variables from content analysis  
2013 2015 
Variable Definition Range M SD M SD 




1.69 0.8 1.16 0.4 
Protestor 
evaluation 





2.01 0.72 2.1 0.58 
Cause 
evaluation 





2.19 0.49 2.14 0.59 
Administration 
evaluation 
Overall, how does the story portray the 




1.77 0.57 1.59 0.6 
Percentage of 
official sources 
Number of official sources quoted in the 
story divided by total sources quotes. 




Number of protestor sources quoted in the 
story divided by total sources quotes. 




Number of other sources quoted in the story 
divided by total sources quotes. 
0-100% 35 44.83 25 18.9 
189 
Table D.2 –  Descriptive statistics of outcome variables from survey 
2013 2015 
Variable Definition Range M SD M SD 
Individual support 
for protests 
In general, you think the 
mainstream media coverage of 
the protests was: 
1= ‘totally unfavorable’ 
to 10= ‘totally 
favorable’  
7.72 2.35 4.67 3.11 
Outlet's support for 
protests 
In general, you think the editorial 
line of the media outlet you work 
for is: 
1= ‘totally unfavorable’ 
to 10= ‘totally 
favorable’ 
5.82 2.29 5.89 2.45 
Mainstream media 
support for protests 
In general, you are: 1= ‘totally unfavorable’ 
to 10= ‘totally 
favorable’ 
4.98 2.46 7.21 2.58 
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Table D.3 – Descriptive statistics of independent variables from survey 
Variable Definition Range M SD 
Age Age in years 18 to 73 33.08 11.89 
Social Class Measured as “would you say that your household growing up 
was…1=lower class, 2= lower middle class, 3= middle class, 4= 
upper middle class, 5= upper class” 
1 to 5 3.02 .83 
Political leaning Political leaning was measured in a 10-point scale item where 
1= strong left and 10= strong right 
1 to 10 3.89 2.07 
Political participation Index: 
a. Attended a political protest
b.Donated money to a campaign or political cause
c. Been involved in public interest groups, political action
groups, political clubs, political campaigns, or political party
committees
d.Created an online petition
e. Changed your social media profile picture in support of a
cause
f. Joined a political or cause-related group on a social media
site
g.Tried to persuade your friends and acquaintances about a
social cause, political cause or to support a candidate
1 to 10 3.34 2.07 
Size of the newsroom What is the size of the newsroom the journalist work for from
1=very small (1 to 5 people) to 6=very large (more than 100 
people). 
1 to 6 3.20 1.83 
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Variable Definition Range M SD 
Social media for daily 
reporting - 
Gatekeeping  
Index of social media use for finding sources, story ideas, 
receiving feedback and publicizing own work on social media 
(1= never, 10= all the time) 
1 to 10 6.80 2.04 
Social media for daily 
reporting - Awareness 
Index of social media use for finding out what people are 
talking about, following news from other organizations, and 
getting background information (1= never, 10= all the time) 
1 to 10 7.73 1.82 
Social media for 
protest reporting - 
Gatekeeping  
Index of social media use for finding sources for news stories
and receiving people’s feedback on the stories you wrote about 
the protests (1= never, 10= all the time). 
1 to 10 6.27 3.06 
Social media for 
protest reporting - 
Awareness 
Index of social media use for finding out what people are 
talking about regarding the protests, finding out the details of 
the protest organization (date, location, etc.) and contacting 
protest organizers (1= never, 10= all the time). 
1 to 10 9.19 1.09 
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